

The background of the slide features a close-up, 3D-rendered view of the American and European Union flags. The American flag, with its characteristic red and white stripes and blue field with white stars, is positioned in the upper left and center. The European Union flag, with its blue field and twelve yellow stars, is visible in the lower right and center. The flags appear to be draped and flowing, creating a sense of movement and depth. The overall color palette is dominated by the red, white, and blue of the American flag, and the blue and yellow of the EU flag.

Morgan Lewis

RUSSIA SANCTIONS UPDATE – US / EU (& UK) OVERVIEW & RUSSIAN COUNTERSANCTIONS

as of 9 September 2021

CONTENTS

- What's Newest (*including Belarus sanctions*)..... 5
- Basic Framework – US/EU/UK..... 16
- US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC 19
- US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS 27
- US Direct Sanctions – SDNs 35
- US Crimea Sanctions 48
- CAATSA / Guidances / Lists 49
- Export Pipeline Sanctions..... 63
- CBW Act Sanctions 64
- Proposed Further US Laws..... 69
- EU Sectoral Sanctions 71
- EU Crimea Sanctions 82
- EU Direct Sanctions (SDN-like, etc.) 83
- UK Sanctions (post-Brexit)..... 84
- Russia's Countersanctions..... 86

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The Russia sanctions regime is quite complex. Many of its provisions overlap with one another, and are otherwise subject to varying interpretations and application. Thus, legal advice should be sought for each specific situation. (Even official FAQs or other “guidelines” published by the relevant government agencies are subject to change or withdrawal – and are, in any event, alone neither dispositive or sufficient for pursuing a particular course of action.)

We have made reasonable efforts to assure that this presentation is current up to the day before the date appearing on the cover page. Also, the links provided from outside sources are subject to expiration or change.

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What's Newest

United States

- On the whole, the Biden Administration actions so far are lighter than could have been (re Nord Stream, CBW Act, no new oligarchs or major companies SDN'd, etc.)
- 15 April sanctions package: potential wide scope, but so far only limited targeting of meaningful int'l business – and no new oligarch designations)
 - [Executive Order 14024](#) (and see the accompanying new FAQs [886](#) and [887](#))
 - provided new framework basis / strengthened authorities for the simultaneously announced and possible further sanctions, in response to Russia's alleged interference in elections, SolarWinds and other malicious cyber activities, transnational corruption, targeting of dissidents and journalists, etc.
 - authorizing sanctions targeted mainly at the Russian tech and defense / related materiel sectors, but also "any other sector of the [Russian] economy..." – e.g., mining? (and see related new [FAQ 887](#))
 - related [White House Fact Sheet](#) – summarized the range of these new sanctions and certain other findings / announcements of measures
 - Administration officials emphasized the measured / "proportionate" nature of the new actions taken (but could be ratcheted up further depending on Ukraine-related and other Russia-US developments)
 - OFAC Directive 1: slightly expanding restrictions on US financial institutions (see slide [9](#))
 - State Dep't 15 April [release](#) re Navalny poisoning (see slide [9](#))

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- OFAC new SDN [designations](#) of 15 April, flowing from EO 14024
 - and following US intelligence community [assessment](#) findings released in March re election interference
 - 6 Russian tech companies, for support to Russia intelligence services' cyber program (this may have some real business effect, particularly if/when there are more such designations – time will tell)
 - 32 entities and individuals for carrying out Russian gov't directed attempts to influence the 2020 US presidential election etc.
 - 8 individuals and entities for Crimea-related activities (coordinated with UK, Canada and Australia)
 - *and possible further sanctions (or other [response](#)) re fresh July ransomware attacks? not yet ...*
- BIS 19 July [designation](#) to Entity List of the same 6 Russian tech companies that were SDN-designated by OFAC on 15 April (see above)
 - imposes licensing requirement on them for exports, reexports, or transfers in-country of all items subject to the EAR (see slide [30](#)) – regardless if any US person or the US financial system is involved
 - see slides [27-34](#) for BIS / Entity List regime details
- See also BIS 12 July Entity List [designation](#) of 6 Russian entities and individuals for involvement in procurement of US-origin electronic components, likely in furtherance of Russian military programs (and addition of JSC Kazan Helicopter Plant Repair Service to the Military End-Users List)
- No Nord Stream 2 sanctions included in the April EO packet *per se*
 - but the EO did include a provision authorizing sanctions against any Russian person/entity involved in “cutting or disrupting gas or energy supplies to Europe, the Caucasus, or Asia” (which perhaps was meant as fresh warning to Gazprom, and attempt to mollify congressional anti-NS2 hawks)
 - and see the more recent May and August actions (next slide)

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- Most recent Nord Stream 2 ("NS2") gas export pipeline actions – May and August 2021 mixed bag
 - Overarching newest developments
 - US-Germany accord of July 2021 that, as [reported](#), *de facto* recognizes NS2 will be completed, in return for various German undertakings in support of Ukraine
 - The NS2 pipelaying proceeds apace, close to [finish](#) – the participating now-sanctioned Russian vessels and entities (see below) evidently being "sanctions-proof" – in the sense of no discernable US / other foreign ties, likely ruble payments for their services, etc.
 - See Moscow Carnegie Center [article](#) "Why Everyone's a Winner in the Nord Stream 2 Deal"; and see also [this](#) view from Germany
 - New [EO 14039](#) of 20 August (specifically targeting "certain Russian energy export pipelines", based on PEESA/PEESCA) and related new OFAC [actions](#) of 20 August:
 - SDN designations of several Russian entities and vessels involved in NS2 pipelaying – essentially overlaps with previous Trump and Biden Admins. designations – and new [FAQ 921](#)
 - [General License \(GL\) 1A](#) issued (updating prior [GL 1](#) – next slide): re the sanctioned Marine Rescue Service (MRS)
 - authorizing dealings with this entity (or any of its 50%-or-more subs) / its vessels not related to NS2 (or Turkstream) construction or other specifically prohibited activities (e.g., Crimea-related)
 - this GL is in recognition of MRS's unique RF Gov't-assigned search and rescue, environmental missions (i.e., similar to the existing GLs re GGE and FSB – see slides [46-47](#))
 - and see related revised OFAC [FAQ 894](#)

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- State Dep't [announcement](#) of 19 May
 - Report issued to Congress under PEESA (Protecting Europe's Energy Security Act) as amended
 - listing various vessels, entities involved in NS2 pipelaying – and the project company itself, Nord Stream 2 AG, and its CEO
 - subjecting to sanctions most of these vessels and entities (including the RF gov't state-controlled MRS enterprise and several more vessels owned/controlled by it – but see previous slide re the related General License), and the project co. and CEO
 - *but simultaneously waiving the sanctions on the project company and CEO: gesture to US-Germany relations – welcomed there and in Moscow, and criticized in US Congress (and in Kiev)*
- OFAC actions of 21 May
 - corresponding non-SDN menu-based sanctions (“NS-MBS”) [designations](#) of the various vessels (including the Akademik Cherskiy – long known to be involved but not sanctioned earlier) and entities participating in the NS2 pipelaying (NS-MBS is essentially same as SDN status: blocked property, except for importation of goods – see slide [62](#))
 - GL 1 re MRS (see above)
- This triggered 20 May reactive [draft](#) legislation (POWERS Act – Protecting Our Well-being by Expanding Russian Sanctions) to reinstate the above noted sanctions waived by the Biden Admin. (and to bar any future PEESA-based sanctions waivers except by Act of Congress)
- And related 3 July [action](#) by a House of Representatives panel that would (if ever enacted) even repeal the above-noted NS2 company and CEO waivers granted in May
- There is a considerable and quite complex 2017-21 pre-history of US legislated sanctions aimed at NS2 (and Turkstream) – see slides [55](#) and [63](#); we can elaborate more on this PEESA, PEESCA and CAATSA based history as needed

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- March, April, August 2021 multi-faceted sanctions packets re the Navalny poisoning / imprisonment etc. (under CBW Act and others): still quite limited effect on business
 - State Dep't overarching 2 March Fact Sheet [announcement](#)
 - first round of Chemical and Biological Weapons Act (CBW Act) sanctions:
 - somewhat broadens the coverage scope and tightens exemptions (re exports of national security-sensitive items, etc.) from what was already in place re the earlier Skripal poisoning – see slides [64-68](#)
 - including new amendment of Int'l Traffic in Arms Regs. (ITAR) section 126.1 to include Russia in list of countries subject to policy of denial for exports of defense articles / services (except support of gov't, and limited-duration exception for commercial space cooperation)
 - CAATSA section 231(e) List of Specified Persons – six more Russian entities (all scientific / research institutes – presumed to be connected with Russia's chemical weapons program) placed on it, such that any person knowingly engaging in a significant transaction with any of them would be subject to sanctions – see slides [54](#) and [57](#)
 - E.O. 13382 sanctions (SDN designations) re weapons of mass destruction (WMD): against the FSB and its head Alexander Bortnikov (re the Navalny poisoning), the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) and the two GRU officers (re the 2018 Skripal poisoning – though they had already been designated under other authorities), and three of the same institutes that were just targeted also for the section 231 List – see immediately above
 - E.O. 13661 sanctions (SDN designations): against seven senior Russian gov't officials (at Defense Ministry, Presidential Executive Office, FSB (Bortnikov), Prosecutor General, and the Penitentiary Service) – all for actual/presumed oversight involvement in the Navalny poisoning and imprisonment
 - some of the 7 persons having been sanctioned by the EU and UK in Oct. 2020 and some more by the EU in March 2021 (see slides [83](#), [85](#))
 - and, like EU, no designation of more oligarchs (as Navalny had proposed be done)
 - Related/follow-on State Dep't 15 April [designations](#) release
 - [OFAC Directive 1](#) under the EO 14024 of 15 April (not under the CBW Act itself)
 - expanded the existing 2019 CBW Act-based ban (see slides [64-65](#)) on US financial institutions' participating in the primary market of Russian sovereign bonds – by extending this (as of 14 June) from non-ruble to ruble denominated as well, and also bans non-ruble or ruble lending to the same three sovereign instrumentalities (see also FAQs [888](#) and [890](#), and updated FAQ [675](#))
 - applies only to RF Central Bank, National Wealth Fund, and Ministry of Finance (and not to any other state-owned entities – see new FAQ [891](#) and updated FAQ [676](#))
 - still no ban on participation in *secondary* market for Russian sovereign bonds (see new FAQ [889](#)) – which would have more serious commercial/financial effects (see [April](#) and [March](#) reports on this)

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- State Dep't overarching 20 August Fact Sheet [announcement](#)
 - Second round of CBW Act sanctions (mandated by that Act, given Russia's failure to satisfy the Act's conditions following imposition of the March first-round – see slide [64](#))
 - denial of new or pending permit applications to ATF for permanent importation of firearms and ammunition, as defined in the Munitions Import List (categories I and III), into the US that are manufactured or located in Russia (see item 4 of the BIS [notice](#) of 7 Sept.)
 - additional BIS restrictions on nuclear and missile-related goods and technology exports to Russia (see item 3 of the above-linked BIS notice of 7 Sept.)
 - and continuation of the prior Navalny first-round and Skripal first- and second-round measures and related waivers
 - ✓ those prior measures, still in effect, include the ban on US financial institutions' participation in ruble and non-ruble primary market of Russian sovereign bonds and lending to three key Russian sovereign entities (see previous slide)
 - ✓ see new OFAC [FAQ 919](#)
 - State/Treasury Dep'ts SDN [designations](#) of several individuals and entities, including operatives involved in the Navalny poisoning and institutes that have developed Russia's chemical weapons capabilities, under Non-Proliferation Sanctions Program (31 CFR, Part 544)
 - State Dep't redesignation of two other Russian chemical weapons-related institutes, under EO 14024
 - Treasury Dep't SDN [designations](#) of several FSB and other Russian gov't officials and operatives for direct involvement in the Navalny poisoning
 - US/UK 20 August [Joint Statement](#) on coordinated measures taken
- See slides [64-68](#) below for some further context/detail (and here again, as re NS2, there is much more detail if/as needed)

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- OFAC related 2 March SDN designations [announcement](#) (and FSB GL amendment)
 - reflects SDN designations against the three institutes (per E.O. 13382) and seven gov't officials (per E.O. 13661) as stated in the above State Dep't announcement
 - issuance of cyber-related GL 1B, replacing former 1A, re permissible interactions with FSB (which was already SDN designated); seems just some tightening of technical wording – see further slides [46-47](#)
- BIS actions
 - March amendment of the Export Administration Rules (EAR), to add 14 Russian, German and Swiss entities (scientific/pharma-related) – including one above-designated RF Defense Ministry institute – to the Entity List ([announcement](#), and [rule](#) effective 18 March)
 - imposing strict new license requirements on and limits availability of most license exceptions for exports, reexports and in-country transfers involving such entities (see slides [31-32](#))
- Pending/possible further US sanctions laws (and see slides [69-70](#))
 - Senate bipartisan updated “Holding Russia Accountable for Malign Activities Act of 2021” [bill](#) introduced in February 2021: focuses on imposition of array of Navalny-related sanctions, so may now be moot (though also would require report on Nemtsov killing, and President Putin's/family's wealth)
 - Others? possible revival / adjustment / passage of DASKA Act (DASKAA – latest draft from Dec. 2019), and/or others on hold from 2020? (see slide [70](#))
 - Perhaps less likely now (given new EO 14024), except for Nord Stream 2 (see slides [7-8](#)): Congress focused on domestic higher priorities – at least for now?

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

- Recent OFAC enforcement actions (and reactions) of note
 - [29 April](#) Settlement Agreements
 - OFAC with a Texas-based global payment company, for violation of multiple sanctions programs
 - OFAC/BIS/DOJ with a leading multinational software company, for export, reexport, sale, supply of technology/services (including cloud-based software subscription services) to companies in third countries, with knowledge or reason to know that same were intended specifically for Iran
 - neither involved Russia-related violations, but are fresh instructive reminders
 - [23 July](#) Settlement Agreement with a NY-based online money transmitter and provider of pre-paid access – for violation of Crimea (and other) sanctions programs
 - US financial services industry groups are [reported](#) to be consulting with Treasury Dep't on easing compliance burden of mushrooming sanctions (including re the 50% rule, desired ability to focus on high-value transactions, special challenges re secondary sanctions) – not just re Russia; and this update [report](#)
 - And see related April 2021 feature [article](#) in *The Economist* re vastly increased use/scope of sanctions (again, not just re Russia ...)
 - US District Court [decision](#) of June 2021 dismissing Oleg Deripaska's delisting-request challenge to his SDN and CAATSA-based "Oligarchs List" designations by Treasury Dep't (see slide [38](#))
- Recent BIS enforcement actions
 - March and May 2021 guilty pleas announcements by DOJ in Russia-related BIS sanctions violation conspiracy to purchase/export US-made turbine for Russian Arctic shelf oil platform (see slide [33](#))
 - And BIS [28 June](#) and DOJ [21 June](#) announcements of actions against a US company and five individuals, respectively, re unlawful export of defense articles to Russia
- And State Dep't [9 August](#) Consent Agreement with a California-based tech company re sales of software having possibly military application without required licensing
- New Belarus sanctions (see slide [15](#))
- And recent measures under other-country sanctions programs (e.g., Venezuela, Iran, China, Syria, North Korea – and now Belarus): possible (and some actual) effects on/for Russian companies – this calls for further caution

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

European Union / UK

- Nothing yet in coordination with the US 15 April actions: some cyber-security blacklist designations will likely come soon – but no sovereign debt bans
- Routine sanctions extensions: Crimea to 23 June 2022, blacklist in process of extension to March 2022, sectoral to 31 January 2022
- And new EU Reg. [2021/821](#) of 20 May 2021 governing export of dual-use goods, software and technology
- EU Council [Decision](#) of 2 March designating four Russian gov't officials (for Navalny detention, and for crushing related protests) under new Global Human Rights Sanctions [Regime](#)
- EU Commission [Opinion](#) of 8 June re transactions with entities not EU-blacklisted that are owned or otherwise controlled by entities/persons designated under Russia blacklisting Reg. 269/2014 – and see slide [83](#)
- UK – post-Brexit (see slides [84-85](#))
 - UK's own Russia sanctions regime replaced the EU regime as of 1 Jan. 2021
 - Here too, nothing much yet in coord. with the US 15 April actions (see 15 April press [release](#) re SolarWinds, etc.)
 - June updated Guidance (with FAQs) on Russian sanctions (linked at slide [85](#))
 - Seven FSB operatives [designated](#) over Navalny poisoning on August 20 (in coordination with US)
 - OFSI 19 April [Guidance](#) re licenses to deal with frozen assets of designated persons
 - And ECJU 22 April [Guidance](#) on issuance of standard individual export licenses (SIELs) for military and dual-use items
 - Recent monetary penalty [upheld](#) against a UK payments co. for past EU Crimea sanctions violations
 - And Belarus sanctions – see slide [15](#)
- Recent court decisions of note – not involving Russia sanctions but relevance by analogy (see slide [61](#))
 - UK and French court decisions – see slide [61](#)
 - And European Court of Justice 12 May 2021 Bank Melli decision – on EU blocking statute re US Iranian sanctions

