Campbell’s Stipulated Order Reinforces Trademark Protection in Political Speech

The Campbell’s Company and CSC Brands LP recently resolved a trademark infringement lawsuit against Michigan congressional candidate Shelby Nicole Campbell and her “Campbell for Congress” campaign, which used imagery closely resembling the iconic Campbell’s soup can design in her 2026 campaign materials. The case, resolved on November 14, 2025, in the US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, underscores the limitations of First Amendment, parody, and personal identity defenses when commercial trademarks appear in political contexts in ways that may create consumer confusion.

In the post-Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products LLC[1] landscape—where the US Supreme Court narrowed parody protections in trademark cases—the stipulated order reflects the increasingly difficult path for defendants seeking to invoke such defenses against famous marks. Because the case was resolved via a stipulated order before the court ruled on the merits, the parties’ legal arguments were never judicially evaluated.

BACKGROUND

Shelby Campbell, a 31-year-old Democratic candidate for Michigan’s 13th Congressional District, launched her “Soup for Change 2026” and “Campbell for Congress” campaign featuring stickers and promotional materials that incorporated imagery resembling key elements of The Campbell’s Company’s famous trade dress. The design used the candidate’s surname “Campbell” in a manner evocative of the brand’s signature style, positioned on a red-and-white design that paralleled the soup company’s iconic packaging.

The Campbell’s Company, which has maintained its distinctive soup can design for more than a century, sent the candidate a cease-and-desist letter on September 2, 2025. When the defendant refused to comply, The Campbell’s Company filed suit on October 10, 2025, alleging trademark infringement, false designation of origin, and violations of the Lanham Act. The complaint asserted that the defendant’s use of the company’s distinctive design created a false impression that The Campbell’s Company endorsed her candidacy.

The complaint noted that social media users and consumers had repeatedly inquired whether The Campbell’s Company endorsed the Michigan candidate, demonstrating what the company characterized as actual marketplace confusion. The Campbell’s Company argued that the defendant’s actions were not innocent parody but were designed to capitalize on the company’s iconic brand and associate one of the country’s most famous brands with her political campaign.

THE DEFENDANT’S POSITION

The defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit on November 6, 2025, advancing several defenses that were never ruled upon due to the subsequent stipulated order. She argued that her use of the design was not commercial in nature and presented no likelihood of confusion. The defendant asserted she had been nicknamed “Soup” since infancy and had used the word “soup” and her surname in a nonprofit, political context, deriving no commercial benefit from doing so.

She supported this position by pointing to evidence that the “Soup” nickname had been part of her identity for decades, including her mother’s personalized license plate reading “EX SOUP 1” and her use of the handle “Shelby Soup” on social media since at least 2013. The defendant further noted that The Campbell name in her family traced back to her great-grandfather William Campbell, born in 1895—two years before The Campbell’s Company was established.

Regarding the use in commerce requirement under the Lanham Act, which requires that a mark be used in commerce before infringement claims can be asserted, the defendant argued that the limited run of stickers created for her campaign were novelties given to supporters, not merchandise, and that the stickers had no price tag, with only voluntary donations accepted. However, on November 7, 2025, Judge Judith E. Levy struck the defendant’s dismissal motion, who appeared in this matter pro se, for improper formatting, including excessive length and missing required information, among other issues. The matter was resolved by a stipulated order before the court could address the substance of these arguments.

THE STIPULATED PERMANENT INJUNCTION

Under the terms of the November 14 stipulated permanent injunction, the defendant agreed to immediately cease all use of the disputed imagery and any designs confusingly similar to The Campbell’s Company’s trademarks and trade dress in connection with her campaign, fundraising, and promotional materials. The stipulated order imposed specific obligations, including removal of all images and content featuring designs using the company’s marks from social media accounts and the defendant’s website by November 21, 2025.

Additionally, the defendant agreed not to make or imply any representations suggesting that The Campbell’s Company sponsored, endorsed, authorized, or was otherwise affiliated with her campaign. Notably, the stipulated order permits the defendant to continue using the term “soup” in her campaign materials, provided she does not do so in conjunction with any references to The Campbell Company or in any other manner suggesting endorsement, affiliation, or association with the company.

