LawFlash

Singapore’s First Published Employment Claims Tribunals Decisions Provide Guidance on Employment Claims

July 15, 2026

The first five recently published decisions of Singapore’s Employment Claims Tribunals (ECT) provide important early guidance for parties to employment disputes. They address a range of issues from wrongful dismissal, overtime pay, retrenchment benefits, and discretionary compensation to commission disputes, limitation periods for ECT claims, and retirement and re-employment obligations.

Singapore’s ECT have begun publishing selected written decisions, marking an important development for employers and employees navigating employment claims. The first ECT decision, JGP v JGQ [2026] SGECT 1, published on 15 May 2026, was soon followed by four further decisions: JHU v JHV [2026] SGECT 2 (published on 1 July 2026), JIF v JIG [2026] SGECT 3 (also published on 1 July 2026), JIQ v JIR [2026] SGECT 4 (published on 10 July 2026) and JIS v JIT [2026] SGECT 5 (published on 13 July 2026).

The publication of ECT judgments marks an important development in the Singapore employment law landscape. ECT proceedings, which are conducted in private by default, have historically been relatively opaque compared with civil court litigation. The Singapore Ministry of Manpower (MOM) stated in September 2025 that the courts had determined that ECT judgments need not be published by default, but that selected judgments would be published because a considerable body of ECT case law had developed since the ECT’s establishment in 2017. The publication exercise with anonymized parties’ names is intended to improve awareness of legal rights and responsibilities in employment relationships while preserving the confidential nature of ECT proceedings.

THE PUBLISHED ECT DECISIONS

In JGP v JGQ, the ECT considered a statutory wrongful dismissal claim arising from alleged misconduct, as well as a claim for a discretionary performance bonus.

  • The wrongful dismissal claim succeeded because, while the employer met the standard of “due inquiry” required under section 14(1) of the Employment Act 1968 (the Act), the employer did not prove the mental element of the alleged misconduct (namely, dishonesty, recklessness, or wilful blindness) and thus failed to prove “just cause or excuse” for dismissal under section 14(2) of the Act. The employee was awarded compensation for “loss of income” (reflecting the proven post-notice earnings shortfall causally attributable to the dismissal) and for “harm” (starting from the conventional base of two months and applying a one-month reduction to reflect the employee’s negligent contribution).
  • The bonus claim failed because the employee did not show an accrued contractual entitlement or that the exercise of bonus discretion by the employer was in bad faith or for an improper purpose. The tribunal noted that a finding of dismissal without just cause or excuse does not, by itself, translate into a right to a performance bonus for the preceding year.

In JHU v JHV, the ECT allowed a foreign worker’s overtime claim. The tribunal rejected the employer’s argument that the claim was inherently improbable, noting that employees (particularly foreign workers) may tolerate poor conditions and raise claims only after employment ends for rational practical reasons. By contrast, the worker’s attendance table was accepted as credible because it was internally coherent and corroborated by evidence of the punch card and facial recognition systems, while the employer’s denial that attendance records existed was rejected. The ECT also drew an adverse inference against the employer for refusing to disclose or make accessible attendance records.

In JIF v JIG, the ECT dismissed the employee’s claims for wrongful dismissal, additional retrenchment benefits, and employee share option payments. The tribunal held that the employee bore the burden of proving that a with-notice redundancy dismissal was not genuine, which he failed to do. The tribunal also held that section 45 of the Act does not create a freestanding statutory entitlement to retrenchment benefits, that the employer’s past generosity in paying retrenchment benefits alone does not amount to a legal obligation to pay retrenchment benefits, and that the employer’s exercise of its discretion in relation to employee share options was not irrational or in bad faith.

In JIQ v JIR, the ECT allowed the employee’s claim for unpaid sales commission under the Sales Pay Plan based on an objective reading to the Plan where the tribunal preferred the employee’s component-based interpretation over the employer’s whole-of-contract basis interpretation for the purposes of calculating the sales commission payable.

The tribunal also held that the employee’s Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management (TADM) mediation request, which is a prerequisite for ECT claims, was filed within the one-year time limit prescribed by section 3 of the Employment Claims Act 2016 (ECA) because time started to run only from the point when the commission was short-paid to the employee and not when the employer communicated its final decision on the commission calculation to the employee.