Also note EU current [review](#) of possibly amending its blocking statute

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

Russian Countersanctions

- Seems in no hurry to impose any stiff new commercial-effect countersanctions vs. US/Europe – just some human rights tit-for-tat measures (see the Tufts study from last year, linked at slide [86](#))
- See slides [86-90](#) for enacted and pending further countermeasures against US/EU (and Ukraine)
 - Incl. draft amendments (re asset blocking, and low 25% control threshold, etc.) to Special Economic Measures Law
 - And April 2021 [proposed](#) amendments to same law and to Currency Control Law are in the State Duma now (1st hearing is scheduled for October 2021)
- Gov't [statements/efforts](#) to cut in use of USD – recent turn away from use of USD in National Wealth Fund and continued reports of Russian companies (including oil producers) trying to do this, to Euro (or other currencies), for deals having no other US link – see slides [20](#) and [79](#) below
- And some other Russian gov't initiatives
 - Directing pension and similar funds away from banks that are under or are supporting anti-Russian sanctions
 - Advancing establishment/acceptance of Russian institute [certification](#) of Russian-produced oil & gas industry equipment as substitute for US API certification
- Also, developing Russian court practice on basis of Russia's controversial anti-sanctions disputes law of 2020 (see slide [86](#))
 - And related position that a contract clause allowing a foreign company to terminate a contract / escape from liability on account of anti-Russia sanctions likely violates public policy / is unenforceable
 - See the [decision](#) of 20 April in the Tsargrad case against a leading global search engine company (reportedly being appealed), and [report](#) of similar late June claim filed by a Chechen football club against the same company
- *Note also Ukraine's late June further rounds of asset freeze / blacklisting designations against various Russian (and Ukrainian "pro-Russian") businessmen, Russian banks and companies, etc. (Ukraine's sanctions are not further covered here.)*

What's Newest (*cont'd*)

Sanctions Against Belarus

- **EU:** Council Implementing Regs. [2021/997](#), [2021/1030](#) (and related acts) of 21 and 24 June 2021, as response to the Belarus gov't recent repressive actions – including blacklisting / freezing funds and assets of many Belarus individuals and entities
 - Also blacklisting Russian oligarch Mikhail Gutseriev (owner of Safmar Holding, and interest in Russneft and many other companies); and his personal designation is generally interpreted to extend to the entities he is deemed to control (per EU law/practice) (he has been blacklisted by UK and Switzerland also); thus, there has been [reported](#) corp. restructuring to demonstrate his relinquishment of control
 - And sectoral sanctions as well – aimed at various Belarus industries etc. (including petroleum products, potash, tech, and banking)
 - These new EU actions / designations against Belarus are already having real effects on Russian, as well as US and European, companies and banks etc. (though EU does not apply secondary sanctions)
 - There were also coordinated late June US (SDN) and UK (blacklisting) sanctions against Belarus, but no Russian businessmen designations
- **UK:** early August 2021 enacted a new [package](#) of trade, financial, and other sectoral sanctions – largely in line with those of the EU, including in the petroleum products sector
 - And see the associated [Guidance](#) (EU has not yet published one)
 - This followed a limited set of blacklist-designation sanctions in late June 2021 (not including an extensive list of Belarus businessmen / companies as the EU has issued)
- **Switzerland:** also early August 2021 enacted new sectoral sanctions tracking those of the EU (again, including the petroleum products sector)
 - These were enacted by amended Ordinance on Measures against Belarus (SR946.231.116.9)
 - This followed a set of blacklist-designation sanctions of early July 2021, also evidently tracking the EU's
- **US:** by Executive Order (“EO”) [14038](#) of 9 August 2021, building on past acts of 2021 and earlier, the US authorized future blacklisting (SDN) designations by the Treasury Department of a broad range of persons / companies operating in various economic sectors including energy
 - And on the same date, OFAC [issued](#) a list of new SDN designations including several leading Belarus businessmen and state- and privately-owned companies
 - The new US designations include some, but not all of the persons and companies designated by the EU and Switzerland (e.g., not Gutseriev)
 - And related FAQs [916](#), [917](#), [918](#); and [GL 4](#) re wind down of transactions with Belaruskali (the leading potash producer)
 - There are no sectoral sanctions (as those against Russia), as such

Basic Framework – US/EU/UK

United States

- Treasury Dep't (*Office of Foreign Assets Control – OFAC*) “sectoral” sanction Directives – as amended to date, most recently in Aug. 2018 (based on EO 13662 from March 2014)
 - *Generally applies only to “US persons” (citizens and US permanent residents) wherever located, any persons / entities in the US, US companies (including branches abroad), and US subs / branches of foreign companies*
 - But may also be applied to non-US persons anywhere, for activity that causes (i) US persons to violate or (ii) a violation to occur within the US – this expansive application being somewhat controversial
 - And all the SDN designations / sanctions are also under OFAC (based on EOs 13660, 13661 etc. of 2014)
 - And Treasury’s further expansive secondary sanctions authorities under CAATSA (slides [49-62](#))
 - March 2021 [Notice](#) (by President Biden) of Continuation of the National Emergency with Respect to Ukraine – routine annual required extension on which the above EOs are based – *and important new EO 14024 of 15 April 2021 (see slides [5-6](#))*
- Commerce Dep't (*Bureau of Industry and Security – BIS*) export restrictions – [15 CFR §746.5](#), “Russian Industry Sector Sanctions”, amended most recently Dec. 2017
 - Applies to activities of any “US person” or within the US
 - And also to US-origin goods, technology, software etc. or foreign-produced goods with sufficient US-origin controlled content, wherever located
 - See also 15 CFR §744.10 (Restriction on certain entities in Russia), §744.19 (Denial of BIS licenses for sanctioned countries or entities), and §744.21 (Restrictions on military end users in Russia) – see slides [27-32](#))
 - *Note: there may well be overlapping OFAC and BIS licensing and enforcement authority – and thus thorough analysis of both sets of rules (and perhaps authorizations from both agencies) re same proposed transaction may be required in some cases*
- State Dep't
 - Has primary authority for certain sections of CAATSA (see slide [50](#)); and contributing authority for most other Russia-related sanctions (now including those under the CBW Act – see slides [9-10](#) and [64-68](#))
 - Also has had / will continue to have important behind-the-scenes and in some contexts up-front role in inter-agency consultations on Treasury / Commerce application of OFAC- and BIS-administered sanctions in general (see, e.g., slide [8](#) – State’s overarching announcements of the recent Navalny-related sanctions packages)

Basic Framework – US/EU/UK (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA enacted August 2017 (and State / Treasury Guidelines of Oct. 2017) – and see:
 - Full summary discussion at slides [49-62](#)
 - The Jan. 2018 CAATSA-based Reports/Lists for Congress (see slides [58-59](#))
 - And note the Sept. 2018 CAATSA-implementing EO (see slide [50](#)), and proposed DASKA Act would further broaden CAATSA (see slides [11](#), [69](#)) ... and CAATSA sec. 232 scope expansion (see slide [55](#))
 - Various cyber- and defense-related CAATSA secondary-sanctions designations of Russian / other foreign entities to date (see slides [42-47](#) and [53-56](#))
- Crimea-focused EO 13685 of 19 Dec. 2014 ... and Crimea-related SDNs
 - Near-total embargo (as for Cuba), OFAC-administered, amended most recently in Sept. 2019
 - Related BIS implementing [rules](#) of Jan. 2015
 - And OFAC Crimea-related SDN designations (see slide [48](#))
- Russian export pipeline sanctions – especially against Nord Stream 2: CAATSA section 232, PEESA and PEESCA (NDAA 2020 and 2021) etc. – but now seems nearly moot for practical purposes, see slides [7](#), [55](#) and [63](#)
- CBW Act application to Russia of 2018-2019 (two rounds, per Skripal poisoning) – and now 2021 (two rounds, per Navalny poisoning) – involves Treasury, Commerce and State Depts. (slides [64-68](#))
- Application of various Iran, Venezuela, Syria, North Korea, and now Belarus sanctions (including against some Russian companies and individuals) authorized by a web of laws and executive orders

Bottom line: US Russia-sanctions analysis is now like peeling an ever more complex onion!

Basic Framework – US/EU/UK (*cont'd*)

European Union / UK

- [EU Council Reg. No. 833/2014](#) of 31 July 2014 – as amended (several times, most recently by Reg. No. 2019/1163 of 5 July 2019)
 - Applies to EU nationals and companies
 - Or anything happening in whole or part within EU territory
 - Or involving an EU-registered aircraft / vessel
 - Currently in effect to 31 January 2022 (extended as of 21 July 2021)
- Commission [Guidance Note](#) (16 Dec. 2014, last amended 25 Aug. 2017) on application of certain provisions (the “EU Guidance Note”)
- And SDN-like “blacklist” Reg. No. [269/2014](#) of 17 March 2014
 - And updates / interpretations since then (see slides [83-85](#))
 - Currently in effect to 15 Sept. 2021 (most recently extended on 12 March 2021)
- And, re Crimea
 - EU Council Reg. No. [692/2014](#) of 23 June 2014 as amended (extended again on 21 June 2021 – now in effect to 23 June 2022)
 - Hits investments in oil & gas and other mineral resources E&P, power, transport, telecoms
 - And further ban on business in various other sectors – see slide [82](#) for detail
- EU Council Reg. No. [2018/1542](#) of 15 Oct. 2018, Concerning Restrictive Measures Against Proliferation and Use of Chemical Weapons; and implementing measures naming Russians as violators (incl. most recent – slide [13](#))
- And Dec. 2020 enactment of EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime – and March 2021 first application, against Russian officials in connection with Navalny detention etc. – see slide [13](#)
- June 2021 dramatic expansion of Belarus sanctions (blacklisting, and sectoral) – see slide [15](#)
- Post-Brexit [UK](#): see slides [84-85](#)

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC

Finance / Capital Markets

- The OFAC SSI sanctions *prohibit without license*:
 - Per [Directive 1](#) (as amended / effective Nov. 2017, per CAATSA addition): new debt financing with maturity of >14 days (*revised down from >30 days*), or new equity financing, for these designated entities or their subs (≥50%-owned), and transactions with or dealing in such debt or equity
 - *Bank of Moscow* (now merged into VTB)
 - *Gazprombank*
 - *Russian Agricultural Bank (Rosselkhozbank)*
 - *Sberbank*
 - *VEB*
 - *VTB*

(except depositary receipts based on pre-existing shares – per FAQ [391](#))

- And note OFAC’s expanded bank SSIs List (by several additions to date)
 - singling out many specific VEB, VTB, Sberbank, Gazprombank and Russian Agricultural Bank subs/affiliates – in Russia, Europe, and elsewhere
 - all of these were technically covered already under the 50%+ ownership rule – so they are also named / singled out just for emphasis / clarity, to help stop circumvention, etc.
 - but note that now any of these named subs would need specific OFAC delisting if/when no longer 50%+ owned by its “named SSI parent”
 - *e.g.*, Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF) – no longer a VEB sub, but still on SSI List
 - as opposed to, for example, Estonia’s Coop Bank (formerly Estonian Credit Bank) delisted in 2018 following 2017 buyout by Coop Eesti from VTB

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

Finance / Capital Markets (*cont'd*)

- Per [Directive 2](#) (as amended / effective Nov. 2017, per CAATSA): new debt financing with maturity of >60 days (revised down from >90 days) for these designated entities or their subs (50%-or-more owned), and transactions dealing in such debt
 - *Gazpromneft*
 - *Novatek*
 - *Rosneft*
 - *Transneft*
- and here again, note the amended SSI Lists issued since 2015 to date – naming / singling out several specific Rosneft, Novatek and Transneft subs – to which the same two above-noted (re Directive 1) coverage caveats apply
- Per [Directive 3](#) (still as of 12 Sept. 2014 – not amended): new debt financing, maturity of >30 days, for Russian Technologies (Rostec) or its subs (≥50%-owned), and transactions / dealing in such debt (and see new FAQ [887](#))
 - and note that Rostec is also a CAATSA section 231 listed defense-industry entity (see slide [54](#) re the added Rostec-dealings burdens/risks this entails, for US as well as non-US persons)
 - and Rostec subsidiary Rosoboronexport (and its subs) now also SDN per 2018 designation
- And see related OFAC FAQs
 - FAQ [395](#) as amended, re permissible / prohibited US persons' activities with regard to L/Cs involving designated companies under Directives 1, 2 and 3 (compare with EU Guidance FAQ 12 – see slide [79](#))
 - FAQ [419](#) as amended, re permissible / prohibited payment terms for US persons' sale of goods / provision of services to, and progress payments for long-term projects with, designated companies under Directives 1, 2 and 3
 - FAQ [371](#) re corresp. banking – OK only if the underlying transaction is permissible (thus seems stricter than under EU rules)
 - in other words, mere use of USD, without more, could violate – which is main reason why Russian companies, including oil exporters, are trying to move from Euro (or other currencies) as possible for transactions that have no other US link*
- Also need to consider possible treatment of certain equipment lease contracts as sanctions-prohibited debt financing
- Note OFAC [General License 1B](#) (of Nov. 2017)
 - Authorizing transactions by US persons (and otherwise within the US) involving derivative products having value linked to underlying asset that is prohibited debt (or equity) under Directives 1-3 (and see related updated FAQ [372](#))
 - And note that the CBW Act ban on US banks' lending doesn't extend to Directives 1-3 SSI state entities (see slides [65-68](#))

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

Energy

- [Directive 4](#) prohibits (*as amended / effective Jan. 2018, per CAATSA*) without license
 - The provision, export or reexport, directly or indirectly, of goods, services (except financial services) or technology
 - “in support of exploration or production for deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects that have the potential to produce oil” in Russia
 - involving any of these designated entities or their subs (50%-or-more owned)
 - *Gazprom* • *Gazpromneft* • *Lukoil* • *Rosneft* • *Surgutneftegaz*
 - And keep in mind various SSI List amendments to date – singling out several Rosneft, Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz subs (and again with the same above-noted slide [19](#) coverage caveats applying)
 - Note also the 2015 BIS special [designation](#) of South Kirinsky field (only part of it is deep water) ... which hasn't yet been expanded to other such “borderline” fields

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

- *And, per CAATSA section 223 (enacted 2017), the Directive 4 scope was expanded to cover such projects worldwide, where one or more of these five designated Russian cos. has/have a (i) $\geq 33\%$ ownership interest or (ii) majority of the voting interests*
 - but this scope expansion applies only to such outside-Russia projects that are “initiated” after Jan. 2018 – which means (per FAQ [536](#)) the date when the host government (or authorized agency etc.) “formally grants exploration, development, or production rights to any party”
 - thus, should not apply to outside-Russia projects where the Russian company(ies) obtained its/their interest at any time after the relevant gov’t grant of rights (but there could be fact/law/interpretation nuances here)
 - note also that, per related FAQ [537](#), OFAC’s “50% rule” – regarding involvement of SSI entity(ies) in such project – will apply to determine whether either of the sanction thresholds ($\geq 33\%$ direct or indirect ownership interests or majority of voting interests) is passed
- The further proposed DASKA Act, if ever enacted, would further broaden sanctions coverage of oil E&P projects both inside and outside Russia (see slides [11](#) and [69](#))

