The Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Assistant Inspector General for Audits issued a memorandum on August 20 on the status of recommendations based on the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG’s) Audit of NRC’s Cyber Security Inspections at Nuclear Power Plants (OIG-19-A-13). As previously reported on Up & Atom, OIG recommended that the NRC work to close the critical skill gap for future cybersecurity inspection staffing, and develop and implement cybersecurity performance measures for licensees to use to demonstrate sustained program effectiveness. Based on the NRC’s July 3, 2019, response, OIG has issued this status of recommendations.
Following the July 12, 2019, release of “Power Reactor Cyber Security Program Assessment,” the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Director of Physical and Cyber Security Policy in the Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response issued a memorandum to NRC Staff on August 6, 2019.
The memorandum provides guidance to Staff on next steps, but also cautions that when initiating changes to the Cyber Security Program they keep several points in mind. Specifically, the Director asks Staff to ensure that changes do not adversely impact other areas of the program; that guidance revisions are consistent and incorporated throughout all documents; that, where necessary, a backfit analysis is performed; and that no changes constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and safety.
The memorandum reminds Staff that their next step, per the assessment, is to present a draft action plan by September 20, 2019. The action plan should identify enhancements to the Cyber Security Program that promote regulatory efficiency and effectiveness, while continuing to provide for reasonable assurance of public health and safety and promote common defense and security. The memorandum also praises NRC Staff for its efforts in conducting the assessment.
We will continue to monitor developments for cybersecurity at the NRC.
On July 25, 2019, the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) released GAO-19-384, a report to congressional requesters analyzing the cybersecurity risk management of 23 civilian agencies—including the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). Using key elements such as risk tolerance and risk mitigation strategies, GAO examined the extent to which all agencies established a cybersecurity risk management program; what challenges, if any, agencies identified in developing and implementing such programs; and what steps the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have taken to meet their risk management responsibilities to address any challenges agencies face in this area. In its analysis, GAO compared policies and procedures from the 23 civilian agencies to key federal cybersecurity risk management practices, attained the agencies’ own views on challenges they faced, identified and analyzed actions taken by the OMB and DHS to determine whether such actions address agency challenges, and interviewed responsible agency officials.
Staff members from the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response and Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation held a public meeting on June 17 to discuss a summary of the Assessment of the NRC’s Power Reactor Cyber Security Program. In response to the Nuclear Energy Institute’s (NEI’s) PRM-73-18, “Petition to Amend 10 CFR 73.54, ‘Protection of Digital Computer and Communication Systems and Networks’,” and based on NRC guidance, this Assessment marked 10 years since the publication of 10 CFR 73.54.
The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) recently confirmed that state-sponsored hackers successfully gained access to the control rooms of US electric utilities and likely had the ability to disrupt power flows. The Wall Street Journal report describes the activities as part of a long-running campaign targeting US utilities. These cyberattacks were first disclosed in a Technical Alert issued by DHS earlier this year. The attacks are another example of the need for continued vigilance in protecting industrial control systems and the importance of strong vendor and supply chain cybersecurity controls for utilities.
The attackers reportedly gained access to secure networks by first exploiting the networks of trusted third-party vendors through the use of familiar tactics, such as spear-phishing emails and watering-hole attacks. Armed with vendor access credentials, the attackers then pivoted into the utilities’ isolated “air-gapped” networks and began gathering information on their operations and equipment. The extent of the attack remains unclear based on publicly available information, and DHS did not state whether any nuclear power stations were targeted in this latest round of attacks. Importantly, however, DHS stated that some companies may not yet know they were victims of the attacks because the hackers used the credentials of actual employees to access networks, thus making detection more difficult.