In JIS v JIT, the ECT allowed the employee’s claims for salary in lieu of notice on the ground of wrongful dismissal and for an employment assistance payment (EAP) under the Retirement and Re-employment Act 1993 (RRA) after the employer purported to “retire” him approximately three months after he reached the statutory retirement age without notice or payment in lieu.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

1. Statutory Wrongful Dismissal Is Distinct from Common Law Wrongful Dismissal

The ECT in JGP v JGQ emphasised that two different wrongs fall under the modern label “wrongful dismissal.” A common law wrongful dismissal claim is contractual and typically concerns whether the employer complied with the employment contract, including notice requirements. By contrast, a statutory claim under section 14(2) of the Act asks whether the dismissal was “without just cause or excuse.”

The ECT’s task under section 14(2) is a merits-based, de novo inquiry. This means that the ECT must decide, afresh and on the evidence before it, whether the dismissal was “without just cause or excuse.” It is not confined to reviewing whether the employer’s internal decision was defensible, and the Tripartite Guidelines on Wrongful Dismissal are guidance rather than a substitute for the statutory inquiry.

2. If Misconduct Is Alleged, ‘Due Inquiry’ Is Required Even Where Notice Is Given

In JGP v JGQ, the tribunal held that where an employer relies on misconduct as the basis for termination, the “due inquiry” safeguard in section 14(1) of the Act is engaged even if the employer gives notice or pays salary in lieu of notice. The tribunal reasoned that the safeguard attaches to the ground of misconduct, not merely to the mode of summary dismissal (notwithstanding that the “due inquiry” safeguard appears only in section 14(1) of the Act, which deals with a dismissal without notice on the grounds of misconduct).

Where the employment contract incorporates a disciplinary framework, that framework does not increase the scope of “due inquiry” and render the obligation to conduct that inquiry more onerous.

The “due inquiry” standard remains modest and fact-sensitive: the employee must receive reasonably clear notice of the case, a real opportunity to answer it, and open-minded consideration before misconduct is fixed as the dismissal ground.

3. Burden of Proof in a Claim that a Dismissal Was Without ‘Just Cause or Excuse’

JGP v JGQ is a warning against over-labelling the misconduct that is relied upon by the employer as reason for the termination. A relevant employee (as defined in section 14(2A) of the Act) may lodge a claim with the ECT if he/she considers that he/she has been dismissed without “just cause or excuse.” Read with section 27 of the ECA:

  • For a dismissal without notice on the ground of misconduct, the employer bears the burden of proving the allegation that the employee was dismissed with “just cause or excuse.”
  • For a dismissal with notice on the ground of poor performance or misconduct, the employer bears the burden of proving that ground for giving the notice of dismissal and also that this amounts to “just cause or excuse” (as held in JGP v JGQ at [79(i)] although it is to be noted that section 27(2)(b) ECA only states that the employer bears the burden of proving the ground for giving the notice of dismissal and says nothing about the need for the employer to prove “just cause or [SL1.1]excuse”).
  • For a dismissal with notice on any other grounds such as redundancy, the burden rests on the employee to prove that the ground is not made out and that the dismissal was without “just cause or excuse.”

4. Proportionality and Parity Matter as to the Sanction to be Imposed on an Employee When Wrongdoing Is Established

The ECT in JGP v JGQ treated relative treatment of comparable employees as relevant to proportionality of the sanction imposed for the misconduct. Parity is not a freestanding ground of liability and will not, in and of itself, determine whether the alleged misconduct is established; but once some misconduct is established, like cases should generally be treated alike unless principled distinctions justify different outcomes.

For employers managing group investigations, this means sanction decisions should be supported by a documented and consistently applied framework. Relevant distinctions may include seniority, degree and duration of participation, prior record, candour, cooperation, trust sensitivity, safety issues, or regulatory implications.

5. Overtime Claims May Succeed Despite Statutory Overtime Limits

In JHU v JHV, the ECT held that an employee may recover overtime pay for work actually performed even if the alleged hours exceed the statutory ceilings under the Act. The tribunal applied the High Court’s reasoning in Hossain Rakib v Ideal Design & Build Pte Ltd [2023] 5 SLR 1529 that overtime limits are intended to protect employees and should not allow an employer to rely on its own statutory breach as a shield against paying wages owed.