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- Note OFAC FAQ [413](#) (and similar [BIS](#)) clarification that “deepwater” = over 500 ft.
- And OFAC FAQ [418](#) (and similar [BIS](#))
 - Clarification that “shale project” doesn’t include E&P *through* shale to locate or extract oil in reservoirs
 - Also, apparently, not all hard-to-extract = shale (not addressed further in later FAQ updates)
- And OFAC FAQ [421](#)
 - Re “Arctic offshore” = offshore field north of Arctic Circle
 - Including an Oct. 2017 clarification that this bar *doesn't* cover horizontal drilling operations originating onshore that extend to seabed areas above Arctic Circle
- And OFAC FAQ [420](#) – re only production (and *not* midstream / downstream) activities are covered

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- For in-Russia projects, the Directive 4 reference to “*in Russia or in other maritime area claimed by [Russia] and extending from its territory*” – is understood to mean/include
 - Any offshore areas (inland / territorial seas, EEZ or Shelf): this is per a BIS FAQ [answer](#), and analogous explanations under other-country sanctions rules (and is consistent with EU Reg. [clarifications](#)) – *but see the cautionary note at bottom of slide [39](#)*
 - And Caspian Sea zone claimed by Russia (the similar EU sanction might not cover this?)
 - As well as the Black Sea shelf area extending from Crimea (despite non-recognition by US as being part of Russia)
- And note the FAQ [414](#) clarification that this sanction doesn't apply if an otherwise-covered project has the potential to produce only gas
 - But *does* apply if potential for both (often not clear; per factual / evidentiary showing)
 - *And note that BIS (and likely OFAC too) considers condensate = oil* (even though the old ban on export of US crude oil, which gave rise to the equivalence rule, has been lifted)
 - And most Russian gas fields have some condensate (as South Kirinsky does)

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- The Directive 4 export ban thus covers essentially
 - All US-origin goods, US-origin services (*except for financial services – covered in Directive 2*), tech. assistance and technology in respect of such projects
 - To the five main listed companies and their subs (and expressly including the added named Rosneft, Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz subs)
 - And likely also to / for use at the South Kirinsky field (and any others that may be so designated)
 - The carve-out for financial services (includes clearing transactions and providing insurance re such activities – per OFAC FAQ [412](#) – but see also the further explanation in FAQ [415](#))
- There have been some license applications / favorable actions under Directive 4 (but still a much stricter approach than in the EU to date)
- Note the “support services” compliance focus / risk

US Sectoral Sanctions – OFAC (*cont'd*)

General

- All four directives (re finance / capital markets, and energy) also expressly prohibit
 - Any transaction that evades or avoids, has that purpose, or causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the directive prohibitions
 - Any conspiracy formed to violate any of same
 - And again, note in this respect the several SSI List supplements to date – singling out, essentially just for anti-circumvention emphasis, several subsidiaries/affiliates of
 - Rosneft, Gazprom, Novatek, Transneft and Surgutneftegaz (under Directives 2 and 4)
 - VEB, VTB, Sberbank, Gazprombank and Russian Agricultural Bank (under Directive 1)
- Possible penalties
 - Civil:
 - >\$311,562 (effective 17 March 2021) *per violation*, or up to twice the value of the transaction that was the basis for the violation
 - per separate OFAC [action](#), this amount applies to transactions valued at \$200,000 or more – and the possible penalty is \$200,000 for transactions valued from \$100,000 to \$200,000 (and lesser amounts are on a scale for lesser amount transactions)
 - Criminal: up to \$1 million per violation
 - And individuals could be imprisoned (for up to 20 years) for criminal violations
- *And remember: while these OFAC Directives (and the CBW Act sanctions)*
 - *in general apply directly only to US persons (incl. USD transfers through correspondent banks in the US)*
 - *now there is enhanced risk of application to non-US companies/individuals also – per the CAATSA secondary sanctions (slides [56-57](#) below)*

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS

Export / Reexport Restrictions

- The basic-limited August 2014 initial BIS Russia sanctions / license requirements – applying to *any* Russian end-users / uses
 - When the exporter knows the items will be used directly or indirectly in exploration for or production of oil or gas in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale formations
 - Or is unable to determine whether the item will be used in such projects
 - And *presumption of denial* when for use in such projects “that have the potential to produce oil” (here again, grey area where could produce both gas and oil)
 - And importantly, as noted above, BIS considers that condensate = oil
- This August 2014 regulation restricts (requires license for):
 - Only specifically designated ECCN items and also several listed types of drill pipe, casings, wireline, downhole equipment (per Supp. No. 2 to Part 746.5 of the EAR)
 - for *all* Russian entities
 - when used in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects
 - Expressly including, but not limited to
 - *drilling rigs*
 - *parts for horizontal drilling*
 - *drilling and completion equipment*
 - *subsea processing equipment*
 - *Arctic-capable marine equipment*
 - *wireline & down-hole equipment*
 - *drill pipe and casing*
 - *software for hydraulic fracturing*
 - *high pressure pumps*
 - *seismic acquisition equipment*
 - *remotely operated vehicles*
 - *compressors, expanders, valves, risers*

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

Export / Reexport Restrictions (*cont'd*)

- Further, the same five OFAC-designated Russian energy companies (per OFAC Directive 4) have been on the BIS “Entity List” since Sept. 2014
 - *Gazprom* • *Gazpromneft* • *Lukoil* • *Rosneft* • *Surgutneftegas*
- Plus 15 specifically named Rosneft subs since 2015 and 51 named Gazprom subs since 2016 (essentially the same as those named by OFAC)
- Also likely (but not automatically) applies to some other owned or controlled subs – see BIS Entity List FAQ [134](#) (depends on nature of sub / its activities, control, and other factors)
- This specific Entity List designation imposes (re these companies, and at least several subs) – *see slide 21*
 - A new license requirement for export, reexport, or transfer of “*all items subject to the EAR*”
 - for the 5 initially named energy sector companies (and likely also most of their subs)
 - when used in Russian deepwater, Arctic offshore, or shale projects
 - and now also at least for all the named Rosneft and Gazprom subs
 - *If... or if...* (the same previous-slide first-bullet oil/gas target projects litany applies here – and the rules of (i) denial presumption for oil projects, and (ii) condensate = oil, are applied here too)

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

Export / Reexport Restrictions (*cont'd*)

- And, as noted above, per a 2015 amendment, BIS added Gazprom's South Kirinsky field (Sea of Okhotsk, part of Sakhalin-3 areas project, off Sakhalin Island) to the Entity List
 - regardless whether in deepwater portion or not (the field has both)
 - this special designation was likely based on some particular factors
 - more such fields might eventually be named too, as also noted above (but none yet)
- BIS FAQ clarifications and license applications / actions (including re offshore drilling) – quite strict to date, like OFAC
- Also further 2015-20 Russia-related Entity List additions – adding many new Russian, Crimean, European and other OFAC-named SDN companies to this List (see slide [42](#))
 - Mostly in the cyber and/or defense categories; some of which are already OFAC-designated SDNs or may be indirect SSIs (as 50%-or-more owned by a directly designated SSI)
 - March 2020 [additions](#) – Avilon Ltd. and Technomar: “for acting on behalf of a listed company in circumvention of licensing requirements by procuring U.S.-origin items for Technopole Company”, which was listed in 2016
 - These companies are thus subject to BIS license requirement for all items that are subject to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), with presumption of denial
- See the current full BIS Entity List [here](#)

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

Export / Reexport Restrictions (*cont'd*)

- What is “*subject to the EAR*” (including all EAR99 items)?
 - All items in / moving in transit through the US
 - All US-origin items, wherever located
 - And
 - *foreign-made goods that incorporate controlled US-origin goods*
 - *foreign-made software that is comingled with controlled US-origin software*
 - *foreign-made goods that are “bundled” with controlled US-origin software*
 - *foreign-made technology that is comingled with controlled US-origin technology*
 - ... in quantities exceeding the de minimis levels for applicable items (see [15 CFR §734](#))
 - currently 25% for Russia
 - *but there are also intricate rules re what items “count” here, beyond encryption technology*
 - Certain foreign-made direct products of US-origin technology or software
 - Certain commodities, produced by any plant or major component thereof outside the US, that are direct product of US-origin technology or software
- *Note: includes even in-country transfers between entities (e.g., within Russia)*
- And BIS also has discretion to apply these sanctions more broadly (*i.e.*, without direct deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale status), for any Russian users, if there is perceived unacceptable *risk of diversion* etc. (per [15 CFR §746.5\(a\)\(2\)](#) etc. – see slide [21](#))

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

Export / Reexport Restrictions (*cont'd*)

- March, July and August 2021
 - BIS new Entity List designations – 14 Russian, German and Swiss entities (see slide [11](#)) in March, 3 Russian entities and 3 individuals (involved in procurement of US-origin electronic components likely in furtherance of Russian military programs) on 12 July, and 6 Russian entities (SDN'd by OFAC on April 15 under EO 14024) on 19 July
 - BIS new licensing restrictions on (and waivers re) export / re-export / transfer of national security-sensitive (including nuclear / missile technology etc.) items to Russia (see slides [11](#) and [64-66](#))
- And broader general military end-use / user restrictions for Russia (and other countries) – 2020 chronology
 - Feb. 2020 [final rule](#) tightening some Country Group designations – affecting some exports and reexports to Russia (based on missile, nuclear, and chemical & biological weapons proliferation concerns)
 - Late 2020 publication of three final rules targeting national-security-controlled exports and re-exports to Russia, China and Venezuela, as follows
 - elimination of [Civil End-Users](#) (“CIV”) license exception
 - the CIV had allowed exports of items controlled for national security reasons to a few countries including Russia, if for civilian end use, per simple confirmation by internal due diligence
 - this benefitted US companies in some high-tech sectors such as semiconductor, sensors, telecom, aircraft, other advanced manufacture
 - but US exporters and enforcement officials have been finding it increasingly difficult to distinguish between military and commercial sectors in destination countries including Russia
 - now exports previously authorized by the CIV exception will require a specific license from BIS, regardless of end use/user (unless another license exception applies) – this presumably affects the civil-use exception recognized under the two rounds of CBW Act sanctions (see slides [64-68](#))
 - thus US companies may need longer lead time for such sales (and need to evaluate related technology transfer arrangements)
- And see new BIS [FAQs](#) of 12 May 2021 re exports under Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Program (that otherwise would be “subject to the EAR”)

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

Export / Reexport Restrictions (*cont'd*)

- expansion of [military end-use and end-user](#) restrictions – further complicating US companies' business
 - expands requirement to obtain specific licenses for export to military end users/uses in Russia (and China and Venezuela)
 - covers wide range of potential dual-use items (there is already a blanket policy of denial for defense articles for these countries)
 - adopts regional stability controls for certain exports to Russia; and adds a new reporting requirement for controlled items
 - and see related new [FAQs 1-32](#) re the subject changes to EAR section 744.21
- And final [rule](#) eliminating re-export authorizations APR
 - to remove a provision of License Exception Additional Permissive Re-exports ("APR") for a small group of countries incl. Russia
 - namely, eliminated some permissive re-exports of sensitive US items to Russia (and China, Venezuela) based on approval by one of certain close ally countries – "due to variations in how the United States and its partners ... perceive the threat caused by the increasing integration of civilian and military technology development in countries of concern"
- And see related BIS Oct. 2020 [action](#) re Russia (and China, Venezuela)
 - [EAR amendments](#) to revise/refine license review policy for national security-controlled items
 - reviewing agencies now to consider whether proposed export/re-export/transfer of controlled items will make a "material contribution to the development, production, maintenance, repair or operation" of weapons systems capability

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

- US Dep't of Justice [March](#) and [May](#) 2021 announcements of guilty plea agreements with Russian company and its owner, and Italian company, for their part in conspiracy to evade BIS-administered sanctions against Russia – attempted export of American-made turbine for use in Russian Arctic offshore oil drilling (and see further background news [here](#) and [here](#))
- Other notable BIS policy / enforcement actions with regard to Russia
 - 2019 reported opposition to a US company's export to affiliates of United Aircraft Corp. (owned by Rostec) of high-tech composite material needed for new-generation Russian passenger liner MS-21
 - And reported related US pressure on Japanese producer of same material; this sparked Russian gov't support development of local substitute (see [report](#)) – reportedly now being certified, production kick-off anticipated for 2022
 - Admin. penalties [imposed](#) in Jan. 2021 against an US-based company for repeated false undervaluing of certain exports to Russia to avoid reporting requirements
 - Jan. 2021 [removal](#) of Vsmopo Avisma (world's leading titanium producer and key supplier to Boeing) from the Military End-User (MEU) List – on basis that it had been mistakenly put on the list (along with several other Russian companies) a month before
 - Some further 2021 actions: see slide [12](#)
- See BIS 2015 [Guidance](#) on Due Diligence to Prevent Unauthorized Transshipment / Reexport of Controlled Items to Russia
 - Expresses BIS concern “about efforts by front companies and other intermediaries who are not the true final end users...”
 - Special focus on third-country freight forwarders and other dubious parties listed as an export item's final destination
- See also OFAC May 2020 [Guidance](#) to Address Illicit Shipping and Sanctions Evasion Practices

US Sectoral Sanctions – BIS (*cont'd*)

- Related notes on transshipment etc.:
 - Be wary of relying on a “we only shipped to a third-country distributor / warehouse” defense (generally for Russia, and for Crimea in particular – see slide [44](#) below)
 - The prevailing “knowledge or reason to know” standard (developed for Iran, but applies generally)
 - Various pronouncements / cases to date (see the Epsilon Electronics case [decision](#) in particular)
 - And another OFAC similar enforcement action in 2018: a US company was fined for knowingly shipping controlled hi-tech goods to like-named sub. of known Russian defense industry SDN Almaz-Antey through Canadian and Russian distributors (and the purchaser end-user evidently was known to the seller)
 - i.e., this was not a case of selling through distributor to unlimited/unknown buyers in Russia
 - provides vivid reconfirmation of the importance of a company’s having meaningful, not just facial, screening program and due diligence in all proposed Russian-related dealings
 - And similar 2019 OFAC [announced](#) Settlement Agreement with US/Dutch co. (PACCAR/DAF) involving trucks diverted through Russian front buyer to Iran
 - Also another OFAC 2019 enforcement action involving a prominent US company – direct payments to it from Cuban SDN end-user of product, per sales through Canadian customer (and various others since then)
 - See also OFAC case [announcement](#) Oct. 2020 Settlement Agreement with a prominent US private equity firm for its Turkish subsidiary’s repeated evasive product sales through Turkish third-party distributors to end-customers in Iran in violation of US trade sanctions
 - And most recent relevant OFAC Settlement Agreement with a leading global software company in April 2021 (see slide [12](#)), and [another](#) with Nordgas of Italy in March 2021, and [newest](#) in Sept. 2021
- Possible penalties
 - Essentially same as for OFAC, and now CAATSA too, sanctions violations (see slides [26](#) and [62](#))
 - Plus denial of US export privileges (incl. that no one can export US items to the penalized co.)
- *Note again: BIS and OFAC licensing / enforcement authority often overlaps – and thus thorough analysis of both sets of rules, and perhaps authorizations from both agencies, may sometimes be needed for one and the same proposed transaction*

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs

Specialty Designated Nationals (SDN) List

Intro / Basics

- Based on EOs 13660 and 13661 of March 2014, 14024 of 15 April 2021, etc.
- These are the US “direct” sanctions (as opposed to the SSI “sectoral” sanctions)
 - All US persons’ dealings with – including payments to or receipt of goods / services from – individuals or company SDNs (and subsidiaries) are generally prohibited, and US persons must block their assets
 - Absent applicable general or specific license from OFAC (see slides [40](#) and [46](#) below)
 - And possible further penalties – essentially same as above for other OFAC (and BIS) sanctions violations
- Plus risk of application of CAATSA-based secondary sanctions – see slides [49-62](#) below
 - Against non-US companies / individuals that initiate or continue dealings with designated SDNs (“for knowingly facilitating significant transactions for or on behalf of” them – per OFAC April 2018 release)
 - See also OFAC FAQs [574](#), [579](#), [580](#), [589](#), [590](#) and [627](#) – and see generally slides [60-61](#) below
 - *Note: there have been some CAATSA-based SDN designations to date (including Russian companies and individuals in the cyber sector)*

