High Court Grants Novel ‘Dynamic Blocking’ Order to Combat Online Sales of Counterfeit Medicines

On 23 June 2026, the English High Court handed down its decision to grant and extend website blocking orders sought by Novo Nordisk against third-party ISPs to target the online sale of counterfeit prescription-only medicines. Notably, the court has developed a novel “dynamic blocking” mechanism, enabling Novo Nordisk to self-certify any third-party website as infringing based on a predetermined set of confidential criteria involving both alleged infringement of private IP rights and/or criminal conduct arising from regulatory breaches.

KEY TAKEAWAYS

• The High Court has granted a novel “dynamic blocking” order that allows the applicant (Novo Nordisk) to identify, self-certify, and require ISPs to block websites selling clearly counterfeit prescription-only medicines without having to return to the court each time a new target has been identified.
• The court confirmed that it has, and is willing to exercise, jurisdiction to make such an order covering both the alleged infringement of private IP rights and/or criminal conduct arising from regulatory breaches under the Human Medicines Regulation 2012 (the 2012 Regulations).
• The mechanism set out in this order was noted to have the support and encouragement of the Medicines & Healthcare products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) as an initiative intended to safeguard the public and prevent the sale of counterfeit medicines within the UK market.

BACKGROUND

In a first decision handed down on 13 May 2026,[1] Mellor J allowed Novo Nordisk’s application for injunctions which require the respondent internet service providers (ISPs) to restrict users’ access to four target websites, together with any mirrors or successors to those websites (the Target Websites), that were offering, selling, or supplying counterfeit versions of Novo Nordisk’s branded semaglutide products[2] and other prescription-only medicines to UK consumers. The making of this application was said by Mellor J to have received support and encouragement from the MHRA.

In making this application, Novo Nordisk relied on the Target Websites’ infringement of its registered trade marks, passing off, and breaches of the 2012 Regulations, including the selling of medicinal products without a marketing authorisation, selling prescription-only products without the necessary authorisations, and advertising prescription-only medicinal products to the general public.

Mellor J was satisfied by the evidence and submissions in support of this, finding that “the interests of the public and UK medicines regulator in ensuring a high level of public health, and those of [Novo Nordisk] in enforcing its rights in the [Novo Nordisk trade marks] and goodwill, clearly outweighed any conceivable interest of the Target Website operators.”

The present case is a second decision handed down on 23 June,[3] wherein Novo Nordisk applied to vary and extend the website blocking injunction ordered by Mellor J to add seven more Target Websites to the scope of the order, together with amendments to allow for the “dynamic blocking” of potential further websites, a novel mechanism to combat the online sale of counterfeit medicines.

DYNAMIC BLOCKING

The stated idea and motivation behind “dynamic blocking” is that Novo Nordisk should not be required to keep returning to the Court for extended relief as further potential Target Websites are identified.

To exemplify the issue, Adam Johnson J observes from the evidence that, from the time Mellor J ordered the website blocking injunction, “there have been attempts to circumvent the block by registration of ‘mirror domain’ names, and moreover [Novo Nordisk has] become aware of over 130 other websites that promote counterfeit and unlicensed semaglutide and [other] products to UK consumers.” As a result, there is a need for “some creative form of intervention” to counter the avoidance efforts by companies selling counterfeit products.

Novo Nordisk’s proposal for dynamic blocking is summarised as follows:

• Novo Nordisk would assess a potential Target Website to determine whether there are allegedly infringements of its IP rights and/or regulatory breaches involving criminal conduct by reference to a set of criteria (Dynamic Blocking Criteria) set out in a confidential schedule to the order. The judge noted the ISPs had no objection to the Dynamic Blocking Criteria and emphasised their confidentiality “is essential to the effective operation of the proposed Order: if the criteria are publicised, the wrongdoers will be able to navigate their way around them” (however, any Target Website that is determined to challenge its designation as such would have the opportunity to see them later, subject to being able to show a legitimate interest and agreeing appropriate confidentiality terms).
• If such a determination is made, Novo Nordisk would self-certify that the criteria have been met by the potential Target Website. It would next notify the ISPs that the assessed website is a proscribed Target Website under the terms of the order, and the ISP would be required to take steps to block it.

