

FAST BREAK: 'NO-POACHING' AGREEMENTS IN HEALTHCARE

Ryan Kantor, Mark Krotoski, and Jake Harper July 26, 2018



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Ryan Kantor's practice focuses on federal and state government antitrust investigations, antitrust litigation, and counseling on antitrust and competition issues. He represents clients before the US Federal Trade Commission, US Department of Justice (DOJ), state attorneys general offices, and in federal and state courts. Ryan previously served as assistant chief of the Healthcare and Consumer Products section in the DOJ's Antitrust Division.

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Mark L. Krotoski is former Assistant Chief of the National Criminal Enforcement Section in the DOJ's Antitrust Division, supervising international criminal antitrust cartel investigations and successfully leading trial teams in prosecuting antitrust and obstruction of justice cases involving corporations and executives.

- His experience includes every phase of the cartel enforcement process.
- In addition to other DOJ leadership positions, he has nearly 20 years of experience as a federal prosecutor.
- Mark represents and advises clients on antitrust cartel investigations; cybersecurity and privacy matters; trade secret; fraud matters; white collar and government investigations.

Agenda

- Antitrust Guidance for HR Professionals
 - Focus on the Healthcare Industry
- Legal Framework
- DOJ Enforcement
- New Emphasis by Antitrust Agencies
- Information Exchanges
- Other Areas of Enforcement
- Key Issues and Recommended Steps
- Resources
- Questions and Answers

ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HR PROFESSIONALS / FOCUS ON THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY

Antitrust Guidance for HR Professionals

- Jointly issued by US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in Oct. 2016
 - "[I]ntended to alert human resource (HR)
 professionals and others involved in hiring and
 compensation decisions to potential violations of
 the antitrust laws."
 - Addresses conduct that can result in criminal or civil liability
 - Announces for the first time that the DOJ will pursue certain HR-related agreements criminally, instead of civilly, as it has historically done





ANTITRUST GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ANTITRUST DIVISION

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION

OCTOBER 2016

This document is intended to alert human resource (HR) professionals and others involved in hiring and compensation decisions to potential violations of the antitrust laws. The Department of Justice Antitrust Division (DOJ or Division) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (collectively, the federal antitrust agencies) jointly enforce the U.S. antitrust laws, which apply to competition among firms to hire employees. An agreement among competing employers to limit or fix the terms of employment for potential hires may violate the antitrust laws if the agreement constrains individual firm decision making with regard to wages, salaries, or benefits; terms of employment; or even job opportunities. HR professionals often are in the best position to ensure that their companies' hiring practices comply with the antitrust laws. In particular, HR professionals can implement safeguards to prevent inappropriate discussions or agreements with other firms seeking to hire the same employees.

Healthcare Industry Investigations

- "Combatting rising healthcare prices has been, and under the new Administration will continue to be, a priority for the Division. We are investigating other potential criminal antitrust violations in this industry, including market allocation agreements among healthcare providers and no-poach agreements restricting competition for employees."
- "We believe it is important that we use our criminal enforcement authority to police these markets, and to promote competition for all Americans seeking the benefits of a competitive healthcare marketplace."

JUSTICE NEWS

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry Nigro Delivers Keynote Remarks at the American Bar Association's Antitrust in Healthcare Conference

Arlington, VA ~ Thursday, May 17, 2018

A Prescription for Competition

Thank you, Christi, for that kind introduction. I also want to thank Doug Ross and Jeff Brennan, who, along with Christi Braun, organized this important conference.

I am delighted to be here this morning to discuss competition in the healthcare industry, and in particular, some of the healthcare-related issues on which the Antitrust Division is focused.