SDN Individuals

- Some industry executives / oligarchs have been on OFAC’s SDN list since 2014 (and expanded further in 2015-20 ... no more yet in 2021) – most notably
 - Initially Messrs. Sechin, Timchenko, Rotenberg – and then Technopromexport’s CEO (per the Siemens turbines scandal of 2017); and another Kremlin insider Yevgeniy Prigozhin in 2016
 - April 2018 dramatic expansion: including Messrs. Deripaska (control of RUSAL, En+, Basic Element, GAZ Group, etc.), Vekselberg (controls Renova, etc.), Miller (Gazprom CEO), Kostin (VTB CEO), Bogdanov (Surgutneftegaz CEO) and Kerimov
 - These designations followed the US Treasury Dept. CAATSA sec. 241 Report to Congress listing many of Russia’s senior political figures, oligarchs, and “parastatal entities” (see slides [58-59](#))
 - And in Feb. 2020 Didier Casimiro, CEO of simultaneously SDN-designated Rosneft Trading S.A. (and he is now a Rosneft SVP), under Venezuela sanctions
 - *There was some fear in early 2021 of further leading oligarch designations in connection with cyber-attack, election, and Navalny events, but hasn’t happened yet – see slides [5-6](#) and [70](#)*

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- Such individual-person listing
 - Bars US persons' dealings with them or their controlled companies, blocked assets etc.
 - generally measured by $\geq 50\%$ shareholding
 - including by two or more SDNs (see OFAC FAQs [398-402](#))
 - *note in particular the serious knock-on effect of the 2018 designations of Messrs. Deripaska and Vekselberg – given their vast direct and indirect controlled-company holdings*
 - Doesn't bar dealing with *non-SDN company* where SDN person is just officer/director, etc. (e.g. Mr. Sechin - Rosneft ... and also Messrs. Miller, Kostin, Bogdanov, etc.)
 - except is now clearly interpreted to bar having an SDN-individual executive signing a contract on behalf of a non-SDN company with US person (OFAC FAQs [398](#), [400](#) – and see FAQ [585](#))
 - and US companies must also be cautious even re "mere" negotiating with such SDN-individual executive (or his/her signing non-binding preliminary documents) acting on behalf of a non-SDN company, or transactions where the SDN-individual is otherwise directly involved
 - note the 2017 OFAC \$2 million penalty imposed on a leading US energy company for Mr. Sechin's signing Rosneft JV documents in 2014 – *but see Dec. 2019 US federal court [decision](#) vacating that penalty, while reinforcing that now US persons are on fair notice*
 - in light of the above, is a US person serving on a Russian company board of directors together with an SDN person still OK? (in any event there is a clear bar on US person's serving on the board of an SDN company – FAQ [568](#), slide [39](#))
 - also need to keep in mind separate SSI sanctions / restrictions re such companies (e.g., Gazprom, Surgutneftegaz and VTB)
 - *Compare with EU Commission June 2020 and June 2021 Opinions on the same subject, reflecting an important broader definition of "control" (see link at slide [83](#) below)*

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

SDN Companies

- Dramatic SDN company designations of April 2018 (and wind-down periods, including several successive extensions, set by General Licenses (GLs) for dealings with them), including
 - En+, RUSAL, Basic Element, GAZ Group, EuroSibEnergO, Russian Machines, others (linked to Mr. Deripaska)
 - Renova (linked to Mr. Vekselberg)
 - As well as any other companies ultimately owned $\geq 50\%$ by any of the SDN individuals
 - These designations hit hard – for the first time in the heart of Russia's private-sector economy
 - More to come from the Jan. 2018 "Oligarchs List"? (depends on ongoing course of US-Russia events) – *nothing more yet ...*
- Then OFAC's SDN delisting of Deripaska-controlled companies – RUSAL, En+, EuroSibEnergO
 - In Jan. 2019 per OFAC [Update](#)
 - Benefited these three companies and their subs – but Mr. Deripaska himself (and any company he continues to hold $\geq 50\%$ of) remain as SDN per his April 2018 designation (see slide [12](#))
 - Followed the three companies' petition to OFAC (per 31 CFR § [501.807](#)) and months-long negotiation (and several related General Licenses / extensions during that period – see slide [40](#)), and based on a set of strict restructuring and governance change [undertakings](#)
 - And these companies are subject to redesignation if any of the agreed terms are violated
- See slides [42-45](#), presenting several more Russia-related SDN designations in various categories – which may be less directly important to most business but should be kept in mind

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

SDN Delistings

- Further notes re SDN delisting:

- The Deripaska companies' delistings were based in large part on the unintended consequences of the SDN designations for the US (and world) aluminum market etc. – and thus may well not be readily achieved by other Russian SDNs
- Deripaska's GAZ Group (automotive giant) might eventually also be SDN-delisted upon ownership restructuring for Deripaska decontrol etc. – see the General Licenses issued for GAZ, most recently extended in Dec. 2020 to Jan. 2022:
 - [GL 13P](#): for divestment / transfer of debt and equity holdings etc.
 - [GL 15J](#): for maintenance/wind-down of pre-existing commercial relations – *but also allowing a broad range of new commercial activities with GAZ and its controlled entities* (and imposing new regular reporting requirements on GAZ – including monthly certifications that the Group is not acting for or on behalf of Deripaska or other SDN, and that control is in the hands of the Board and shareholders)
 - Also OFAC July 2020 related amendments to several FAQs
- Vekselberg and Deripaska court challenges against their OFAC SDN designations / consequences – dismissed
 - Vekselberg- and Renova-linked US investment management cos. and GP entities, which are not SDNs but whose assets and related proceeds were blocked because of Vekselberg/Renova majority ownership of asset-holding entities, filed [complaint](#) in US federal court in 2019 – basically challenging OFAC's 50% rule as applied to them – case [dismissed](#) in Sept. 2020
 - And reported Dec. 2020 Swiss court decision rejecting Vekselberg co. claim against bank to unblock USD funds (see slide [61](#))
 - OFAC notified Mr. Deripaska in Jan. 2020 that he is unlikely to be delisted (see [letter](#) and [news report](#)), OFAC formally denied his request in March 2020, and his US federal court challenge was dismissed in June 2021 (see slide [12](#))
- But note Russian-American physicist/entrepreneur V. Gapontsev's successful challenge to his 2018 OFAC "Oligarch List" designation – seems a special case: notified by OFAC Sept. 2019 [letter](#) that he "is not an oligarch in [Russia] for purposes of Section 241 of CAATSA" (see slides [58-59](#)); this lifted cloud from him and his Mass.-based company IPG Photonics
- And also March 2020 [delisting](#) of Khudainatov's Independent Petroleum Co. (NNK) and a sub (had been designated in 2017 for shipping petroleum products to North Korea)

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

Dealing with SDNs: Guidance, Licensing, etc.

- See the related OFAC 2018 FAQs [567-582](#) and 625 – see below, as further amended in [2020](#) – giving guidance to US persons re continued relations with such designated SDN companies (or those also covered by the 50% rule) or individuals, including:
 - Employment by or board service at such a company
 - Purchase / import of goods from such a company
 - Ownership of such a company's shares or GDRs
 - Holding accounts or other property of such a company or individual
- And note the most recent OFAC FAQ re “maintenance” of operations, contracts etc. with GAZ Group (and their subs)
 - This is [FAQ 625](#) (as amended July 2020, from initial 2018 issuance that applied to all the then-designated Deripaska-controlled companies)
 - which refers specifically to the relevant General License re GAZ
 - may well also have more general application in other analogous GL-based maintenance/wind-down situations – so important to review / have in mind
 - *but caution is needed – OFAC and/or BIS or State Dep't guidances, restrictions and permissions stated in one document (GLs, FAQs, regulations etc.) in the context of one sanctions program cannot automatically be applied / relied on in the context of a different-country and/or different agency program*

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- *Specific licenses* – needed (especially by a US person) for any activity vis-à-vis an SDN that is otherwise prohibited by law, absent coverage by any general license (“GL” – see slides [46-47](#) re two important Russia GLs)
 - These licenses are issued on a private basis to the specific applicant (i.e., are not published or usable by others)
 - These may be / are granted by OFAC to allow certain transactions such as purchases / sales or money transfers to or from an SDN for a longer period than an applicable general license allows (or if no general license applies)
 - For example, [see](#) the report of Swiss pump-maker Sulzer obtaining two such licenses in April 2018, allowing (i) its buyback of shares from new SDN Mr. Vekselberg to reduce his holding to below 50%, and (ii) the related unblocking of Sulzer’s US bank accounts
 - Also the Oct. 2019 private license(s) reportedly granted for an SDN’d Chinese-owned ship to onload cargo (and other examples occasionally reported)
 - And such licenses may be granted to allow US lawyers to advise / collect fees from SDNs on sanctions compliance (incl. help in SDN delisting application)

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- OFAC "[Guidance](#) on the Provision of Certain Services ..." of 12 Jan. 2017 (and FAQs [495-499](#))
 - Provides some clarity as to what a US person (citizen or permanent resident) legal counsel (in-house or outside) or compliance officer can/can't do in advising a non-US company (employer, client) on the legality of proposed transactions under the US sanctions laws
 - Essential point: can advise on whether complies / violates (and approve if clearly complies ... e.g., upon OFAC authorization); but can't otherwise "facilitate" a violative transaction ... by voting at Board level, signing, etc.
 - *Indeed, as a general matter, "facilitation" (re a US person's direct or indirect participation in a non-US person's sanctions-relevant activity – involving not only SDNs but also SSIs) is a complex, case-by-case determination requiring careful factual analysis to determine whether any such US person's actions may be viewed as facilitating prohibited transactions or activities*
- And OFAC general (some Russia-related, others not) 2019-21 releases of note
 - See slide [48](#) for OFAC settlement agreements announcements re US companies' dealings with Crimea
 - 2020-21 settlement agreements with several US and European companies – see slides [12](#) and [34](#) above
 - Sept. 2020 OFAC [Settlement Agreement](#) with a US affiliate of a leading European bank for processing various USD payments involving two SDN-designated entities under the Russia sanctions program: the bank's diligence lapses are highlighted
 - 2019 OFAC [Settlement Agreement](#) with British Arab Commercial Bank (BACB):
 - London-based bank, having no US offices, business, or presence, was found to have violated the Sudan sanctions regs by processing many USD funding transactions for sanctioned Sudanese financial institutions that involved a nostro account at a non-US bank but also indirectly involved funds flows to or through the US financial system
 - OFAC found that BACB "ignored warning signs that reasonably should have put the bank on notice" of violative conduct (as elaborated in the settlement [announcement](#))
 - FAQs [819-820](#) of Feb. 2020 on amendments to OFAC's Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (RPRR)
 - clarifying that both US persons *and persons otherwise subject to US jurisdiction* (e.g., foreign banks handling USD transactions) are required to report to OFAC on a rejected transaction within 10 business days, and elaborating on the info required to be collected/submitted
 - see the underlying RPRR [amendments](#) of June 2019 (re blocking, unblocking, and rejected transactions reporting, and licensing procedures, etc.)
 - Framework for OFAC [Compliance Commitments](#) of May 2019 (including indication of OFAC intent to focus more on enforcement against responsible executives of companies, US as well as non-US, that have violated sanctions)
 - And see May 2020 [Guidance](#) for shipping industry etc.

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

Other Notable SDN Designations

- Designations (persons / companies) under EOs 13661, 13662 and 13684 of 2014, and now 14024 of April 2021 and 14039 of August 2021 – including against:
 - Many Russian entities and individuals designations (for alleged cyber security, elections interference, and Crimea-related matters – including Russian officials for involvement in the Kerch Strait naval incident of 2018)
 - Nord Stream 2 designations in [Jan.](#) 2021, and more in [May](#) and [August](#) 2021 (see slide [7](#))
 - Russian gov't officials designations re Navalny poisoning and imprisonment ([March](#) and [August](#) 2021)
 - 2018 designations of several Russian companies (including *Power Machines*) and officials involvement in transfer of turbines made by a Siemens Russian JV co. to Crimea
 - [Sept. 2019](#) designations of employees of already blacklisted Internet Research Agency (IRA), private jets and yachts of Evgeny Prigozhin (he an SDN already) and his front companies that allegedly finance IRA, under related Trump EO re election interference (see slide [48](#))
 - [Dec. 2019](#), [Oct. 2020](#) and [April 2021](#) cyber-criminal designations (re malware infesting financial institutions and industrial safety systems worldwide)
 - [Jan. 2020](#): further persons in Crimea, and rail carrier running to Crimea across new bridge
 - [July 2020](#): three individuals and five entities involved in furthering financier Prigozhin's operations in Sudan and assisting his ability to evade sanctions (and related Sept. 2020 designation – see slide [43](#))
 - Further designations – per CAATSA sec. 224 (cyber / election interference, etc.), and various EOs
 - And see EO 13848 of Sept. 2018 re election interference

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- Actions in 2021 against certain Ukrainians
 - 11 Jan. OFAC SDN [designation](#) of inner circle people and disinformation apparatus entities linked to pro-Russian Ukrainian politician Andrey Derkach – for spreading misleading / unsubstantiated allegations of Ukraine-related corruption etc. by “current and former US officials” (follows 10 Sept. 2020 [designation](#) of Derkach himself – apparently for trying to interfere in the US election by discrediting the Bidens, etc.)
 - also 5 March State Dep’t [designation](#) of oligarch / former regional governor Ihor Kolomoyskyy (and immediate family members) for corrupt acts etc., making them ineligible for entry into US
- Also several Crimean commercial port and transport companies (and some Russian ships that call in Crimea), companies involved in the Kerch Strait and other Russia / Crimea transport projects, banks and resort complexes are also named
- And a number of Russian defense industry companies
 - Including *Rosoboronexport* (ROE – Russia’s giant arms-export enterprise, a sub of Rostec ... an existing SSI per OFAC Directive 3 and on LSP) – and ROE’s sub Russian Financial Corp (RFK Bank)
 - Note a COVID-19 / Russia sanctions link: April 2020 [report](#) that the USG purchased a large shipment of ventilators, face masks etc. from KRET, another Russian SDN sub of Rostec
 - And see the BIS 12 July 2021 defense-related Entity List designations (slide [6](#))
- And June 2017 (Independent Petroleum Co. – NNK, and a sub.) for dealings with North Korea – but then *delisted* as of March 2020 (see slide [38](#))
- Some of the above coordinated with similar EU, UK and Canada actions

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- Note: State Dep't 2017 CAATSA section 231(e) listing of Russian defense / intelligence sector entities (see slide [54](#)) – supplemented with 45 more individuals and entities in 2018 (see below), and 6 more in March 2021 (see slide [9](#))
 - This is the List of Specified Persons (“LSP”): doesn’t itself impose SDN (or any other sanctions) on them
 - *But*
 - many were already SDNs and some were SSIs (including Rosoboronexport – now is both), and
 - there is likely chilling effect in practice on US / other companies’ willingness to do business with them (see linked list of them at slide [51](#)), and
 - other companies risk having some SDN-like sanctions imposed on *themselves* under CAATSA section 235 for some kinds of “significant transactions” with them (see State Dep't announcement (slide [51](#)), and slides [54](#) and [57](#))
 - See further discussion on this at slides [54](#), [56-57](#) and [60](#) below
- And SDN designations of Sept. 2018 – per CAATSA section 231 (defense/intelligence-related)
 - Against
 - EDD (Equipment Development Dep't), a weapons-purchasing entity of the Chinese military – for taking delivery of advanced aircraft and missiles from Rosoboronexport of Russia, which is on the CAATSA section 231 List of Specified Person (LSP), and is also an SDN (see slide [54](#) below) and EDD’s director
 - these were the first-ever SDN designations under CAATSA section 231 (for significant transactions with the Russian defense or intelligence sectors)
 - [announced](#) by State Dep't (which also set out the specific sanctions chosen and being applied) – and also corresponding OFAC SDN designations announcement of Sept. 2018
- See also the Turkey sanctions mandate in NDAA 2021 (section 1241) – for purchase of Russian S-400 air-defense missile system – including statutory finding that this was a “significant transaction” per CAATSA section 231 (see next slide and slide [57](#))

