The global space economy is projected to grow from around $630 billion in 2023 to around $1.8 trillion by 2035, according to 2024 World Economic Forum and McKinsey research. Lower launch costs and wider access to space are enabling private satellite deployments, in-orbit servicing, assembly and manufacturing, and even space tourism. As a result, the number of active satellites in orbit is growing rapidly. Military, civilian, and commercial services are becoming more reliant on shared space infrastructure, while emerging technologies such as In-Space Servicing and Manufacturing (ISAM) will involve greater interaction between spacecraft in orbit.
Through the Space Industry Act 2018 and the Space Industry Regulations 2021, the United Kingdom established the regulatory framework for domestic space launches, commercial spaceflight, and the development of spaceports in the country. The UK Space Strategy concentrates UK resources on four priority areas: (1) satellite communications; (2) space domain awareness (SDA); (3) ISAM; and (4) access to space. It also proposes changes intended to make space activities launched from the United Kingdom easier and less costly for businesses.
Taken together, these proposals create commercial opportunities, while also bringing questions of risk, responsibility, and resilience into sharper focus.
FROM LAUNCHING SATELLITES TO INTERACTING WITH THEM
The UK Space Strategy places ISAM at the centre of the United Kingdom’s plans to develop commercial capabilities in orbit. This includes supporting the development of the expertise and physical infrastructure required to manufacture products in the unique environment of space—including microgravity. Potential benefits include the development of more uniform materials as a result of the lack of sedimentation and buoyancy, and also the high vacuum environment of space, which helps reduce the risk of contamination during manufacturing and of convection heat transfer. These characteristics are particularly useful for innovative, advanced manufacturing—particularly for the production of pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and advanced materials. These are areas in which the United Kingdom sees opportunities to build on existing advanced manufacturing capabilities.
Rather than accepting that a satellite has a finite operational life, service spacecraft could increasingly be used to maintain, move, repair, refuel, or repurpose assets already in orbit. Traditionally, much of the risk associated with a satellite has centred on whether it launches successfully and then performs as intended. ISAM could extend the useful life of existing assets, reduce reliance on replacement launches, and relax some of the physical constraints associated with launching fully assembled systems.
ISAM also creates novel risks related to rendezvous, proximity operations, docking, and servicing. An unsuccessful servicing operation could negatively affect an asset that would otherwise have remained operational. The risk of debris—particularly as orbit becomes more congested—is particularly acute. Any resulting disruption to satellite services could have global consequences for customers who are reliant on them, including energy and utilities providers, financial institutions, airlines, and shipping companies. As these activities develop, incidents involving debris or service disruptions could make questions of causation and responsibility more factually complex.
Unlike incidents involving terrestrial infrastructure, the relevant assets are unlikely to be capable of physical human inspection. Where multiple spacecraft, operators, or systems are involved, reconstructing the sequence of events and ultimately determining what occurred and who was responsible can require piecing together technical data from a number of different sources.
SPACE DOMAIN AWARENESS AND RESPONSIBILITY IN A CROWDED ORBIT
The UK Space Strategy frames SDA as a means of understanding and responding to activity, hazards, and threats in orbit. Although the strategy presents SDA as an operational, safety, and security capability, enhanced tracking and monitoring could also become important in future disputes by helping parties reconstruct incidents and attribute responsibility.
The international legal framework adds another layer of complexity. Under the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, states bear international responsibility for national space activities, including activities carried out by nongovernmental entities, and a state on whose registry a space object is carried retains jurisdiction and control over that object. The 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects established rules governing the liability of launching states for damage caused by space objects, while the 1975 Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space established a registration framework that assists in identifying space objects. Incidents involving operators, objects, or launch arrangements spanning several jurisdictions may therefore engage multiple layers of contractual, domestic regulatory, and international law.