Healthcare is a large and critical part of our nation's economy. In 2016, healthcare spending by households, businesses, and the government accounted for approximately 18% of Gross Domestic Product, and totaled \$3.3 trillion, or \$10.348 per person. Imagine a reduction in competition that causes prices to rise by 5% throughout this industry—that equates to \$165 billion in annual consumer harm. But, it is not just a question of money: reduce the quality or accessibility of healthcare by 5%, and you potentially cut short millions of lives. Competition in healthcare means being able to afford life-saving surgery, or critical medicines, or an infant's first checkup. It's important. That's why few, if any, segments of our economy merit higher priority when it comes to antitrust enforcement, and healthcare has long been an enforcement priority for the Antitrust Division and our friends at the Federal Trade Commission.

Deputy Assistant Attorney General Barry Nigro, Keynote Remarks at the American Bar Association's Antitrust in Healthcare Conference (May 17, 2018)

Application to Healthcare Industry

- Numerous no-poach and wage-fixing lawsuits in the healthcare industry over the years
- Significant consolidation throughout the healthcare supply chain
- Other anticompetitive agreements among competitors found recently
 - U.S. v. Hillsdale Community Health Center et al. (2015)
 - U.S. v. Charleston Area Medical Center et al. (2016)

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Sherman Act, Section One

- Is there an agreement?
- If so, does it unreasonably restrain or harm competition?

- Price fixing or market allocation agreement
 - Unreasonable restraint on employee compensation and mobility

- *Per se* unlawful vs. rule of reason
 - Naked restraint
 - Joint ventures

What Is...

"No Poach" Agreement

- An agreement with another company not to compete for each other's employees
- Examples: Not soliciting or not hiring each other's employees

"Wage Fixing" Agreement

- An agreement with another company regarding employees' salaries or other terms of compensation
- Examples: Setting salaries at a specific level, agreeing which benefits will or will not be offered

DOJ Focus

- "Robbing employees of labor market competition deprives them of job opportunities, information, and the ability to use competing offers to negotiate better terms of employment"
 - DOJ Antitrust Division Update Spring 2018 (April 10, 2018)

Potential Legal Exposure

Criminal Prosecution

Against individuals, the company, or both

Civil Enforcement

Against individuals, the company, or both

Private Litigation

- Subject to treble damages
- Joint and several liability
- Injunctive relief
- Attorneys' fees and interest

Potential Plaintiffs

- Department of Justice
- Federal Trade Commission
- State Attorneys General
- Private Parties
 - Class Actions
 - Employee Suits

DOJ ENFORCEMENT

Criminal Cases Under Investigation

Delrahim Says Criminal No-Poach Cases Are In The Works

By Matthew Perlman

Law360, New York (January 19, 2018, 5:18 PM EST) -- The U.S. Department of Justice's antitrust chief said Friday that the division has a handful of criminal cases in the works over agreements by companies not to hire each other's workers, signaling that a focus of the Obama administration is continuing.

Assistant Attorney General Makan Delrahim laid out the division's recent work and current initiatives while speaking at a conference hosted by the Antitrust Research Foundation at the Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason University. He pointed to a **joint guidance issued** by the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission in 2016 — that warned employers that so-called no-poaching agreements would receive the same criminal treatment as traditional price-fixing — and said the agency remains active in the area.

"In the coming couple of months you will see some announcements, and to be honest with you, I've been shocked about how many of these there are, but they're real," Delrahim said at the conference.

Criminal Penalties: Statutory Maximum

Corporations

 Increased maximum fines from \$10 Million to \$100 Million

[Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act 2004]

Alternative Fine Provision
 Twice the financial gain to the defendant or twice the financial loss to the victim

Individuals

- Prison terms up to 10 years
- Statutory fines of \$1,000,000
- More if "twice" the gain or loss

DOJ Leniency Program

Leniency Program

- 1978: Established

1993: Corporate Leniency Program Modified

- 1994: Individual Leniency Program

Benefits

- No criminal convictions for company, executives or employees
- No criminal fine but must make restitution
- No prison
- De-treble civil damages
 - Under ACPERA, single damages and no joint and several liability