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- Further recent SDN designations of note affecting Russia – though not under the Russian sanctions regime
 - Trading affiliates of Rosneft: Feb.-March 2020 SDN designations, re Venezuela/PdVSA oil business
 - Rosneft's sale of all its Venezuela assets – after its two Swiss subs, Rosneft Trading S.A. and TNK Trading International S.A., were SDN-designated in early 2020 (along with RT's Chairman and President) for buying/trading Venezuela crude
 - and then [announcement](#) that Rosneft was closing down these subs because of the SDN-related disruption caused (and new Swiss trading co., Energopole S.A., has been established by Rosneft)
 - and follow-on vessel designation of Jan. 2021 (see slide [42](#))
 - Chinese state-owned shipping giant – SDN designations in Sept. 2019 under Iran sanctions regime
 - two specific subsidiaries sanctioned under EO [13846](#), for shipping Iranian crude oil
 - with a Russia-related effect: one of those two subs had a venture whose tankers were carrying Yamal LNG product
 - in Jan. 2020 OFAC delisted that sub; thus, no more obstacle to dealing with it
 - note also related FAQs 804-807 issued in Nov. 2019 (only FAQs [804](#) and [805](#) have survived the Jan. 2020 delisting)
 - Note: Mikhail Gutseriev (Safmar Holdings, Russneft, etc.) isn't US SDN-designated; but blacklisted by EU (and UK, Switzerland) under 2021 Belarus sanctions
- See also July 2020 Senate committee [report](#) (The Art Industry and U.S. Policies That Undermine Sanctions) – and OFAC 30 Oct. 2020 [Art Advisory](#)

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

Three Special Cases – GGE, FSB and MRS Designations / Related GLs

- Two general licenses issued by OFAC to respond to / correct overbroad reach of the Sept. 2016 and Dec. 2016 designations of GGE and FSB as SDNs (re GGE activities in Crimea and FSB alleged involvement in hacking / election-tampering):
 - OFAC [General License No. 11](#) of 20 Dec. 2016 (entitled “Authorizing Certain Transactions with FAU Glavgosekspertiza Rossii” - GGE)
 - gives general authorization for “all transactions and activities ... that are ordinarily incident and necessary to requesting, contracting for, paying for, receiving, or utilizing a project design review or permit from [GGE]’s office(s) in [Russia]”
 - except for carving out (i.e., still prohibiting) anything to do with GGE relating to Crimea
 - OFAC [General License No. 1B](#) of March 2021 (as replacing/slightly amending earlier GL 1A) under the cyber- and now also WMD-related sanctions – entitled “Authorizing Certain Transactions with the Federal Security Service” (FSB)
 - gives authorization for “all transactions and activities ... necessary and ordinarily incident to ... [r]equesting, receiving, utilizing, paying for, or dealing in licenses, permits, certifications, or notifications issued or registered by [FSB] for the importation, distribution, or use of information technology products” in Russia
 - but export, reexport, or provision of any goods or technology subject to the EAR requires BIS license, and fees payable to FSB must not be \geq \$5,000 annually
 - compliance with FSB law enforcement / administrative actions or investigations as well as regulations administered by FSB is also authorized
 - and see corresponding BIS Entity List correction of 16 July 2021

US Direct Sanctions – SDNs (*cont'd*)

- And note OFAC FAQs [501-504](#) (the first three as amended in March 2021) repeating / clarifying certain points of General License No. 1B
 - Exportation of hardware and software directly to FSB or when FSB is end-user is prohibited
 - No license needed to clear Russian border control (which is under FSB jurisdiction)
- At the same time, keep in mind the various cyber-related SDN designations to date for assisting / enabling certain FSB activities etc., and likelihood of more such
- And the related carve-out, per Oct. 2017 State Dep't CAATSA section 231 [Guidance](#), on required regulatory dealings with the FSB – while generally section 231 warns / sets new risk re “significant transactions” with FSB (see slide [54](#))
- Another GL issued in 2021 for interactions with Marine Rescue Service (MRS) – Nord Stream 2-related (see slide [7](#))

US Crimea Sanctions

- Crimea-focused Executive Order 13685 of Dec. 2014
 - Bars all new direct or indirect US investments / transactions into Crimea – including for energy sector / offshore areas
 - There are also Jan. 2015 BIS rules implementing this EO (see slide [17](#))
 - Many Crimea-related SDN designations (entities and individuals) from 2014 to date (slides [6](#), [42-43](#))
 - And March 2020 voluntary [disclosure](#) by Swedbank of Crimea-related USD transfers by its Baltic affiliates
 - And these recent OFAC settlement agreements for Crimea-related sanctions violations
 - [July 2021](#) and [Feb. 2021](#) ones with US digital currency payment processing companies (also involving some other sanctioned countries)
 - [July 2020](#) one with world-leading US-based e-commerce co. re business with Crimea etc.
- And see July 2015 OFAC [Advisory Release](#) re circumvention / evasion by omitting critical information in financial and trade transactions (further to the EO)
 - OFAC warns re
 - various patterns / practices in financial transactions that hinder correspondent banks' efforts to identify and interdict (*note the very substantial fines suffered in recent years by various European banks for similar-type violations of OFAC sanctions – against countries other than Russia / Crimea*)
 - and similar practices in trade transactions – incl. in distributorship arrangements covering Russia
 - and OFAC advises various types of mitigation measures for these risks
- Note also these OFAC Crimea-related General License exceptions, including:
 - No. [4](#) of Dec. 2014, permitting various food and agricultural products (including soft drinks, cigarettes, etc.) and medicines, medical supplies and devices
 - No. [9](#) of May 2015, permitting common internet communications (see related OFAC FAQ [454](#))
- Further SDN designations (somewhat coordinated w/Canada and EU) following 2018 Kerch Strait Ukraine/Russia navies incident: in Sept. 2019, of 3 officers and 5 vessels of already blacklisted Sovfracht and its front co. Maritime Assistance; and in Jan. 2020 (slides [42-43](#))

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists

- CAATSA (Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act)
 - Enacted in August 2017 (after passage through both Houses of Congress by near-unanimous vote)
 - Full text is [here](#) (PL 115-44) – the Russia-related part is Title II, sections 201-292
 - Eastern Ukraine / Crimea situation, alleged US (and European) election meddling, and Syria were/are the three bases for it
 - Broadened / toughened the pre-existing sanctions as contained in six Executive Orders, the Ukraine Freedom Support Act of 2014 (the "UFSA") and another 2014 law in support of Ukraine (now amended by CAATSA)
 - Also has framework authorization for some more *primary sanctions* (aimed at US persons, or dealings having some other nexus to US) and *secondary sanctions* (aimed at non-US persons – and not needing any US nexus)
 - Dramatically widened the gap between US and EU sanctions against Russia (*which has widened even further since then*)

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- By accompanying Presidential Memorandum
 - CAATSA implementation functions were delegated mostly to State and Treasury Dep'ts (and in consultation with Director of National Intelligence)
 - with primary responsibility given to one or the other, on CAATSA article-by-article basis
- And note EO 13849 of Sept. 2018 setting out certain CAATSA sanctions implementation details for State and Treasury (see slide [59](#) below)
- CAATSA also covers Iran and North Korea – introduced stiffened primary and secondary sanctions with regard to those two countries
- The ever-tightening Iran, North Korea, Venezuela and Syria sanctions, aside from CAATSA, can also continue to affect some Russian (and Chinese) companies, banks, etc. (but those other-countries sanctions regimes are not further covered in this CAATSA summary)
 - e.g., the 2020-21 SDN'ing of two Rosneft subs., and various-nationality (including Russia) oil tankers and their owners – re Venezuela (see slide [45](#))
 - and Sept. 2019 SDN designation of two Chinese cos. (and Jan. 2020 delisting of one of them) – re Iran (see slide [45](#))
 - see also a July 2020 OFAC [Settlement Agreement](#) with a UAE company for trade with North Korea (through Chinese front companies)
- Also keep in mind
 - potential application of CAATSA secondary sanctions to non-US companies for dealings now barred for US persons under CBW Act second-round sanctions of 2019 – e.g., primary-market purchase of Russian non-ruble sovereign debt, or US bank lending to Russian sovereign (see slides [64-68](#))
 - the possible further broad expansion of Russia primary and secondary sanctions provisions by the still-proposed DASKA Act which, if ever enacted, would amend CAATSA (see slide [69](#) below)

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA's basic content (as Russia-relevant)
 - Codification by statute
 - of the existing Russia blacklist (SDN) and sectoral (SSI) sanctions enacted by the series of EOs since 2014
 - which made it harder for President Trump (and now will make it harder for President Biden and beyond) to narrow / loosen any of these sanctions by exec. action – would require new law to repeal CAATSA (*recall Jackson-Vanik Amendment's decades-long life*)
 - State / Treasury Dep'ts in Oct. 2017 issued important Guidances (and FAQs, Entity List, revised Directives) per various sections of the then-new law
 - State Dep't on 27 Oct. 2017 issued CAATSA section 231(e) List of entities in the Russian defense / intelligence sectors: section 231 requires President to impose sanctions on any US or non-US person, wherever located, that the President determines has knowingly engaged in a "significant transaction" with a Russian defense / intelligence sector entity on the [List of Specified Persons](#) as of now (and associated [Public Guidance](#) – and see slides [44](#), [54](#) and [57](#))
 - State Dep't also issued on 31 Oct. 2017 [Public Guidance](#)
 - on CAATSA section 225 (requiring President to impose sanctions on non-US persons that invest in certain types of oil projects in Russia (see further slide [53](#)))
 - and on section 232 (giving President discretion to impose sanctions on US or non-US persons that invest or are otherwise involved substantially in construction / modernization / repair of Russian energy export pipelines) – *and State Dep't update of July 2020 stiffen interp./application of that re Nord Stream 2 etc. (see further slide [55](#))*
 - OFAC (Treasury Dep't) on 31 Oct. 2017 issued its initial [Guidance](#) (including some revised and new FAQs) to implement various CAATSA provisions for which it has primary authority – including amended / expanded Directive 4 (re Arctic offshore, deepwater and shale projects) and three other CAATSA provisions (see below)
 - and see FAQs [540-547](#), [579](#) and [589](#) (all from Oct. 2017 or after) re "significant transaction", "facilitation" and other related CAATSA application issues
 - and further 2020 State Dep't stiffening Guidance re CAATSA section 232 – see slide [55](#)

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA stiffened existing OFAC Directives 1, 2 and 4 (*this is essentially for US persons – see slides [19-21](#)*)
 - *Directive 1*: permissible “new debt” of designated Russian banks was reduced from max. 30 to 14 days
 - *Directive 2*: permissible new debt of designated Russian energy cos. was reduced from max. 90 to 60 days
 - *Directive 4*: the prohibition on goods / services / technology involvement in deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale projects was expanded from Russia to worldwide
 - but, for outside Russia, applies only to “new” projects (see slide [22](#) above)
 - if one or more of the designated Russian energy companies has $\geq 33\%$ ownership or $> 50\%$ voting interest
 - All of this was then implemented by OFAC amendments of the relevant Directives – see slides [19-26](#) above
- Per CAATSA section 223(a), *potential* expansion of industry coverage of the OFAC sanctions (beyond financial services, energy, engineering / defense-related) – see FAQ [539](#) ... but none yet
- *Requiring review / approval by Congress*
 - per CAATSA section 216 – before President can terminate or waive existing sanctions (or grant any non-routine-type license that “significantly alters” foreign policy re Russia)
 - apparently including SDN delistings – such as those of En+, RUSAL and EuroSibEnergO in 2019 (Congress was notified, and opposition was insufficient to block)
- Reality check: Despite the “President shall impose” CAATSA sanctions language (see slides [53-56](#))
 - to date there has been no case of such imposition on any non-US person save for a few in the cyber-security and defense sectors – i.e., none yet in the purely civilian-economy space (see slides [42-45](#) above)
 - *but* notable recent secondary sanctions imposed on non-US persons under Venezuela (two Rosneft oil trading subs.) and Iran (two Chinese entities) sanctions programs

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA: *requires* the President to impose sanctions – from a few menus of possibilities, mostly involving penalties re business with/in the US – in various contexts (*upon findings, and with some carve-outs / waiver possibilities – in other words, de facto discretion*) including against:
 - per CAATSA section 224 – US or non-US persons that knowingly engage in significant activities undermining cyber-security on behalf of the Russian gov't, materially assist, sponsor, or provide support for, or provide financial services in support of same (no general State or OFAC Guidance yet on this provision – but there has been some application ... see slides [42](#) and [45](#))
 - per CAATSA section 225 (and see the Oct. 2017 State Dep't Guidance), *non-US* companies and individuals that knowingly make significant investment in deepwater, Arctic offshore or shale oil projects in Russia (as written, could be whether or not one of the Directive 4 Russian cos. is involved – and the State Dept. Guidance doesn't clarify)
 - per CAATSA section 226 (and see the Oct. 2017 OFAC Guidance), *Russian and other foreign financial institutions ("FFIs")* that knowingly engage in / facilitate "significant" transactions involving any of the Directive 4-type oil projects in Russia, certain defense-related activities, or Gazprom's withholding of gas supplies
 - per CAATSA section 228 (and see the Oct. 2017 OFAC Guidance), *non-US* companies and individuals that knowingly – *this being the broadest / most worrisome CAATSA provision*
 - materially violate, attempt or conspire to violate or cause a violation of *any* Russia sanction
 - facilitate "significant transactions" (including "deceptive or structured transactions") for or on behalf of any person that is subject to *any* Russia sanction – or child, spouse, parent or sibling of same
 - though the related OFAC Guidance does go some way to calm fears of over-expansive application with respect to SSI sanctioned entities (see slides [60-61](#) below for details)
 - but note also the section 225 stiffened requirement to impose sanctions on any FFI that knowingly facilitates a significant financial transaction for any SDN

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- per CAATSA section 231 (and see Oct. 2017 State Dep't List and Guidance), *US or non-US* companies and individuals that knowingly engage in a significant transaction with a Russian defense / intelligence sector entity on the List of Specified Persons
 - see the List, expanded as of 2 March 2021 (see slides [42-44](#) above) – and again note that a company's appearance on it doesn't itself mean any new sanction against it ... (but some were already SDNs or SSIs – *e.g., Rosoboronexport, which was on the list, has since been made an SDN*)
 - these include some defense-sector companies that also have important civilian-oriented production (*e.g. Sukhoi, Tupolev, and holding companies United Aircraft, United Shipbuilding*)
 - but the State Dep't Guidance (in FAQ) stresses that:
 - ✓ for now at least, purely civilian end-use / end-user transactions, and not involving intelligence sector, are not likely to be considered “significant”
 - ✓ and that transactions with the FSB (which is also on the List) are unlikely to be considered “significant” if necessary to comply with FSB rules or law enforcement / admin. actions / investigations involving FSB re import / distribution / use of IT products in Russia and payment of related processing fees to FSB (*i.e., this dovetails with OFAC General License No. 1 of Feb. 2017 – see slide [46](#) above*)
 - and from another State Dep't release of Sept. 2018 it appears that only the actual listed companies and not necessarily their subsidiaries are covered (at least not yet)
- per CAATSA section 233 (and see Oct. 2017 OFAC Guidance), *US or non-US* cos. and individuals that with actual knowledge make or facilitate investments into privatization of Russian state-owned companies (of \$10M, or combination \$1M+ bites for \$10M total in a year) where the process “unjustly benefits” RFG officials or their close associates / family (*this is also one of the CAATSA sections covered in further Sept. 2018 EO – see slide [59](#)*)

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- Per CAATSA section 232 (and see Oct. 2017 State Dep't Guidance *as updated/stiffened in 2020* – detail and link below), creating *discretionary* power for the President, *in coordination with US allies*, to impose various possible sanctions on US or non-US cos. or individuals that knowingly invest or are otherwise involved substantially in construction (or modernization, repair) of *energy export pipelines* by Russia – *e.g., Nord Stream 2* – namely:
 - make an investment that directly and significantly contributes to the enhancement of Russia's ability to construct energy export pipelines, or
 - sell, lease or provide to Russia, for such construction purpose, goods, services, technology, information or support that could directly and significantly facilitate the maintenance or expansion of construction, modernization or repair of Russian energy export pipelines
 - if any of the above has fair market value of >\$1 million, or an aggregate fair market value of >\$5 million during any 12-month period
 - there are some softening points re CAATSA section 232 in the State Dep't Guidance clarification – namely:
 - covers only energy export pipelines that originate in Russia, and not those originating outside and transiting through Russia – *thus, safe harbor for the CPC pipeline*
 - and would not target investments / activities related to standard repair / maintenance of pipelines already in commercial operation as of August 2017
 - See slide 7 re the newest developments (featuring US-Germany agreement and sanctions waivers that should allow NS2 to be completed, etc.) as of August 2021, and slide 63 re 2019-21 PEESA / NDAA 2020 and PEESCA / NDAA 2021 background etc.