The decision also cautions against dismissing employee claims as inherently improbable merely because the alleged hours are extreme or because the employee complained only after employment ended. The tribunal recognised that employees, particularly foreign workers, may tolerate poor conditions for practical reasons and that the better approach is to decide the issue on the documentary and witness evidence.

6. Employee Records Are Critical in Wage Disputes

JHU v JHV underscores the importance of maintaining and producing proper employment records. The tribunal held that an employer that had made and kept records of hours worked could have produced them to identify discrepancies between its records and the employee’s claim. The employer’s refusal to disclose or make accessible attendance records breached section 95(2) of the Act and engaged section 21(2) of the ECA, allowing the tribunal to draw an adverse inference against the employer.

The tribunal ultimately accepted the employee’s attendance evidence and allowed the claim in full, after noting that the employer did not seriously challenge the attendance table with specific contrary evidence.

7. Section 45 of the Act Does Not Create a General Retrenchment-Benefit Entitlement

The ECT in JIF v JIG held that section 45 of the Act should not be understood as creating a statutory entitlement to retrenchment benefits. An employee’s entitlement to retrenchment benefits depends on rights derived from contract or collective agreement. This is consistent with the recent High Court decision in Seng Hock Chye Daniel v Denso International Asia Pte Ltd [2026] SGHCR 14, where the Assistant Registrar struck out a claim for retrenchment benefits on the ground that the claim was legally unsustainable where no contractual or statutory basis for entitlement was established of particularised.

In this connection, the Assistant Registrar held that the mere fact that other employees may have received redundancy packages (even if proven) does not create a legal entitlement for the claimant absent a contractual or statutory foundation.

Internal redundancy standards, policies, or past practice will not automatically create a contractual entitlement. A non-contractual policy may guide internal practice, but it does not become binding without clear incorporation into the employment contract, unequivocal assurances, or a properly pleaded estoppel or representation case was articulated with the requisite particulars (representation, reliance, and detriment).

8. Discretionary Bonuses and Share Awards Turn on Contractual Wording and the Exercise of Discretion

Both JGP v JGQ and JIF v JIG confirm that discretionary compensation claims will turn heavily on the contractual wording and the evidence of how discretion was exercised. In JGP v JGQ, the bonus claim failed because the employee did not prove an accrued contractual entitlement or that the exercise of bonus discretion by the employer was in bad faith or for an improper purpose; the finding of wrongful dismissal did not itself create a right to a prior-year performance bonus.

The claim for employee share options in JIF v JIG similarly failed as the employee failed to prove that the employer’s decision not to vest employee share options awards was either irrational or had been taken in bad faith. The tribunal’s task in this context was supervisory, and it was not to undertake a de novo assessment of the issue on the merits or to substitute its own view of whether the share awards should vest.

9. Commission Plans Will Be Construed Objectively

In JIQ v JIR, the ECT preferred the employee’s component-based interpretation because the plain text of the Sales Pay Plan pointed to the sales commission being assessed along product lines rather than whole-of-contract lines (based on the employer’s interpretation). The tribunal also considered how the Sales Pay Plan was calculated for the other sales colleagues involved in securing with the sales contract (that gave rise to the sales commission), as well as the context in which the Sales Pay Plan was drafted and introduced, before drawing the conclusion that the employee’s interpretation “sat comfortably with the contextual cues relevant to the exercise of interpretation.”

The ECT further held that the clause stating that the Pay Plan Committee’s interpretation and decision “shall prevail” could govern the employer’s internal processes but did not bind the ECT; if construed otherwise, it would be void under Section 28(a) of the ECA to the extent that it purported to limit the tribunal’s jurisdiction.

Notably, the tribunal rejected the employer’s evidence of subjective intention or “long-standing practice,” which could not override the objective meaning of the plan. Given that the employer had free rein to unilaterally draft the terms of the plan in a manner which captured its specific intentions, the tribunal noted that it had “no excuse for its lack of clearer definitions and imprecise drafting” if it had intended otherwise. This underscores the importance of clear and precise drafting of employee’s contractual entitlements to ensure that the employer’s intentions are properly reflected.