Department of Justice

LENIENCY POLICY FOR INDIVIDUALS

On August 10, 1993, the Division announced a new Corporate Leniency Policy under which a corporation can avoid criminal prosecution for antitust violations by confessing its role in the illegal activities, fully cooperating with the Division, and meeting the other specified conditions. The Corporate Leniency Policy also sets out the conditions under which the directors, officers and employees who come forward with the company, confess, and cooperate will be considered for individual leniency. The Division today announces a new Leniency Policy for Individuals that is effective immediately and applies to all individuals who approach the Division on their own behalf, not as part of a corporate proffer or confession, to seek leniency for reporting illegal antitrust activity of which the Division has not previously been made aware. Under this Policy, "Jeniency" means not charging such an individual criminally for the activity being reported.

A. Requirements for Leniency for Individuals

Leniency will be granted to an individual reporting illegal antitrust activity before an investigation has begun, if the following three conditions are met:

- At the time the individual comes forward to report the illegal activity, the Division has not received information about the illegal activity being reported from any other source.
- The individual reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation to the Division throughout the investigation, and

Recent DOJ Civil Enforcement Action

- *U.S. v. Knorr-Bremse et al.*: lawsuit against "two of the world's largest rail equipment suppliers"
 - German private company and US company, both with US subsidiaries
 - "No-poach" agreements with each other and a third rail equipment supplier based in France (acquired in 2016)
 - Per se unlawful horizontal market allocation agreements



- Consent Judgment Terms
 - Seven-year term
 - Appoint antitrust compliance officer
 - Annual compliance certification by CEO or CFO and General Counsel
 - DOJ may "inspect and copy" records and obtain interviews
 - Notice to all US employees, recruiting agencies, rail industry
 - Ongoing cooperation with DOJ



Ancillary Restraints

- Hiring restrictions can be lawful if reasonably necessary to a legitimate collaboration
 - Examples: M&A, due diligence, joint venture, contracts with consultants
- U.S. v. Knorr-Bremse et al.
 - Allows "reasonable" agreements not to solicit, recruit, or hire employees if ancillary to a legitimate business collaboration
 - Any ancillary agreements must:
 - 1) Be in writing and signed by all parties
 - 2) Identify the agreement to which it is ancillary
 - 3) Be narrowly tailored to affect only employees who are directly involved
 - 4) Identify the employees who are subject to the agreement
 - 5) Contain a specific termination date or event

NEW EMPHASIS BY ANTITRUST AGENCIES

Antitrust Agency Enforcement

- FTC v. Debes Corp. (1992)
 - Boycott of temporary nurse registries by nursing homes
- FTC v. Council of Fashion Designers (1995)
 - Agreement to reduce fees and compensation for models by fashion designers
- DOJ/FTC Healthcare Statements (1996)
 - "If an exchange among competing providers of . . . cost information results in an agreement among competitors as to . . . the wages to be paid to health care employees, that agreement will be considered unlawful per se"
- U.S. v. Arizona Hospital and Healthcare Association et al. (2007)
 - Joint salary-setting by 100+ Arizona hospitals (through a GPO) for per diem and traveling nurse services
- U.S. v. Adobe Systems et al. (2010); U.S. v. Lucasfilm (2010); U.S. v. eBay (2012)
 - Agreement not to cold call, not to make counteroffers under certain circumstances, or to provide notification when making employment offers to each other's employees among tech companies
- *U.S. v. Knorr-Bremse et al.* (2018)

Private Civil Litigation

- Cason Merenda v. VHS of Michigan (2006)
 - Wage fixing and improper information sharing among eight Michigan hospitals for nurse salaries
 - More than \$90 million in settlements
- High Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation (2011)
 - Follow-on litigation from U.S v. Adobe
 - More than \$400 million in settlements
- Animation Works Antitrust Litigation (2014)
 - Follow-on litigation from U.S. v. Lucasfilm
 - More than \$100 million in settlements
- Seaman v. Duke University and University of North Carolina (2015)
 - Alleged agreement not to hire each other's medical school faculty, physicians, nurses, and skilled medical staff
- Carruth v. Knorr-Bremse et al. (2018)
 - Follow-on litigation from U.S. v. Knorr-Bremse et al.

INFORMATION EXCHANGES

Information Exchanges

- Information sharing about terms and conditions of employment can be legal under certain conditions
- May be lawful if:
 - 1) A third party manages the exchange
 - 2) The information exchanged is relatively old
 - 3) The information is aggregated to protect the identity of the sources
 - 4) There are enough sources of data to prevent competitors from linking data to a source
- Also may be lawful if exchanged in the course of merger discussions

OTHER AREAS OF ENFORCEMENT

State Attorneys General





International Issues

- Hong Kong Competition Commission Guidance (April 2018)
- Japan Fair Trade Commission, Report of Study Group on HR and Competition Policy (Feb. 2018)
- Europe
 - "[C]ourts and competition regulators in Europe (Spain, the Netherlands, and Croatia) have all made major findings in the last eight years against companies in relation to national nonpoaching agreements made in the freight forwarding, hospitals, and IT employment sectors"



Competition Commission Advisory Bulletin

9 April 2018

Competition concerns regarding certain practices in the employment marketplace in relation to hiring and terms and conditions of employment

Background

- 1.1. Since the commencement of the Competition Ordinance ("Ordinance") the Commission has encountered a number of situations where undertakings have engaged in employment-related practices that could give rise to competition concerns under the Ordinance.
- 1.2. The Commission is issuing this Advisory Bulletin to raise awareness of the potential competition risks relating to employment practices, in particular in the determination of employment terms and conditions and the hiring of employees. This Advisory Bulletin should be read in conjunction with the Commission's Guideline on the First Conduct Rule ("FCR Guideline").

The employment marketplace

- 2.1 In a free market economy, businesses compete with each other to offer the best range of products at the best price. A competitive market leads to better prices, products and choices for everyone. Likewise, competition among employers for employees leads to better employment terms (e.g., higher salaries or more favourable benefits) and increased opportunities for employees.
- 2.2 For the purpose of the Ordinance, the Commission considers there can be competition within a market for the procurement of labour. In the employment context, undertakings are purchasers who compete for a key input: labour.
- 2.3 The Commission considers that undertakings that compete with each other to hire employees are competitors in the relevant labour market, regardless of whether or not those undertakings compete in the provision of the same products or services, i.e., the downstream market. The Commission may choose to prioritise a matter if the undertakings are also competitors or potential competitors in the downstream market.

KEY ISSUES AND RECOMMENDED STEPS

What to Watch For

- No court has held that no-poach or wage-fixing agreements are a per se violation
 - "It is only after considerable experience with certain business relationships that courts classify them as *per se* violations of the Sherman Act." *U.S. v. Topco Assocs.*
 - Many settlements under the per se standard over the years
- No jury has found a defendant criminally liable for a no-poach or wage-fixing agreement

Tips

- Educate <u>everyone</u> involved in the hiring process about the antitrust laws
- Can have a unilateral policy not to hire from competitors
 - But should document the policy and not request or suggest that a competitor adopt the same policy
- If a restriction is ancillary to a legitimate collaboration:
 - Document the procompetitive justifications
 - Ensure that the restriction is narrowly tailored (covers only the necessary employees)
- Other means for the company to protect itself
 - Non-compete and non-solicitation clauses
- Can still be a violation if the agreement is...
 - Not in writing ("handshake" agreement)
 - Between one or more non-profits
 - Between companies that do not compete in the sale of their products
 - Through a third-party intermediary (consultant)
 - About benefits (health insurance, 401Ks, gym memberships), not salary
 - About a salary range, rather than a specific number

Recommended Steps

- Post–October 2016 conduct
 - "Naked" wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements
- Antitrust compliance training
 - HR professionals, legal and executives
 - Awareness of issues
- Review and modify policies and code of conduct
- Consult experienced antitrust counsel if wrongdoing is detected
 - Consider appropriate steps such as the Leniency Program
 - Other mitigation steps