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- *CAATSA has thus introduced a range of possible “secondary sanctions” – i.e., aimed at non-US persons (as well as potential new sanctions against US persons for certain conduct)*
 - whether or not there is any US person / US nexus
 - but OFAC’s Oct. 2017 CAATSA Guidance reflects recognition that it would be inappropriate to penalize any / all foreigners’ activities – *i.e.*, various possible dealings with SSIs (as opposed to SDNs) that aren’t prohibited for a US person
 - for example
 - per OFAC’s section 226 Guidance, FFIs are not to be subject to sanctions solely on basis of knowingly facilitating significant financial transactions on behalf of an SSI listed under Directives 1-4
 - and per OFAC’s section 228 Guidance (appearing as FAQs [544-546](#) – and see FAQs [585](#), [589](#) and [590](#) as well):
 - ✓ a transaction isn’t “significant” if US persons wouldn’t need a specific OFAC license to participate in it
 - ✓ and if involves only an SSI entity there must also be a deceptive practice (attempt to obscure, conceal, evade) to be considered “significant”
 - ✓ and even if an SSI entity is involved, and also involves deceptive practices, it is still not automatically “significant” – rather, totality of circumstances (bearing in mind the below-specified factors) are considered
 - ✓ see updated / slightly refined [FAQ 545](#), as of 5 Jan. 2021
 - *but, caveat re the above and below references to US gov’t agency “guidances” or FAQs:*
 - *they may be changed without notice (e.g., the July 2020 amended State Dep’t Guidance re CAATSA sec. 232)*
 - *and in any event are not alone dispositive or otherwise sufficient to pursue a particular course of action, without specific agency authorization and/or targeted professional advice*

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- what is a “significant” transaction (in “totality of the facts and circumstances”)?
 - in the State Dep't and OFAC Oct. 2017 Guidances, there are slightly differing elaborations of the “totality of facts and circumstances” factors taken into account, in view of the differing focuses of the specific CAATSA provisions at issue – but basic similarity
 - the State Dep't Guidance on section 231 implementation (re transactions with LSP-listed Russian defense / intelligence entities) highlights
 - ✓ relation to / significance of US national security and foreign policy interests, and significance of defense / intelligence nature
 - ✓ versus goods / services for purely civilian end-use / end-user weighing heavily against determination of significance
 - ✓ and also notes that unity with allied countries will be taken into account as a factor ... even with regard to such countries' purchase of Russian military equipment (from entities on the CAATSA section 231 List)
 - ✓ and see elaboration on this in State Dept's Sept. 2018 [release](#) / press conf. [transcript](#)
 - the State Dep't Guidance on section 225 (re investments into certain Russian oil projects) notes, among relevant factors, “the relation and significance of the investment to the Russian energy sector”
 - the OFAC Guidances on sections 226 (re certain energy or defense-related activities etc.) and 228 (facilitating significant transactions for any sanctioned entity etc.) set out several factors
 - ✓ keying on size, number, frequency, nature, management's level of awareness / whether part of pattern of conduct / nexus with blocked person (for FFIs' financial transactions) / impact on statutory objectives / whether involves deceptive practices
 - ✓ and other factors deemed relevant on case-by-case basis
 - ✓ note: the Russia-Turkey S-400 missile system sale was deemed “significant” (see slide [44](#))

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA section 241 Report and Lists:
 - US Treasury Dep't in January 2018 issued its required Report to Congress (per CAATSA sec. 241) re Russia's senior political figures, oligarchs and parastatal entities
 - Comprising an [unclassified main report](#) with list-appendices, and a classified annex
 - This Report was not a sanctions list (as stated in the Report itself, and in OFAC's accompanying FAQ [552](#), and in CAATSA sec. 241 itself)
 - The unclassified part
 - listed 114 senior political figures – in the Presidential Administration, Cabinet of Ministers, and “other senior political leaders” (including the CEOs of many of Russia's largest majority state-owned companies such as Messrs. Miller, Sechin, Gref, Kostin and Chemezov – *some of whom were already or have since become SDNs*)
 - and 96 “oligarchs” – Russian individuals having a net worth estimated at \$1 billion (apparently just taken from the Forbes list, set out in alphabetical order ... *a few having since become SDNs – see slide [35](#) above*)
 - The classified annex (submitted only to Congress) apparently featured
 - a list of Russia's “parastatal entities” (companies having ≥25% state ownership and 2016 revenues of >\$2 billion – see such an unofficial [list](#), in Russian, created / published by *Kommersant* newspaper on 30 Jan. 2018), an assessment of their role in Russia's economy, etc.
 - the oligarchs' (apparently including some not included on the unclassified list of 96) “closeness to the Russian regime” and sources of income, location of assets, etc.
 - an overview of key US economic sectors' exposure to Russian persons and entities
 - an analysis of possible impact of additional sanctions on these persons / entities

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- The April 2018 SDN individuals designations (slide [35](#)) came from among those on the Jan. 2018 List
- And subsequent public news reports and further private sense
 - that some leading oligarchs have been restructuring holdings to reduce potential or actual sanctions exposure
 - and a number of state / “parastatal” companies are making preparations for possible further sanctions imposition
- Note also Jan. 2020 [news report](#) of an Asian gov’t declining to go forward on a proposed project with a Russian co. – apparently just because its principal is on the Oligarchs List; but apparently now reported to be going forward despite this
- And a few legal challenges against inclusion on this List (e.g., successful Gapontsev case – slide [38](#))
- *Bottom-line note: companies considering dealing with any individuals or entities on these lists should have in mind the additional risks / due diligence concerns raised, and proceed with caution*
- And companion January 2018 report to Congress on the Effects of Expanding Sanctions to include Russian Sovereign Debt and Derivative Products (per CAATSA sec. 242)
 - Had an [unclassified main text](#); not clear if it also had a classified annex
 - Did not recommend in favor of such sanctions expansion (given the effects this would have on the ban on US and European, as well as the Russian, financial markets)
 - But note that a limited version of this sanction – ban on US banks’ participating in primary market for Russian *non-ruble* sovereign debt – became one of the CBW Act second-round measures in 2019 (see slides [64-68](#) below)
 - This limited Trump Administration measure has so far served to forestall Congressional appetite for possible broader Russian sovereign debt ban (*but more may now be brewing – see slide [11](#) above*)
- See also [Executive Order 13849](#) of 20 Sept. 2018 – re implementation of certain CAATSA sections, and see related OFAC FAQ [627](#) of 20 Sept. 2018 on this

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- Some further CAATSA interpretative / application points
 - *Important issue*: whether all / any of these tightened and new anti-Russia secondary sanctions may be imposed against *Russian* as well as other non-US companies / individuals
 - by the technical CAATSA wording, yes – though such imposition against “target-country” persons isn’t traditional in US sanctions practice
 - and the fact of only CAATSA section 226 (amending UFGA section 5) being expressly aimed at “*Russian and other foreign financial institutions*” (emphasis added) might be taken as another sign that otherwise Russian entities/individuals are not intended to be caught – *i.e.*, that they are and can continue to be more easily targeted by existing/future *primary* sanctions as SDNs or SSIs
 - but in fact
 - a number of Russian companies and individuals were SDN-designated in 2018 for cyber-related activities under CAATSA section 224 (and some Russian companies / individuals already put on the section 231 LSP List, and others might be vulnerable to same)
 - and the NS2-related designations (per CAATSA sec. 232 and PEESA/PEESCA) in 2021 – see slide [7](#) etc.
 - In any event, here again, the mere possibility / threat of such application against otherwise non-sanctioned or at least non-SDN Russian companies / banks now makes some of them pause before doing possible sanctions-targeted business with sanctioned or possibly sanctioned Russian companies (especially with SDNs) under any of the CAATSA provisions
 - And *non-Russian* companies / banks certainly have become more cautious about doing any such business with Russian cos. (whether sanction targets or not) in general ... all the more so with the April 2018 SDN designations (core-economy oligarchs / their companies) and some newer US actions

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- See a [reported](#) Jan. 2020 Finnish court decision dismissing claim by Boris Rotenberg, a US-designated SDN, that certain Scandinavian banks refused to serve his Euro accounts
- And a similar (Sept. 2019) English court [judgement](#) that upheld a bank's secondary sanctions risk argument against (non-USD) payment to creditor (a Vekselberg-affiliated entity); and also [reported](#) Dec. 2020 Swiss court ruling against same Vekselberg affiliate (involving USD deposit at Swiss bank – so, involved primary sanctions)
- See also interesting 2018 English court [judgement](#) in the *Mamancochet* case involving claim vs. UK insurers controlled by US persons on Iranian insured loss
- Also a Singapore arbitration filed by Mordashov-owned Power Machines ("PM") vs. Petrovietnam ("PV" – Vietnam's state oil & gas co.) – per Nov. 2019 [press report](#) (and then Jan. 2020 [press report](#) that PM willing to carry on with project per non-USD payments)
- But see Nov. 2020 English court [decision](#) rejecting loan debtor PDVSA's sanctions defense argument for non-payment: seen as "return to orthodoxy" under English law – and also the Dec. 2020 French court [decision](#) re US secondary sanctions
- Note also this series of [reported](#) European court cases
 - holding that European companies' refusal to perform under contracts (e.g., with an Iran or Cuba entity) for fear of exposure to US secondary sanctions may well not be justified by force majeure – and may also violate [EU Blocking Statute](#)
 - similar April 2020 Dutch court decision in the PGP case (see [report](#))
 - and now May 2021 ECJ Opinion in Bank Melli case (see slide [13](#))
- Note: there is still a CAATSA exemption for Russian suppliers for NASA or DoD space launches
- And note the Russian counter-measures enacted in response to CAATSA and the April 2018 SDN designations – and more still to come? (see slides [14](#) and [86-90](#))

CAATSA / Guidances / Lists (*cont'd*)

- CAATSA – potential penalties (same as for OFAC / BIS regs. violations – based on underlying laws)
 - Civil: \$311,562 (per most recent inflation adjustment) *per violation*, or up to twice the value of the transaction that was the basis for violation
 - Criminal: up to \$1 million per violation, and individuals could be imprisoned (for up to 20 years) for criminal violations
 - These being in addition to the CAATSA-referenced (see primarily section 235) menus of potential sanctions themselves
 - for non-US persons, involving various penalties re business in/with the US (and which can also include some possible personal penalties against CEOs / other officers of a sanctioned company)
 - note also OFAC's Dec. 2020 [announcement](#) of new Non-SDN Menu Based (NS-MBS) [List](#) – primarily re CAATSA sec. 235
- Possible consultation with US authorities
 - Many US, allied-nation and other companies have been seeking private clarifications from State and Treasury Departments (and licenses) re the possible CAATSA application to their Russian dealings
 - For example, note the reported approach to / blessing from State Dep't re a major non-US energy company's participation in Russia deepwater drilling in 2017 (and other companies' reported similar consultations re Russian unconventional resource project participation)
 - And India's apparently getting a specific waiver to protect it from CAATSA section 231 sanctions in connection with a major new arms purchase from Russia, under a special US defense law provision amending CAATSA to allow this (*contrast with treatment of China – see slide 44*)
 - But most Russian companies seem hesitant to seek such, unless they need to
 - e.g., already-designated SDNs applying for delisting – *including En+, RUSAL, GAZ, etc. ... see slide 38*
 - and some more direct court challenges to SDN and/or Oligarch List designations (see slide 38 above)

Export Pipeline Sanctions

- See slide [7](#) re
 - US-Germany agreement that apparently will allow Nord Stream 2 to be completed by Russian pipelaying vessels etc.
 - Despite the existing PEESA/PEESCA-based sanctions and waivers
 - And threatened further action in US Congress (though seems unlikely/futile by now)
- See slide [55](#) re the related CAATSA section 232 (which now seems essentially moot as well with regard to NS2 – given that Western companies that were assisting have evidently by now all been scared off by the various sanctions)
- We can elaborate further on any of this, including
 - The whole PEESA / PEESCA (and implementing National Defense Authorization Acts (“NDAA”)) history over the past few years
 - Successive official guidances under CAATSA section 232
 - And all other aspects

CBW Act Sanctions

- Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (“CBW Act”) and related EO 12851 of June 1993
- Imposition of CBW Act new second-round sanctions against Russia
 - per State Dep’t announcement 20 August 2021 and coordinated OFAC and BIS actions (see slides [9-10](#)), following [March](#) 2021 first-round sanctions for the Navalny poisoning
 - building on / overlapping with the 2018 and 2019 two rounds of such sanctions imposed for the Skripal poisoning, still in effect
- Effectiveness term/conditions
 - Minimum 12 months, and can be removed thereafter but only upon Russia’s meeting several conditions (assurances of future preparation / no unlawful use of lethal chemical/biological weapons against its own nationals, and restitution to Navalny) which Russia has never satisfied (or indeed make any effort to) in 2021 just as in 2018-19 – thus, all still in effect (see immediately below)
- Bottom-line cumulative CBW Act (and related) restrictions on Russia from the two Skripal rounds and two Navalny rounds all taken together (subject to and see notes re: national security-based waivers of / exceptions from certain of these new restrictions and practical effects)
 - US opposition to any loan or financial assistance to Russia by int’l financial institutions (IFIs)
 - but there has been very little if any such loan / assistance activity to Russia in recent years in any event
 - and the US, while having weighty vote, doesn’t have formal veto power over these (World Bank, IMF)
 - Prohibition on US banks’ (i) participating in the primary market for non-ruble denominated Russian sovereign debt, and (ii) lending non-ruble and ruble denominated funds to the Russian government

CBW Act Sanctions (*cont'd*)

- The ban on lending to the Russian “government” is (still) narrowly defined as being only to the “Russian sovereign” (see slide [68](#)) – so that lending to Russian gov’t-owned companies have been/is untouched by this sanction (but OFAC Directives 1 and 2 still restrict lending to the designated state-owned banks and energy companies – see slides [16–17](#) above)
- and OFAC [Directive 1](#) of 15 April 2021 (per EO 14024 of same date – providing its own new authority ... not CBW Act based) now expands the Russian sovereign debt ban to ruble-denominated on primary market (but still no ban re secondary market – may still come)
- see related FAQ [890](#), and updated FAQs [673](#), [674](#), [675](#), [676](#)
- and see slide [9](#) for market reports on this
- Additional export licensing restrictions on Dep’t of Commerce controlled goods / technology
 - on goods/technology controlled for chemical and biological weapons proliferation reasons under National Security (NS) controls, and also now nuclear/missile technology related
 - waivers (license exceptions) apply here on case-by-case basis (and with same presumption of denial for state-owned / -funded entities)
 - but such availability of waivers now tightened by early 2020 Commerce/BIS rules, and now the new Navalny-related CBW Act sanctions (see slides [9](#), [28](#))
- Termination of assistance to Russia under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, except for urgent humanitarian assistance and food/agricultural commodities etc. (already imposed in 2018 – little/no practical effect)
- Termination of (a) sales to Russia under the Arms Export Control Act of any defense articles or services, and (b) licenses/other approvals for export to Russia of any items on US Munitions List – except in support of commercial space cooperation, but only for a six-month transition period, and government space cooperation (same)
- Termination of all foreign military financing for Russia under the Arms Export Control Act (same)
- Denial to Russia of any credit, credit guarantees, or other financial assistance by any dep’t, agency or instrumentality of the USG, including the US Eximbank (same)
- Denial of new or pending permit applications to ATF for permanent importation of firearms and ammunition, as defined in the Munitions Import List (categories I and III), into the US that are manufactured or located in Russia (and see new FAQ [920](#))

CBW Act Sanctions (*cont'd*)

- Waivers

- And some of the waivers to restrictions on arms sales and commerce NS-sensitive items that were supplemented in connection with the Skripal first-round CBW Act sanctions in 2018 will continue, including:
 - items eligible for some standard license exceptions (need to carefully check the details) – i.e., no license application needed
 - safety-of-flight items (for civil passenger aviation) – case-by-case licensing still OK
 - “deemed exports/reexports” to Russian nationals in the US – licensing permitted on case-by-case basis unless otherwise prohibited
 - to wholly-owned US (and other foreign-company) subsidiaries in Russia – on same basis
 - in support of government space cooperation – on same basis
 - for state-owned/-funded enterprises – case-by-case licensing, but presumption of denial (*not clear*)
- But other export-related waivers from 2018 are now removed, including
 - items that were subject to some other standard license exceptions (again, need to carefully check the details)
 - for export/reexport of NS items to commercial end-users in Russia for civil end-uses (such applications will now be reviewed under “presumption of denial”)
 - for exports of US Munitions List items and NS items in support of commercial space flight activities were to be removed following a six-month transition period (after which, subject to presumption of denial)