10. Termination for Retirement Requires Notice; Employer’s Re-employment Obligations Requires Reasonable Substantive and Procedural Handling

In JIS v JIT, the ECT addressed retirement and re-employment obligations. The tribunal held that reaching statutory retirement age does not automatically bring employment to a “natural end.” If the employer wished to end the employment relationship, it had to do so by giving contractual notice or salary in lieu, and its failure to do so amounted to a repudiatory breach. The employee was thus entitled to salary in lieu of notice, which represents the employee’s loss of wages had the employer duly performed its obligations under the contract but exercised its power to terminate the contract by giving notice or paying salary in lieu thereof.

As regards the employer’s re-employment obligations, the tribunal held that while a late re-employment offer does not, by itself, trigger an immediate entitlement to an EAP, the employer’s six-month re-employment offer did not discharge its statutory obligations under section 7A(6) of the RRA because the minimum re-employment term is one year unless the employee agrees otherwise. The tribunal further observed that a change in job role and a reduction in salary do not, without more, render a re-employment offer unreasonable, but the manner in which the re-employment exercise is conducted (including the timing, the quality of consultation, and the extent to which the employee is given a genuine opportunity to engage with and consider the proposal) must be reasonable.

On the facts, the compressed timeline, refusal of an extension, lack of meaningful engagement, and immediate ermination for retirement meant the employer fell short of the statutory standard under sSection 7A of the RRA. The tribunal therefore ordered the employer to pay the claimed EAP, which represented approximately 2.3 months of the employee’s gross monthly wages, and was equivalent to the ceiling suggested in the Tripartite Guidelines on the Re-Employment of Older Employees.

11. ECT Time Bar

JIQ v JIR provides guidance on when time bar for an ECT claim falling under Section 3(2)(g) of the ECA starts to run.

Before a claim may be lodged in the ECT, the claimant must submit a mediation request relating to every specified employment dispute for which the claim will be lodged. The mediation requested must be submitted within the period stipulated in Section 3(2) of the ECA, which varies depending on the nature of the dispute.

The time bar for the dispute in question falls within Section 3(2)(g) of the ECA, that is “not later than one year after the date on which the material facts giving rise to the earliest specified employment dispute listed in the mediation request occurred.”

The ECT held that the time bar started to run when the employee was actually short-paid commission, because that was the final “material fact” needed to “give rise” to the dispute. Before payment was made, any claim would have been premature because the ECT does not have the power to issue declarations as to the proper interpretation of contractual documents.

The tribunal also stated, in the alternative, that where there exist formal internal mechanisms for employee grievances to be resolved, the material facts do not “give rise” to a “dispute” until those internal mechanisms have been either exhausted or waived. This, however, does not create an “indefinite freeze on the limitation clock”: the employee must still act within the timelines specified in the internal mechanisms or, where none are specified, within a reasonable time.

It is thus recommended that employers draft internal grievance processes with clear timelines because an open-ended or informal process may complicate time bar arguments should a claim be made at the ECT.

CONCLUSION

The publication of the ECT decisions is significant not only because they provide the first publicly available ECT guidance, but also because they show the range of employment issues the ECT deals with.

Employers that employ precise drafting of contractual documents, clearly document the reasons for the exercise of contractual discretion, maintain proper records, conduct “due inquiry,” apply sanctions for misconduct consistently and comply substantively and procedurally with retirement and re-employment obligations will be better placed to defend ECT claims.

That said, one should treat these early ECT decisions with appropriate caution. They are first-instance tribunal decisions and best viewed as persuasive guidance rather than binding precedent on another tribunal determining similar issues in the future. ECT orders may be appealed to the General Division of the High Court on questions of law or jurisdiction. The legal principles emerging from these decisions may be refined if and when such appellate guidance is given. It also remains to be seen whether different tribunal magistrates will distinguish these ECT decisions on their facts or develop the analysis in other directions.

Contacts

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Authors
Wendy Tan (Singapore)*

*A solicitor of Morgan Lewis Stamford LLC, a Singapore law corporation affiliated ‎with Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP