SEPs are increasingly important to a range of products and industries, including telecommunications, computers, automotives, wireless devices, and medical technologies. The UK government, recognising the importance of SEPs for economic growth and innovation, held a public consultation to assess the functioning of the SEP ecosystem in the UK and the need for reform to the system.
Taking place from July to October 2025, the consultation asked a series of open and closed questions on the SEP ecosystem. It received 93 responses from a broad spectrum of stakeholders based in the United Kingdom, United States, Europe, and Asia, including SEP rightsholders, implementers, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), large businesses, legal professionals, academics, and international bodies.
Having analysed the consultation submissions, the UK government (via the UK IPO) published its Response to the consultation on 13 October 2026.[1]
MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT WILL NOT TAKE FORWARD
Notably, the Response indicated that the evidence did not support several proposed measures that had been previously canvassed. In particular:
No Establishment of a Rate-Determination Track Within the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court
While consultation respondents broadly supported faster, more affordable, and more predictable means of resolving FRAND disputes, the government concluded that the evidence did not establish a sufficiently clear and workable route through a dedicated track.
Its concerns included the difficulty of separating the rate-setting itself from wider disputes between the parties, the evidential and methodological complexity of FRAND assessment, and the risk that prioritising speed and cost could compromise the quality of outcomes.
Instead, the government will pursue development of two complementary procedures that can assist at different stages of a licensing dispute, as described further below.
No Legislative Changes in Relation to the Availability of Injunctions in SEP Disputes
The government considered the existing framework governing injunctions in SEP disputes to be broadly adequate and concluded that the consultation evidence does not support legislative change. The Response notes in particular that the current approach is internationally respected and provides necessary flexibility and proportionality to the parties.
To address concerns regarding bad-faith negotiation tactics and the challenges faced by SMEs, the government will instead look to develop SEP licensing guidance with the support of a technical working group that includes relevant industry and legal services (note this guidance will be distinct from the FRAND licensing guidelines discussed below). It will focus on the transparent and timely engagement by both SEP rightsholders and implementers in licensing negotiations. The UK IPO expects to begin work on this guidance “promptly.”
No Standalone ADR Mechanism/Expansion of the UK IPO's Mediation Service for SEP Disputes
The government concluded that the limited use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in this field is not due to a lack of services but rather such factors as information asymmetry, confidentiality concerns, uncertainty over outcomes, and incentives for one or both parties to not engage in the process.
The government will instead focus on making it easier for parties to use ADR effectively and at an earlier stage in a dispute, a strategy which will be developed alongside other potential tools arising from this consultation.
No UK IPO Essentiality Checking Service
Uncertainty over feasibility and delivery, operational cost and complexity, interaction with existing commercial services, and the risk of drawing the government into a quasi-judicial role resulted in the rejection of a UK IPO–led essentiality checking service (although further study of a separate FRAND opinion service will proceed as described below).
Instead, the UK IPO will work with commercial providers, patent offices, standard development organisations, and other stakeholders to encourage improvements in the quality and usability of essentiality information. The government will also explore non-binding principles for best practice in addressing matters such as claim-to-standard mapping, approaches to SEP sampling, and assessor expertise.
MEASURES THE GOVERNMENT WILL EXPLORE OR DEVELOP
The Response identified several measures which the evidence suggests could make SEP licensing more transparent, predictable, and accessible. In particular:
Court-Anchored FRAND Determination Mechanism
The government will explore the possibility of a court-based early neutral evaluation (ENE)-style FRAND determination mechanism. This is a type of ADR wherein an independent evaluator (in this proposed court-based process, a judge) reviews the matter and provides a non-binding opinion to the parties.
This would not create a standalone rate-setting procedure—rather, it could introduce a structured procedure for FRAND cases once a claim has been issued pursuant to the courts’ existing case-management powers.
Related considerations that will be investigated by the government include possibly providing for an automatic stay of a claim in appropriate FRAND cases to enable parties to engage in ENE (or another appropriate form of ADR) and costs consequences where parties fail to engage constructively.
UK IPO–Led FRAND Opinion Service
The UK IPO is engaging stakeholders this autumn to assess the feasibility of a voluntary, non-binding service providing an indicative view on whether a proposed licence offer falls within a plausible FRAND range.
This service could support early licensing negotiations, but would not determine final liability, adjudicate patent validity or infringement, or impose a binding global FRAND rate. It would also promote greater general transparency for FRAND disputes through potentially publishing “anonymised outputs or benchmarks,” subject to confidentiality safeguards.
The government has kicked off its call for evidence on this potential service,[2] which will run for eight weeks and close on 15 December.
FRAND Licensing Guidelines
The government intends to develop non-binding guidelines that will set out the practical steps and procedural considerations for using the court-anchored FRAND determination mechanism and any voluntary UK IPO–led FRAND opinion service. The guidelines would not be intended to prescribe outcomes or alter the FRAND legal framework.
SEP-Specific Pre-Action Protocol
The government will assess the feasibility of a targeted SEP-specific pre-action protocol within the existing civil procedure rules. Any resulting framework would be narrowly scoped given that it would need to be proportionate, avoid creating unnecessary burdens for the parties, and complement existing case law and industry practices.
Increased Licensing Transparency
The government will look to introduce a measure for the voluntary disclosure of standard-related patent information (at patent grant and, for EP(UK) patents, at the renewal stage, in relation to future standards only) at the UK IPO; this will not involve verification or validation of essentiality and is not intended to interfere with declarations made to standards development organisations.
The government will work with industry to agree what information can be reasonably provided to balance the interests of SEP rightsholders and implementers.
IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
The potential reforms outlined in the Response are intended to deliver tangible benefits for businesses navigating SEP licensing in the UK, with a particular focus on reducing barriers for SMEs. The proposals for a court-anchored FRAND determination mechanism and voluntary UK IPO–led FRAND opinion service may offer parties a faster, less adversarial pathway to resolving licensing disagreements, potentially lowering litigation costs and encouraging earlier settlements.
The impact of these proposals will ultimately depend on how they are implemented and whether parties engage with the proposed processes and follow the relevant guidance. While the UK courts currently play an important role in FRAND dispute resolution, SEP licensing takes place within a truly global ecosystem and thus, to be effective, any guidance, opinion service, or information disclosure regime—particularly voluntary ones—would have to be consistent with and complementary to similar initiatives being developed elsewhere.
The suggestion of a new ENE-style process and SEP-specific pre-action protocol within the court’s existing rate-setting procedures provides an interesting and potentially promising framework for bolstering the objective of effective dispute resolution. For example, ENE procedures have proven effective in other areas of law and can provide a useful “reality check” to encourage parties towards settlement.
One challenge in the proposed judge-led process could be having enough judges to participate in the ENE-style determination given the evaluator would typically not be able to sit as judge for the trial of the dispute. Further, a desire for a rapid, binding determination of a FRAND dispute may outweigh the benefits of a compulsory ADR process in certain cases. Consequently, the details of any proposed implementation are likely to be important and are worth monitoring closely.