CBW Act Sanctions (*cont'd*)

- Notes re NS-sensitive goods and technologies (for the CBW Act export restrictions in Russia)
 - These being items designated as “NS 1” or “NS 2” on the [Commerce Control List](#) (“CCL” – Supp. No. 1 to Part 740 of EAR), all of which had been exportable with license for Russia pre-2018
 - There are many such items – spanning the whole CCL: nuclear materials, facilities and equipment; special materials, equipment, chemicals, microorganisms, toxins etc.; materials processing; electronics; computers; technology and information security; sensors and lasers; navigation and avionics; marine; and aerospace / propulsion
 - Keep in mind also the BIS Feb. 2020 final rule (see slide [31](#)), which may already have further narrowed the announced CBW Act imposition of exceptions/waivers even before the 2021 new overlay
- *The details of the export restrictions imposed, and application of the remaining exceptions/waivers, is a particularly complex area; careful case-by-case consultation is needed*

CBW Act Sanctions (*cont'd*)

- Further notes
 - OFAC CBW Act [Directive](#) of 2 August 2019 – provided definitions/details on the US bank lending sanctions, confirming that:
 - foreign branches of US banks, as well as US branches and subs of foreign banks, are covered
 - gives further wide definition of US “bank” – including depositories, securities/options brokers and dealers, forward contract and foreign exchange merchants, securities and commodities exchanges, investment companies, and employee benefit plans
 - confirms that “Russian sovereign” means any Russian ministry, agency or sovereign fund (including Central Bank, National Wealth Fund, Ministry of Finance) – but does *not* include Russian state-owned enterprises (though again, keep in mind OFAC SSI Directives 1 and 2)
 - and now see also OFAC Directive 1 of 15 April 2021 (related “US financial institutions” broad definition) and OFAC FAQ [891](#) (narrow scope of covered Russian sovereign instrumentalities)
 - State Dep't [Notice](#) in 26 August 2019 Fed. Reg.
 - memorialized the new CBW-related export control sanction, but also incorporated and appeared to somewhat expand/adjust the first-round export control sanction (slides [64-66](#))
 - *so special caution is needed with regard to any possibly sensitive exports / reexports to Russia (and all the more so per newest Commerce/BIS rules – see generally slides [11](#), [27-34](#))*
- Note also the risk of imposition of secondary sanctions on non-US persons under CAATSA (see slides [49-62](#)) for certain violations of the CBW Act sanctions
 - The CBW Act (and related EO) isn't among the sanctions acts specifically covered under CAATSA (see its section 222(a))
 - But CAATSA sec. 228 catches anyone who “facilitates a significant transaction” for or on behalf of “any person subject to [US] sanctions...” (i.e., could mean *any* sanctions); and would now be caught under EO 14024 of 15 April 2021 in any event

Proposed Further US Laws

- See slides [8](#) and [11](#) for newest proposed array of additional sanctions laws as of early Sept. 2021
 - *no meaningful recent forward actions sensed on any of them*
- DASKA Act (DASKAA)
 - Dec. 2019 amended [draft](#) approved by Senate Foreign Relations Committee; and Senate sponsors' 18 Dec. 2019 [statement](#), and State Dept's 17 Dec. 2019 [letter](#) stating Administration's opposing views
 - As of fall 2020 some renewed focus on possibly moving it forward to enactment – though nothing more on this yet in 2021
 - Would amend/enlarge CAATSA in various ways (incl. enlarging scope of possible secondary sanctions – applicable to non-US persons) ... including mandating sanctions against:
 - Russian malicious cyber activities; shipbuilding industry; individuals and parastatal entities thought to be close to President Putin (and their family members, and financial institutions engaging in significant transactions with them)
 - a wide range of Russian domestic energy projects, and global energy projects involving certain Russian companies, including
 - making investments in LNG "export facility located outside of [Russia]" (with low \$ thresholds)
 - making investments in energy project (unclear meaning) outside Russia that also has involvement by a Russian parastatal or state-owned/controlled company (where total value of project is >\$250 million)
 - that sell, lease, provide to Russia goods, services, technology, financing or support that could directly/significantly contribute to Russia's ability to develop/produce crude oil resources in Russia (including with respect to associated infrastructure)
 - excludes maintenance of existing projects
 - USG to issue guidance as to (i) scope/application of the exception, and (ii) listing specific covered goods, services, technology, financing, support
 - US persons' dealing in Russian sovereign debt (this would further expand the current limited CBW Act ban re Russia's sovereign debt – see slide [65](#))
 - Menu of possible sanctions is from existing CAATSA (mainly re commerce in/with US)

Proposed Further US Laws (*cont'd*)

- And at least three more sanctions bills were introduced in Congress in 2020
 - Sept. 2020 proposed “Russia Bounty Response Act of 2020” – by Sen. Menendez and five other Democratic senators (keying on the Afghanistan bounty payment allegations, and containing a wide range of proposed sanctions consequences – see [press release](#) and [full text](#))
 - Sept. 2020 proposed “Holding Russia Accountable for Malign Activities Act of 2020” – by three Democratic senators and Republican Sens. Rubio and Romney (keying on the Navalny poisoning – less elaborate, see [press release](#) and [full text](#))
 - Oct. 2020 proposed “Safeguarding Elections by Countering Unchallenged Russia Efforts” (SECURE) Act by five House representatives (like DASKAA, would impose broader restrictions on US persons dealing in Russian sovereign debt than are in the current CBW Act (see slides [64-68](#)), including Central Bank or Treasury bonds and certain FX swap agreements – with some exceptions for shortest-term debt (see [press release](#) and [full text](#)))
- Further anti-Russia sanctions [package](#) proposed in June 2020 by a Task Force of the Republican Study Committee (“RSC” – a national security focused group in the US House of Representatives)
 - Advocates DASKAA enactment and further strengthening of the NS2 sanctions (the latter already well in progress – see slide [8](#) above)
 - And, among other things
 - SDN designation of VEB (Vnesheconombank – already an SSI entity under OFAC Directive 1, see slide [19](#))
 - sanctions on SWIFT (Society of Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) until it expels Russia from the SWIFT system
 - designation Russia as state sponsor of terrorism
- Momentum for any of these seems blunted for now – by Biden Administration’s April 2021 and follow-on sanctions packages, and other US domestic political factors at present

EU Sectoral Sanctions

Overview

- The EU sanctions regime (in Council Reg. No 833/2014 of 31 July 2014, most recently amended by [Reg. 2019/1163](#) of 5 July 2019, focuses on financial, energy, and dual-use / military sectors
 - Now in effect to 31 January 2022 (and likely to keep being extended for now)
 - Coordinated with US on many essentials ... but some key differences, *e.g.*:
 - No sanctions on anything re Russian gas-focused projects (given Europe's dependence on Russian gas supplies) ... and maybe not interpreted to cover condensate (see slide [24](#) above)?
 - And no sanctions on any oil & gas projects with Russian participation outside Russia (or on Russian energy export pipelines)
 - And guidance notice exempting mere correspondent banking (payment / settlement services) from the loan / credit bans – thus more lenient than analogous US rule / interpretation (*but see slide [85](#) re new UK interp.*)
 - Unlike the US, no broad-reach blacklisting into leading commercial entities, CEOs of leading state-owned cos. (and no Rosneft for business with Venezuela, no Chinese cos. for business with Iran, etc.)
 - And no secondary sanctions (like the US CAATSA, etc.)
- Much easier to grasp the basic EU rules than the US ones (and all the more so now, with all the newer US acts and regs.) – essentially all in one document's four corners
- *But the devil (?) is in the diversity:*
 - Each member state competent authority interprets, authorizes (where called for) or denies, enforces, ... and sets / imposes its own penalties
 - Unlike the US ... where this is all a uniform, federal-level matter
 - Though some coordination / consistency is called for in the Regulation
 - And see EU Commission [Guidance Note](#) of Dec. 2014 (as amended most recently 25 Aug. 2017) – FAQs

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

- And now, with Brexit done as of 31 Dec. 2020, the EU sanctions no longer apply in UK
 - Replaced by UK's own essentially identical (for now) regime
 - But emerging interpretive differences between the EU and UK Regs already create some real questions (see slides [84-85](#) below, and FT [report](#))

Energy

- Per the initial July 2014 energy-sector sanctions regime (Reg. art. 3):
 - Prior authorization is required for sale, supply, transfer or export, directly or indirectly, of the items listed *in Annex II* (see link to the Reg. at slide [18](#))
 - to *any person or entity* in Russia or elsewhere
 - if for use in Russia (clarified to include its EEZ and Continental Shelf – but not clear whether includes Russian sector of Caspian Sea)
 - Authorization is to be considered / granted by competent authority “*of the member state where the exporter is established*”, per other EU rules

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- But authorization shall *not* be granted for supply etc. of Annex II items
 - if reasonable grounds to determine that is for Russian oil (incl. condensate?) E&P projects:
 - in waters deeper than 150 meters (circa 492 feet)
 - in offshore areas north of the Arctic Circle
 - in shale formations by way of hydraulic fracturing (but not including E&P activities *through* shale formations to locate/extract oil from non-shale reservoirs)
 - *except for*
 - execution of obligation arising from contract concluded before 1 Aug. 2014 – or, per Dec. 2014 liberalization, from “ancillary contracts necessary for the execution of such contracts”, or
 - items necessary in case of certain events threatening health, safety or environment
 - in fact, there have been many such license applications / approvals since 2014 to date (for European and US companies, and EU subsidiaries / JVs of Russian energy companies)
 - and further note – EU has not followed US CAATSA / OFAC Directive 4 expansion of coverage to any such project worldwide having $\geq 33\%$ ownership or $> 50\%$ voting interest by designated Russian company(ies)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- Restricted activities include (per Reg. art. 3a, as amended Dec. 2014):
 - Provision, directly or indirectly, of specified types of “associated services necessary for” deepwater, Arctic offshore, shale oil E&P projects (same litany-detail as for art. 3 – see slide [72](#) above) in Russia including in its EEZ and Continental Shelf (again note uncertainty re Russia’s Caspian zone):
 - these specified types of services:
 - *drilling*
 - *well testing*
 - *logging*
 - *completion services*
 - *supply of specialised floating vessels**
 - [* Note: EU Guidance Note FAQ 10 exempts “supply vessels such as platform supply vessels, anchor handling tug and supply vessels or emergency response vessels”]
 - and the same exceptions apply for
 - execution of an obligation arising from a prior (pre-12 Sept. 2014) contract / agreement or follow-on ancillary contracts, or
 - services necessary in case of certain events threatening health, safety or environment
 - *again, otherwise apparently no scope for authorization here – rather, a pure prohibition for / to all (if neither of the above two carve-outs applies)*
 - but may be attainable for activities (per Reg. arts 3 or 3a) in shallow-water portion of mixed shallow/deep water field?

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Energy (*cont'd*)

- Also, provision of the following services related to any Annex II items *needs authorization* from national competent authority (per art. 4.3 – existing since initial July 2014 version of the Reg., and as refined by Dec. 2014 amendment):
 - Technical assistance (or brokering services) re Annex II items and re provision, manufacture, maintenance and use of those items directly or indirectly
 - to anyone in Russia (including its EEZ and Shelf)
 - or to anyone in any other country if concerns items for use in Russia (including EEZ / Shelf)
 - Financing or financial assistance re Annex II items – including grants, loans and export credit insurance
 - for any sale, supply, transfer or export of those items
 - or for any provision of related technical assistance
 - also (as above for technical assistance) directly or indirectly to anyone in Russia (including its EEZ / Shelf) or to anyone in another country for use in Russia (including its EEZ / Shelf)
 - Per art. 4.4, authorizations may be granted on same basis as set out in art. 3 (and possible emergency services, with prompt post-reporting – per arts. 4.3 and 3.5)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Finance – for Energy (and Military) Sector Companies

- Prohibits (per Reg. art. 5.2) direct or indirect purchase or sale of, provision of investment services for or assistance in issuance of, or other dealings with, certain debt or equity “transferable securities” (and money-market instruments) issued after 12 Sept. 2014 by
 - *Rosneft, Transneft, Gazpromneft* (the three currently designated entities engaged in “sale or transportation of crude oil or petroleum products” – per Annex VI [*Novatek isn't included*]), their non-EU subs (>50% owned), or persons or entities acting at their behalf / direction
 - Applies to debt securities, including money market instruments, with maturity >30 days (note OFAC Directive 2 now is = 60 days max.)
 - And note the relevant “transferable securities” definition: “... which are negotiable on the capital market” (some uncertainty re whether equity investment in LLC-type cos. is covered: some specialist practitioners take the view that it isn't – but can't surely rely on this)
 - And see EU Guidance Note FAQ 36 allowing modifications to transferable securities depending on materiality – *i.e.*, if would not “actually or potentially result in additional capital being made available to a targeted entity”
- Same basic prohibition re the three designated Russian entities connected with military-sector goods / services – including United Aircraft Corp. (per Annex V), with exception for space / nuclear sector entities (and a hydrazine exception)
- And note that the EU rule / interpretation re depositary receipts (GDRs etc.) appears to be stricter than that of the US (compare EU Guidance Note FAQ 37-39 with OFAC FAQ 391)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Finance – for Russian Banks

- Prohibits (per Reg. art. 5.1) purchase or sale of, provision of investment services for or assistance in the issuance of, or other dealings with, “transferable securities” or money-market instruments
 - issued by the 5 Russian banks designated in Annex III (Sberbank, VTB, Gazprombank, VEB, Rosselkhozbank – Russian Agricultural Bank)
 - or their non-EU subs (>50% owned)
 - so, essentially the same coverage as the US OFAC sanctions
 - or persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction
- Applies to
 - debt securities issued (i) 2 Aug. - 12 Sept. 2014, with maturity >90 days; and (ii) after 12 Sept. 2014, with maturity ≥30 days (*note OFAC Directive 1 now is = 14 days max.*)
 - and to equity securities issued after 12 Sept. 2014 (as does US OFAC Directive 1)
- See EU Guidance Note FAQs 33-34, addressing what EU subs of targeted Russian bank entities can / can't do (including warning re passing on funds = circumvention)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Loans – for Energy (and Military) Companies and Banks

- Prohibits (per Reg. art. 5.3) directly or indirectly making or being “part of any arrangement to make” new loans / credits with maturity >30 days after 12 Sept. 2014 to any entity covered under the previous two slides – namely
 - the three Russian energy-sector companies (per Annex VI – see slide [76](#))
 - the five Russian banks (per Annex III – see slide [77](#))
 - the three Russian military-sector companies (per Annex V)
 - or their non-EU subs, or persons acting on their behalf or at their direction
- And see EU Guidance Note, FAQ 31
 - rollover of an existing debt is allowed, subject to 30-day maturity restriction
 - but succession of rollovers each with maturity of ≤ 30 days may = circumvention
- Certain carve-outs provided (per Reg. art. 5.3, amended as of Dec. 2014)
 - *Trade finance exemption*: for “loans or credit having a specific / documented objective to provide financing for non-prohibited imports or exports of goods and non-financial services between the [EU] and any third State” (intended for use by targeted entity)
 - *But not* for purpose of *funding* any such entity (see art. 12)
 - Practical approach to the interplay here: compliant vs. circumvention? (see Reg. art. 12)
 - And see EU Guidance Note FAQ 11: this exception “should be interpreted narrowly” (but also FAQs 11-21 clarifications)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Loans – for Energy (and Military) Companies and Banks (*cont'd*)

- And note these further EU Guidance Note FAQ clarifications
 - Post-Sept. 2014 cancellation of a pre-Sept. 2014 loan = prohibited new loan (FAQ 25)
 - A new term deposit at a targeted bank isn't barred (but see FAQ 27 re circumvention)
 - Correspondent banking (or other payment / settlement services) is in itself ≠ making or being part of arrangement to make new loan or credit (FAQ 28, and see FAQs 1 and 2) – *contrast this with the US/OFAC position, see slide [20](#)*
 - Payment terms / delayed payment for goods / services ≠ per se prohibited loan/credit – but warning that may suggest circumvention if (per FAQ 30)
 - “not in line with normal business practice”, or
 - “have been substantially extended” since 12 Sept. 2014
- And see FAQ 12 on activities with regard to L/Cs involving designated companies (compare with OFAC FAQ 395)
- Some forms of prepayment finance for Russian oil producers are permissible (and occurring daily)
- Note the Feb. 2020 UK Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) [announcement](#) of penalty against a major UK-based bank for making several loans to then-Sberbank-sub. Denizbank of Turkey in violation of Reg. article 5.3