COMMENT

While the stipulated order does not constitute a judicial determination on the merits, it demonstrates the practical challenges of asserting personal identity and political speech defenses in trademark disputes. The defendant’s narrative about her lifelong “Soup” nickname and family history was therefore never tested in court. The terms of the stipulated order suggest that visual similarity between campaign materials and famous trade dress may create significant legal exposure regarding consumer confusion about corporate endorsement, regardless of the strength of alternative defenses.

The case illustrates several important principles at the intersection of trademark law and political expression. First, the stipulated order reflects that political speech does not necessarily provide complete protection from trademark claims. While the First Amendment protects robust political discourse, plaintiffs may still bring claims under the Lanham Act for uses that allegedly create a likelihood of confusion about source, sponsorship, or affiliation—even in campaign contexts.

Second, the Supreme Court’s decision in Jack Daniel’s fundamentally altered the landscape for trademark defendants seeking to invoke First Amendment or parody defenses. The Court unanimously held that when an allegedly infringing product uses another’s trademark as a source identifier, as VIP Products did by replicating Jack Daniel’s iconic bottle as “Bad Spaniels,” the heightened Rogers test does not apply. Instead, such uses are subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis.

In this case, the defendant’s sticker replicated key elements of The Campbell’s Company’s iconic soup can design, using it as the identifying mark for her campaign materials. Under Jack Daniel’s, this use as a source identifier meant that traditional Lanham Act analysis would apply, without the protection of heightened First Amendment scrutiny under Rogers. The complaint specifically characterized the defendant’s use as “not innocent parody,” and given the evidence of actual consumer confusion (with multiple inquiries about whether the company endorsed the candidate), the narrowed scope of parody protection following Jack Daniel’s may have limited the persuasiveness of this defense, although the argument was not reviewed on the merits as a result of the stipulated order.

Third, this case invites an interesting discussion on the Lanham Act’s commercial use requirement. The defendant argued her stickers were mere novelties distributed to supporters and volunteers without charge or with the option to make a donation. The promotional nature of campaign materials, combined with their role in fundraising efforts, presents an interesting question regarding the Lanham Act’s commercial use threshold that may arise in future litigation.

Fourth, the terms of the stipulated order suggest that personal connections to a brand name or long-standing nicknames may not provide license to appropriate full trade dress. While the defendant’s “Soup” nickname and family name history might have supported use of the word “soup” in text form, her adoption of The Campbell’s Company’s distinctive can design allegedly crossed into actionable infringement. The stipulated order’s allowance for continued use of the term “soup” (absent references to the company) reflects a practical distinction between textual references and full trade dress appropriation.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• Political expression may not be enough to override trademark rights: This stipulated order demonstrates that a mark owner may leverage the Lanham Act, even in a political context, when the campaign materials allegedly create confusion about brand endorsement or affiliation with the mark owner.
• Use in commerce may extend beyond traditional sales: The stipulated order reflects the plaintiff’s position that promotional campaign materials can constitute trademark use when they leverage commercial branding, regardless of whether the materials are sold or distributed freely to supporters.
• First Amendment and parody defenses are limited when marks are used as source identifiers: Following Jack Daniel’s, when a defendant uses another’s trademark as a trademark, the heightened Rogers test does not apply, and courts instead apply traditional likelihood-of-confusion and dilution analysis. While parody may factor into that analysis, it does not provide automatic immunity from liability.
• Personal identity connections may have limits: The terms of the stipulated order suggest that long-standing personal nicknames and family name history may not excuse appropriation of protected trade dress when the overall design allegedly creates marketplace confusion about corporate sponsorship.
• Allegations of actual confusion strengthen plaintiff leverage: The complaint’s allegation that consumers repeatedly inquired whether The Campbell’s Company endorsed the candidate demonstrates the type of source confusion evidence that supports a strong infringement case, providing leverage for early settlement discussions.
• Text vs. trade dress distinction matters: The stipulated order’s allowance for continued use of the word “soup” (with limitations) while prohibiting use of The Campbell’s Company’s distinctive can design illustrates a practical distinction between using common words and appropriating comprehensive trade dress elements.