- Due diligence in mergers and acquisitions
- Best practices in structuring whistleblowing procedures
- Assess international issues and jurisdictions
- Caution areas
 - Information Exchanges
 - Permissible only if carefully designed to conform with antitrust laws
 - Slippery slope issues
 - Trade associations, conferences, informal meetings

DOJ Warning

- "Market participants are on notice: the Division intends to zealously enforce the antitrust laws in labor markets and aggressively pursue information on additional violations to identify and end anticompetitive no-poach agreements that harm employees and the economy."
 - DOJ Division Update, Spring 2018 (April 10, 2018)

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RESOURCES

Resources



DOJ and FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals

In October 2016, both federal antitruit agencies—the US Department of Justice Antitruit Division (DOJ) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)—printy issued Antitruit Guidance for Human Resource Professionals (Antitruit HR Guidance), which was expressly "intereded to aller Human resource (PRI) professionals and others involved in hiring and compensation decisions to potential violations of the antitruit laws" and their prospect of criminal enforcement with respect to firm matters.¹

The Guidance and subsequent DOI commentary are significant in two primary respects. First, both finderal arrithrust apendes announced that they will focus their enforcement efforts on Rid decisions that rises arathrust concerns. Second, the DOI stated for the first time that it plans to bring criminal enforcement actions for centain His agreement—specifically, how involving "naked wage-fixing on roposching agreement" (discussed below). Previously, this conduct had been enforced civility, not criminally, but in January 2018, the DOI confirmed the esistence of several active criminal involves and extreme the contract active criminal involves and extreme the contract active criminal involves and extreme the contract active criminal involves and extreme that the contract of t

This summary provides high-level responses to common questions concerning criminal and civil enforcement under the Antitrust HR Guidance.¹

Q1. What are the new developments concerning criminal prosecution?

There are two significant developments. First, the DOJ and FTC had previously brought civil enforcement actions for antitrust volations involving PIR agreements. In October 2016, the Guidance noted that "[g]oing forward, the DOJ intends to proceed criminally against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements."

Second, in January 2018, the highest-ranking official in the Antitrust Division, Assistant Attorney General Makan Delnahim, stated at a conference that the DOI was investigating and preparing several criminal prosecutions involving no-poaching agreements. He underscored, "3f the activity has not been stopped

Actual El Guidano, et 1 (NO. 2016), see also Peen Reliens. Activos Division, 15 Gayls of Justice, Justice Cognetimes, and feetal Table Common Reliense Guidano in the Immune Resource Reliense in the Immune Resource Reliense and Common Reliense Reliense in Reliense Reliense Reliense Activos and Common Reliense Relie

Individual clients should seek specific legal advice based on their unique circumstances so the facts can be appropriately unsidered.

Antitrust HR Guidance, at 4.

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LAWRIBEN

ARE YOUR EMPLORED BREACH OF ANTI

March 30, 2018

AUTHORS AND CONTACTS OMAR SHAH, DORA WANG, MARK L.

Authorities in various jurisdictions are ste between employers. From training their H employers should take several steps to ma anti-competition laws.

Human Resources managers who agree w at specific levels may be undertaking illegcriminal convictions in several jurisdiction Kong. In addition, the sharing of future sal other similar information may constitute. Employers should now consider the currelegal team to ensure that they are in comp any historical conduct.

THE LIKELIHOOD OF GROWING

In the United States, the Department of Juinvolving "no poaching" agreements (see o on DOJ's HR Guidance). Assistant Att. Division, has been quoted as saying, "I've b but they're real."

Competition (antitrust) enforcers talk to e is just a matter of time before enforcers ou arrangements, particularly if the companie there are reports that the Irish authorities Italian asset management firms prompted

The DOJ (jointly with the US Federal Trade

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LAWFLAS

DOJ ANTITRUST DIVISION AN IMMINENT CRIMINAL PROSEC 'NO POACHING' AGREEMENT

February 06, 2018

AUTHORS AND CONTACTS MARK L. KROTOSKI, RICHARD G.S. LEE

The US Department of Justice's Antitrust Division will soon announce its "no poaching" agreements—agreements to refuse to solicit or hire another previously announcing in October 2016 that the department would bring sifederal antitrust law.