The ability to track and reconstruct events in orbit could prove critical to determining causation and responsibility following such incidents. Where the relevant assets cannot readily be recovered or inspected, the factual record could instead depend on tracking information, commands, communications records, software logs, and satellite imagery. Where more than one spacecraft is involved, the relevant information may be held by different operators, commercial providers, and government bodies. The involvement of multiple actors throughout a space object’s lifecycle further complicates the task of isolating the cause of an incident and attributing responsibility. An incident could raise questions not only about what occurred, but also whether relevant information is available and who controls it.
The UK Space Strategy draws a close connection between ISAM and SDA. Greater interaction between spacecraft heightens the importance of being able to observe and reconstruct events in orbit, not only for safe operation and collision avoidance, but also for establishing causation and responsibility.
CYBERSECURITY AND OPERATIONAL RISK
Cybersecurity forms a notable part of the UK Space Strategy’s focus on space resilience. Among the measures proposed is a UK “Hack-a-Sat” programme, which includes an in-orbit cybersecurity testing satellite to enable industry-led exercises to identify vulnerabilities and assess satellite cybersecurity countermeasures.
The initiative reflects the growing importance of cyber resilience to space operations and calls for measures to strengthen the sector’s resilience and preparedness. As the UK Space Strategy envisages greater integration of commercial space capabilities with defence and other critical services, cyber incidents could have wider consequences, including service disruption, contractual claims, third-party liability, and insurance disputes.
Cyber incidents could also complicate the reconstruction and attribution of operational failures. A loss of functionality might result from a technical malfunction, compromised commands, interference with communications, or malicious access, making the cause of an incident difficult to establish without access to telemetry, system logs, cybersecurity records, and other technical information.
INSURANCE AND SPACE LOSS
The UK Space Strategy also announces reforms intended to reduce insurance costs and support innovation in the UK space insurance market. Novel space activities could give rise to unusual forms of loss, raising questions as to the scope of insurance cover and the allocation of risk between insurers and operators.
Those questions could be particularly difficult where there is no conventional physical loss. An ISAM incident could leave a satellite operational but with reduced functionality or a shortened useful life, while a cyber incident could disrupt services without physically damaging the asset. Key issues include whether an event falls within the scope of cover, whether any exclusions apply, and how the loss should be valued.
Operators, counterparties, and insurers may therefore need to consider how policies and contracts address loss of functionality, degradation of asset life, interruption of satellite-enabled services, cyber events, and liabilities arising from servicing or interacting with another operator’s asset. As new services develop, questions may also arise over how risk is allocated between the owner of an asset, a servicing provider, and other parties involved in an operation.
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESSES
For companies developing, financing, operating, servicing, or insuring space assets, the UK Space Strategy may have implications beyond the regulatory framework governing whether an activity can take place.
Businesses may wish to consider
- how existing contracts allocate responsibility for proximity operations, servicing, and other interactions between spacecraft;
- what technical data should be retained or made available following an incident;
- how cyber and operational events interact with insurance coverage; and
- whether existing risk-allocation frameworks adequately address reduced functionality or shortened asset life in circumstances where an asset has not been physically destroyed.
These issues may become increasingly important as commercial relationships in orbit become more complex and as services are provided across multiple spacecraft, operators, and jurisdictions.
LOOKING AHEAD
The UK Space Strategy sets out the UK government’s plans for the space sector through 2030 and beyond. Much will depend on how the government translates the strategy into funding programmes, regulatory reforms, technical standards, and commercial incentives. It will be important to see how these proposals are implemented, particularly as emerging technologies move towards wider commercial deployment and commercial space capabilities become more closely integrated with critical infrastructure, defence, and national security.
As ISAM and other interactive space activities move towards wider deployment, businesses may wish to monitor not only the regulatory framework governing those activities, but also the contractual, evidentiary, cybersecurity, and insurance frameworks that may shape how risk is allocated when something goes wrong. Questions of causation, attribution, and responsibility may evolve alongside the technologies themselves.