Therefore, a key difference from the first decision is that, here, the order by Adam Johnson J was not limited to specific websites but can be adapted by the rights holder to target new sites without further intervention by the court.

Whereas the first website blocking order was made on the basis of both (1) infringement of Novo Nordisk’s private rights (i.e., its IP rights) and (2) criminal conduct arising from breaches of the 2012 Regulations, Adam Johnson J observed that in some permutations of the confidential Dynamic Blocking Criteria Novo Nordisk’s private rights may not be engaged at all—in other words, the proposed order would potentially permit Novo Nordisk to “act as a form of private enforcement agency targeting regulatory breaches.” This is the first time that this type of injunction has been granted based on alleged regulatory breaches, rather than private rights.

Novo Nordisk’s application was ultimately allowed, finding that the order sought was sound in principle and justified on the facts.

In establishing the High Court’s jurisdiction to make such an order, the judge reasoned:

• The court has a wide jurisdiction to make orders against third parties that are unwittingly facilitating the wrongdoing of others. One of the best-known exercises of this jurisdiction is to require the disclosure of identifying information from such third parties via a Norwich Pharmacal Order.
• This jurisdiction is not limited to the disclosure of information; it can extend more broadly to making orders aimed at preventing the use of an unwitting third party’s assets to commit or facilitate a wrongdoing (Cartier International AG v British Telecommunications plc and Anor [2018] UKSC 28).
• Nor is this jurisdiction limited to cases where the underlying wrongdoing is the infringement of a private law right; rather, it can also be invoked where the nature of the act is criminal in character (Ashworth Hospital Authority v MGN Limited [2002] UKHL 29).
• Even assuming that certain permutations of the Dynamic Blocking Criteria only breach the 2012 Regulations and not Novo Nordisk’s private IP rights, it will still necessarily involve actions that negatively affect Novo Nordisk, giving it a sufficient basis in law to require the ISPs to take steps to prevent the activities from continuing.

Adam Johnson J likewise found it was appropriate for the court to exercise this jurisdiction in these circumstances given (1) the proposed order was aligned with the interests and support of the MHRA, (2) the proposed order has the potential to plug a gap in the control of the online environment that presently exists and creates a public health risk, and (3) based on the evidence the judge was satisfied Novo Nordisk has the resources and skills available to carry out the relevant and ongoing monitoring with “an impressive degree of rigour and diligence,” and “the potential for interference with legitimate commercial activity is negligible and so there is no real risk of ‘overblocking.’”

The MHRA has been open about the difficulty in monitoring and taking action against online sellers of counterfeit products, and has deployed an AI decision support tool to streamline the process of searching for and identifying potentially infringing sites. Even with such tools, however, the MHRA Criminal Enforcement Unit must still investigate and take action against the identified sites on an individual basis, which is time-consuming.

The addition of company resources to assist with such search and a streamlined process for taking action against infringing sites will greatly enhance the ability to take meaningful action against counterfeit products.

IMPLICATIONS

The novel dynamic blocking mechanism substantially enhances a rights holder’s ability to respond to new forms of alleged online infringement and criminal activity related to pharmaceutical products. Rights holders may monitor online environments closely and consider similar judicial remedies where traditional enforcement is inadequate.

Furthermore, companies marketing prescription-only medicines should remain vigilant about online channels as proliferation of counterfeits can damage reputation, undermine consumer trust, and lead to potential product liability claims. Notably, the order is aimed squarely at sales that are clearly illicit: in other circumstances, the appropriateness of such an order may be more questionable.

Regulators may view dynamic blocking as a valuable tool in the fight against the sale of counterfeit medicines, especially where direct regulatory actions are having limited effect. These decisions highlight the potential collaboration between rights holders, regulatory teams, and the MHRA in this respect.

It remains to be seen whether this type of order would be made in other circumstances outside of the pharmaceutical sphere given the specific factors noted above in support of the judge’s exercise of discretion. While website blocking orders have become fairly common in the UK, they are usually targeted at sites engaged in content piracy or counterfeit consumer goods where regulatory breaches may be less clear cut or have less severe consequences.

In those scenarios, it might be expected that the High Court would apply greater scrutiny to the Dynamic Blocking Criteria and/or build in safeguards against possible “overblocking.”