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Loans – for Energy (and Military) Companies and Banks (*cont'd*)

- And note art. 5.4 (introduced by Dec. 2014 clarification) – carving out from the general prohibition *new drawdowns / disbursements under pre-12 Sept. loan / credit contracts*
 - If
 - “all the terms and conditions” were agreed pre-12 Sept. 2014 and haven’t been modified since then; and
 - before 12 Sept. 2014 “a contractual maturity date has been fixed for the repayment in full of all funds made available ...”
 - Possible issues re
 - whether “all” terms and conditions really mean *all* (ref. FAQ 30 by analogy?)
 - treatment of typical carry-type loans – re the “repayment in full” aspect (in case no commercial discovery)
- Again, see the various EU Guidance Note FAQ clarifications
- Note – here again, there have been many such license applications / approvals to date (experience varying by member state)

EU Sectoral Sanctions (*cont'd*)

Important Overarching Provisions

- The Reg. also bans knowing and intentional participation in activities having object or effect of circumventing the above prohibitions (Reg. art. 12). UK has only somewhat similar to this bullet (items 15 and 55 of the Russia Sanctions Regs.)
- But, per art. 10, no liability w/o knowledge or reasonable cause to suspect that actions would violate
- Jurisdictional reach – the Reg. applies (art. 13, and see EU Guidance Note FAQ 8):
 - Within EU territory (or on board aircraft / vessels under member state jurisdiction)
 - To any person, wherever located, who is an EU member state national
 - To any entity, wherever acting, that is incorporated in an EU member state
 - To any entity “in respect of any business done in whole or in part within the Union”
- *Note the distinctions between US / EU regs. overall reach – especially now with CAATSA*
- And the “no claims ... shall be satisfied” provision but without prejudice to “judicial review of the legality of the non-performance of contractual obligations in accordance with this Regulation” (Reg. art. 11) – interesting for lawyers
- And note the Sept. 2018 EU General Court decisions upholding the sectoral sanctions against challenges by Rosneft, Gazpromneft, Sberbank, VTB, VEB and others
 - Rejecting challenges brought some years ago by Rosneft, Gazpromneft, Sberbank, VTB, VEB and others
 - And then the European Court of Justice (ECJ – the EU’s top court) affirmed these rejections / dismissals in its June 2020 rulings in appeals by [VTB](#) and [VEB](#), and 17 Sept. 2020 ruling in appeal by [Rosneft](#)

EU Crimea Sanctions

- Reg. No. 692/2014 (on the basis of Council Decision 2014/386/CFSP) as amended
 - Extended on 21 June 2021 to 23 June 2022
 - Bars sale, supply, transfer, export of goods and technology (per this Reg's Annex II) to any Crimean entity or individual or for use there
 - Covers oil & gas / other mineral resources and E&P, transport, telecoms, power sectors
 - And further general ban on financing, corporate acquisitions, JVs, investment in real estate, construction / engineering services, investment services, tourism services
- And see EU [Information Note](#) to EU Business Operating and/or Investing in Crimea / Sevastopol (Joint Working Doc. SWD/2014) of July 2014
 - As amended most recently in Jan. 2018
 - Gives updated summary of restrictions now in effect for EU-connected commercial activity there (though no real interpretive guidance)
- And EU's Sept. 2017 blacklist reg. (see next slide) amendment to allow member state authorities to permit certain types of payments to Crimean Sea Ports
- Note the still-reverberating 2017 scandal re Siemens gas turbines that found their way to Crimea (evidently without the company's knowledge and despite its compliance program / efforts)
- And NL-based Booking.com's 2018 announced discontinuance of tourist booking for Crimea
- Some new EU designations in 2019 following the Russia-Ukraine Black Sea naval incident, and in early 2020 in connection with Crimean elections

EU Direct Sanctions (SDN-like, etc.)

- The EU's SDN-like "blacklist" Reg. No. 269/2014 of March 2014, and with updates
- And more names have been added in several update regs. to date
- Individuals and entities, including those added
 - In January 2020 in connection with Crimean elections; and in March 2019 in connection with the Ukraine/Russia Kerch Strait naval incident
 - In 2018 in connection with construction of Kerch Bridge (to Crimea), and in 2017 per the Siemens turbines affair
- All dealings with the blocked assets of listed persons (or their subs or certain other affiliates) etc. are generally prohibited
- And see EU Commission [Opinion](#) of 8 June 2021 and [Opinion](#) of 19 June 2020 re financial and other transactions with non-blacklisted entities that are owned or otherwise controlled by a blacklisted / designated person per Reg. 269/2014
 - *Note the broad "control" understanding, including management and/or financial control or major influence reflected here* – these rulings not being specific to the Russia sanctions
 - And similar standard at Section 4.1 of UK December 2020 [General Guidance](#)
- Now in process of extension from 15 Sept. 2021 (to March 2022)
- Several Russians including the FSB Head (in connection with the 2018 Skripal poisoning in England, and now the Navalny poisoning in Russia)
 - Are on the EU's new [list](#) of chemical weapons proliferation/use violators as of Oct. 2020
 - And 2 March 2021 [designations](#) of four state officials under new EU Global Human Rights sanctions regime (GHRSR) – see slide [13](#)
- And note also the EU's separate June 2021 blacklist sanctioning of several Belarus businessmen (and Russia's Mikhail Gutseriev) etc. – see slide [15](#)

UK Sanctions (post-Brexit)

- Brexit transition period ended on 31 Dec. 2020 – the EU sanctions (see slides [71-83](#)) thus lost effect in UK as of that date
- But the UK had already adopted its own Russia sanctions, now fully in effect
 - This is
 - the [Russia \(Sanctions\) \(EU Exit\) Regulations 2019](#) as further amended
 - its substantive provisions first came into force on 31 Jan. 2020, then fully on 31 Dec. 2020
 - covers general sectoral sanctions, blacklisting sanctions, and Crimea sanctions against Russia
 - These Regs. (based on the Sanctions and Anti-Money-Laundering [Act 2018](#)) revoked / replaced the EU Regs. as of 31 Dec. 2020, and allow the UK gov't now to autonomously amend/lift the existing sanctions, impose new sanctions etc.
 - See also the accompanying [Explanatory Memo](#) from April 2019
 - explaining reasons for keeping sanctions on Russia and justifying related criminal sanctions / penalties
 - and two related reports per Sections [2\(4\)](#) and [18](#) of the underlying Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2018
 - Diverges from the EU sanctions in some rather minor particulars
 - UK gov't Nov.-Dec. 2020 exchange of letters ([inquiry](#) and [response](#)) clarifying UK sanctions policy post-Brexit
 - And the UK's underlying act on criminal liability for violations of the EU Russia sanctions – [2014 Regulations](#)
 - also note a UK law granting power to impose fine of £1 million or 50% of deal value, for EU financial sanctions breaches as of April 2017
 - now all applies to the UK's own replacement sanctions regime

UK Sanctions (post-Brexit) (*cont'd*)

- New Russia sanctions [Guidance](#) of June 2021 – updating original May 2019 and follow-on June 2020 guidances with FAQs
 - The FAQs reflect most of the same points as those comprising the EU Guidance Note last amended 2017 (see slide [18](#) above), and some latest additions
 - With these notable differences
 - banks “payment and settlement services” (i.e., corresponding banking) are construed as “making” or “being part of an arrangement to make” a new loan or credit to a targeted entity (compare UK FAQ 6 with EU FAQ 28) – *thus aligning UK’s position with the US position* (see OFAC FAQ 371)
 - the EU Regulation loan and trade finance sanction exceptions for EU subsidiaries / trade with the EU are narrowed to UK subsidiaries / trade with the UK – *which will require extra care, not to violate either rule in applicable cases*
- Sept. 2020 amended Notice and annexed list of blacklisted persons per EU Council Reg. 269/2014 (see slide [83](#))
- Also noteworthy
 - 2021 monetary penalty upheld vs. UK financial institution for Crimea-related violation of then-effective EU sanction (slide [13](#))
 - “[The Global Human Rights Sanctions Regulations 2020](#)” of July 2020, imposing SDN-like blocking sanctions on initial [list](#) of several Russian (and Saudi, Myanmar and North Korean) officials alleged to be involved in gross human rights violations
 - Oct. 2020 [enforcement](#) of sanctions against six Russian officials and a chemicals institute for the alleged Navalny poisoning under the EU’s chemical weapons sanctions regime ([implemented](#) then under the UK Chemical Weapons (Sanctions) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019), and further Aug. 2021 designations of FSB operatives (in coordination with US) re same (see slide [10](#))
 - No newest further 2021 human rights designations yet akin to the US/EU ones re Navalny imprisonment etc., but may come
 - Gov’t [initiative](#) to crack down on Russian oligarchs’ “money laundering” ... [reported](#) attention to this in early 2021
 - New licensing guidances of April and June 2021 (see slide [13](#))

Russia's Countersanctions

- Controversial anti-sanctions dispute [law](#) – came into effect in June 2020, and real practice to date
 - Seeks to force into Russian court many disputes involving Russian (and other) sanctioned persons/entities ... whether or not the dispute relates to the sanctions
 - And provides for Russian court to issue anti-suit injunction against proceedings in foreign courts or arbitral tribunals, and to award damages up to amount of damages claimed by foreign party in proceedings abroad
 - See our [Lawflash](#) of June 2020; and court practice is developing since then (we can elaborate) – Tsargrad case of April 2021 (see slide [14](#)) and the Sovfrakht case [decision](#) of Jan 2021 (finding abuse of this new law by Russian claimant)
- Other than this, as noted above, Russia seems not inclined to implement further new countersanctions against US/European countries that could substantially disrupt commercial relations
 - See the below summary history status to date
 - And an interesting 2020 published [study](#) on Russia's "Sanctions vs. Strategy" approach, from Tufts University
- Russia enacted in 2018 a law "On Measures (Countermeasures) against Unfriendly Actions of the United States of America and/or Other Foreign Governments", (the "Countermeasures Law" – full text is [here](#), unofficial English translation available on request), which provides essentially as follows:
 - Basic thrust is not to impose automatically – but rather to authorize the President or the Government to institute – various countermeasures (bans on import of goods / work / services, export bans, etc.)
 - upon finding of justification in anti-Russia sanctions measures (presumably including already-effective and possible future ones) of the US and other countries that commit unfriendly actions
 - "as well as against organizations located in the jurisdiction of [such countries], directly or indirectly controlled by [such countries] or affiliated with them, officials and citizens of [such countries], in the event such organizations, officials, and citizens are involved in the commission of unfriendly actions" vs. Russia
 - Thus, this Law as enacted may well not have substantial effect on international trade with Russia, unless/until the Western sanctions and/or general political relations worsen to an extent deemed sufficient to trigger discretionary Russian executive actions under the Law
 - But wording uncertainties (see above and next slide) awaits authoritative interpretation and/or practice to clarify

Russia's Countersanctions (*cont'd*)

- These specific types of countermeasures are authorized:
 - termination or suspension of “international cooperation” of Russia and Russian legal entities with such countries and organizations, in sectors to be determined by decision of the President
 - prohibition or restriction on import into Russia of products or raw materials that originate from such countries or are produced by such organizations, with a list of such products / raw materials to be determined by the Government – and exceptions provided for (i) goods that are indispensable to life, analogues of which are not produced in Russia (e.g., certain pharmaceuticals), and (ii) goods imported for personal use
 - prohibition or restriction on export from Russia of products or raw materials by such organizations or by citizens of such countries, again with a list of such products / raw materials to be determined by the Government
 - prohibition or restriction on performance of public-procurement-type works / services in Russia for Russian state agencies and certain state-owned legal entities, by such organizations, again with a list of such works / services to be determined by the Government
 - prohibition or restriction on participation by such organizations or by citizens of such countries in Russian privatizations, as well as in performing services on behalf of Russia in connection with such privatizations of federal state property
 - and “other measures” by decision of the President (of course, this “catch-all” provision could be the basis for enactment of possible additional countermeasures, if sanctions-related tensions deteriorate further)

Russia's Countersanctions (*cont'd*)

- There are these additional closing provisions of note:
 - the countermeasures provided in the Law are to be introduced (and removed) by the Government by decision of the President – or by the President on the basis of proposal by the Security Council
 - the President may introduce a special “national regime” (or exceptions from it) with respect to goods and services originating from unfriendly countries if such countries introduce same for Russian goods and services
- And note there is a pending set of draft [amendments](#) as of mid-2020 to a pre-existing general Special Economic Measures Law of 2006
 - which would introduce a detailed mechanism on application of freezing/blocking of assets of blacklisted persons
 - And a low greater-than-25% control threshold for entities in which blacklisted person(s) have an interest
 - Adopted at first reading by Duma in Nov. 2020 (and new Duma legal dep’t [comments](#) of April 2021)
 - And the April 2021 set of further proposed amendments, which is now in the State Duma (see slide [14](#))
- There was another proposed set of Russian law amendments in 2018 that would impose
 - Substantial administrative fines on any (foreign or local) person or company in Russia for compliance with US sanctions, and
 - Criminal liability on any Russian citizen who by willful action facilitates the imposition of such anti-Russian sanctions
 - Further in brief summary as follows:
 - The administrative violation part would be aimed at acts or omissions, for the purpose of implementing / complying with foreign sanctions, resulting in limitation or refusal of the ability of Russian citizens, companies and state entities (and their subsidiaries anywhere) to conduct “ordinary business operations or transactions”
 - The criminal violation part would be aimed at commission by a Russian citizen of willful actions facilitating the imposition of foreign sanctions against Russian persons and entities and their subsidiaries, including by providing recommendations and transfer of information that led or could have led to the imposition of foreign sanctions. Possible criminal penalties for such a violation could include substantial fine or imprisonment

Russia's Countersanctions (*cont'd*)

- There have been a series of statements from the leading Duma sponsors of this proposed legislation, upon dialogue with Russian business leaders and supported by the President's Administration, accentuating that the proposed administrative violation part (assuming this softened part remains as such if/when the bill is enacted) would be meant to cover
 - only refusal/restriction of "practically automatic"-type business dealings with Russian citizens / entities such as opening bank accounts, or sales that are by law open to any bidders etc.
 - as opposed to more individualized-type dealings such as opening / closing of bank branches (e.g., in Crimea), extending long-term credits
- This proposed 2018 act has remained essentially dormant since then – but early 2021 [report](#) that it might reactivate
- Russia also enacted a special SDN-like blocking sanctions [edict](#) in 2018, with implementing [decree](#) attaching specific designations (as [amended](#) most recently in Aug. 2021 adding 73 individuals), against Ukraine – which would have a further tightened regime under the above-noted pending law amendments (slide [88](#))
- Gov't [Decree No. 1767](#) of 30 Dec. 2018 includes threat of withholding/removing state pension funds etc. from Russian banks that cooperate with foreign sanctions against Russia (see its art. 2)

Russia's Countersanctions (*cont'd*)


- New Presidential Order No. [243](#) of 23 April 2021 empowering the Gov't to limit a number of personnel of "unfriendly" states' diplomatic missions and consulates in Russia and accompanying Gov't Decree No. [1230p](#) of 13 May 2021 setting forth such limitations for US and Czech Republic
- Foreign blocking statutes (such as Russia is in process of developing / implementing) and US law / practice:
 - What would be OFAC's (or a US court's) reaction, if Russia's blocking legislation is enacted in some form, and a company (US, European, Russian, etc.) acts in a way that violates a US sanction (e.g., deals with an SDN individual or entity) on account of the new Russian-law mandate not to reject such dealings?
 - This is a complex subject in itself, which can't be quickly summarized; suffice it to say here that
 - OFAC might take such claimed foreign-law mandate into account as one mitigating factor in an enforcement proceeding, but will not be controlled by it
 - the leading US court [decision](#) in the *United States v. Brodie* case on this subject to date – essentially rejected such a defense raised by a US company (involving in part an earlier version of the EU Blocking Statute – see also slide [61](#))

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