LawFlash

US Supreme Court Says Egregious Strike Misconduct Subject to Employer State Court Damages Action

June 12, 2023

In a recent 8-1 decision, the US Supreme Court held that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) does not preempt state claims against unions for intentional property damage during a strike. The decision reaffirms the Act’s limits and the care that unions should take when engaging in strikes and other job actions.

Relying on well-settled National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) law, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that strikers are not afforded the Act’s protections if they “fail to take reasonable precautions to protect their employer’s [property] from foreseeable, imminent danger due to the sudden cessation of work.”[1] The Court held that the employer’s claim against the union for damages was not preempted and should be returned to state court for further proceedings.

Glacier Northwest, a concrete company, sued Teamsters Local 174 in Washington state court seeking damages caused by the union’s deliberate conduct in a 2017 strike. As alleged in Glacier’s complaint, concrete is highly perishable and, once mixed, “time is of the essence.”[2]

The Teamsters commenced its strike when it knew that Glacier had begun mixing and loading substantial batches of concrete into its ready-mix trucks for delivery. Ignoring delivery orders and returning the trucks with fully loaded and mixed concrete, the drivers went out on strike. Some drivers abandoned their trucks without even advising Glacier.

The Supreme Court reversed a Washington state high court decision finding that federal labor law preempted the claims against the union under Garmon.[3] In a fact-specific decision, the majority found that the Garmon preemption doctrine that blocks most labor disputes litigated outside the Board processes does not apply to claims where unions failed to take “reasonable precautions” to safeguard an employer’s property during strikes.[4]

The Supreme Court’s majority opinion focused on the union’s intentional destruction of property and found the strike was conducted “in a manner designed to compromise the safety of Glacier’s trucks and destroy its concrete.”[5]

Dissent and Concurring Opinions Shed Light on Justices’ Views

In a concurring opinion, Supreme Court Justices Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch said they are willing to reconsider whether the NLRA supports Garmon’s “unusual” preemption history. Relying heavily on their textualist background, the justices made clear that “any proper preemption inquiry must focus on the NLRA’s text and ask whether federal law and state law ‘are in logical contradiction,’ such that it is impossible to comply with both.”[6]

Supreme Court Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the lone dissenter, demonstrated her deference to the NLRB, highlighting the fact that the Board’s general counsel issued a complaint alleging that the union’s strike conduct is protected by federal labor law, which remains pending at the NLRB. According to Justice Jackson, the Supreme Court should have suspended its adjudication of the case until the NLRB had completed its prosecution.

Practical Implications

Glacier was a fact-driven decision that went to great lengths to say the Supreme Court was not rewriting the law. However, the decision is another recent example of the Court finding that the Act’s protections are not unlimited, this time in the context of strike activity. While ultimately the Garmon preemption remains intact, the decision means unions will need to be more careful to consider the potential harm when engaging in strikes and other job actions. Not doing so could subject them to potential state law tort actions by employers.  

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[1] Glacier Northwest, Inc. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 174, No. 21-1449 (slip op.) (citations omitted).

[2] Id. at 4.

[3] San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).

[4] Id. at 8.

[5] Id.

[6] Id. at 4 (Thomas, J., concurring).