The head of the US Department of Justice's Anthrust Division (DDJ), Assis Makan Delrahim, announced on January 19, 2018, that the DQJ will bring it alleged "no poaching" agreements in violation of the Sherman Act in the cc AAG Delrahim warned that if such activity "has not been stopped and cont DQI's [new antipoaching] policy was made" in October 2016, "we'll treat the added, "I've been shocked about how many of these [agreements] there are,

As we noted in our prior LawFlash following the October 2016 policy annofederal Trade Commission (FTC) jointly issued the Antitrust Guidance for (the Antitrust HR Guidance), which signaled for the first time that the DOI against naked wage-fixing or no-poaching agreements. [33] Moreover, unde this conduct may be considered per se illegal, meaning that companies couby seeking to explain or justify guida greements.

With his remarks, AAG Delrahim underscored the recent DOJ focus conce naked wage-fixing and no-poaching agreements. The enforcement efforts w 2017 by then Acting AAG Andrew Finch.[4]

In light of AAG Delrahim's statements, companies should urgently consided policies and practices to make sure their HR professionals and executives have not engaged in conduct that could be considered a no-poaching or wage-fixing agreement. The DOJ has made clear that engagement in such conduct or agreements after October 2016 when the policy was first announced may be criminally investigated and prosecuted.

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LAWFLASH

DOJ CONFIRMS ACTIVE 'NO-POACHING' CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS IN HEALTHCARE AND OTHER INDUSTRIES

May 22 205

AUTHORS AND CONTACTS MARK L. KROTOSKI, RYAN KANTOR

A saries of excert statements highlight the continuing unforcement by the US Department of Justice to focus on "no-posching" and wage-fixing agreements with more enforcement actions expected to be annuarized in the near future.

The Antitrust Division at the US Department of histice (DIOI) publicly acknowledged once again last week that acknowledged ence again last week that acknowledged ence again last week that acknowledged ence again so week that a number of these criminal investigations are targeting companies in the healthcare industry.

In general, DOJ and the Foderal Trade Commission (FFC) have discribed "ne-positing" agreements as agreements. "With individual(s) at another company to refuse to solicit or hive that other company's employees." In addition, DOJ and the FTC are scrutinizing wage-fixing agreements, described as agreements "with individual(s) at another company about employee salary or other terms of compensation, either at a specific level or within a ranges?

At an Antitrust in Healthcare Conference on May 17, Deputy Assistant Attorney General Bennard (Barry) A. Nigro noted that the Antitrust Division plans to bring criminal cases to redress artifrust violations in the healthcare industry for no-posiching agreements. As he explained:

Combatting rising healthcare prices has been, and under the new Administration will continue to be, a priority for the Division We are investigating other potential criminal autitrust violations in this [health care] Industry, including market allocation agreements among huilthcare providers, and ne-poach agreements restricting competition for employees. We believe it is important that we use user criminal enforcement authority to pulies these markets, and to premote competitive for all Americans seeking the benefits of a competitive individual markets.

Mr. Nigro's speach was the latest in a series by Antitrust Division leaders highlighting pending criminal

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Resources

- DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidance for Human Resource Professionals (2016)
 - https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/903511/download
- U.S. v. Knorr-Bremse and Wabtec (2018)
 - https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-requires-knorr-and-wabtecterminate-unlawful-agreements-not-compete
- DOJ/FTC Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care (1996)
 - https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/competition-policyguidance/statements of antitrust enforcement policy in health care august 1996.pdf

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Thanks!



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Join us next month!

Please join us for next month's webinar:

"Fast Break: Stark Lessons for Physician Practice
Acquisitions"

Featuring Al Shay and Eric Knickrehm

➤ August 23, 3:00 PM (EST)

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